Essays on stock performance, regulation, and financial stability of banks and insurers by Irresberger, Felix
Essays on Stock Performance,
Regulation, and Financial Stability of
Banks and Insurers
INAUGURALDISSERTATION
zur
Erlangung des akademischen Grades eines
Doctor rerum politicarum (Dr. rer. pol.)
der
Fakulta¨t fu¨r Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften
der
Technischen Universita¨t Dortmund
vorgelegt von
Felix Irresberger
Master of Science
aus Essen
2015
CONTENTS a
Contents
List of Figures I
List of Tables III
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Publication details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2 Systemic Risk of Insurers Around the Globe 12
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.2 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.2.1 Sample construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.2.2 Systemic risk measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.2.3 Explanatory variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.2.4 Descriptive statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.3 The determinants of systemic risk of insurers . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.3.1 Panel regressions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.3.2 Additional analyses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.3.3 Insurers and the systemic risk in the financial sector . . . . . . 38
2.3.4 Robustness checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3 Size Is Everything: How Should We Measure Systemic Relevance of Banks
and Insurers? 43
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.2 Related literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
CONTENTS b
3.3 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.3.1 Sample construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.3.2 Systemic risk measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.3.3 Explanatory variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.3.4 Descriptive statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.4 The determinants of systemic relevance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.4.1 Cross-sectional regressions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.4.2 Probit regressions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.4.3 Robustness checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
4 Bank Stock Performance and Bank Regulation Around the Globe 65
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4.2 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.2.1 Sample construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.2.2 Bank characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
4.2.3 Regulatory and macroeconomic environment . . . . . . . . . 76
4.2.4 Additional variables controlling for possible government bailouts 79
4.2.5 Bank stock performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.3 The influence of regulation on stock performance . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.3.1 Does stricter bank regulation lead to worse stock performance? 85
4.3.2 Implicit bailout guarantees and bank stock performance . . . 96
4.3.3 Banks’ stock performance during crises times . . . . . . . . . 100
4.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
5 Crisis Sentiment and Insurer Performance 104
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
5.2 Data and variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
5.2.1 Sample selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
5.2.2 General crisis sentiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
5.2.3 Crisis Sentiment Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
5.2.4 Further control variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
5.2.5 Insurer performance and descriptive statistics . . . . . . . . . 118
CONTENTS c
5.3 Does crisis sentiment drive insurer performance? . . . . . . . . . . . 122
5.3.1 Baseline panel regressions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
5.3.2 Robustness checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
5.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
6 Depositor Sentiment 132
6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
6.2 Depositor sentiment and depositor attention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
6.3 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
6.3.1 Google Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
6.3.2 Depositor sentiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
6.3.3 Depositor attention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
6.3.4 Other data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
6.4 Empirical strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
6.5 Empirical results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
6.5.1 Changes in U.S. bank deposits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
6.5.2 Depositor sentiment, depositor attention, and changes in deposits152
6.5.3 Does deposit insurance attention prevent bank runs? . . . . . 160
6.5.4 Why do depositors search for FDIC? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
6.6 Robustness and further analyses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
6.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
A Supplementary Material for Chapter 2 171
A.1 Sample insurance companies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
A.2 Variable definitions and data sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
B Supplementary Material for Chapter 3 176
B.1 Variable definitions and data sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
C Supplementary Material for Chapter 4 179
C.1 Variable definitions and data sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
D Supplementary Material for Chapter 5 182
D.1 Additional figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
CONTENTS d
D.2 Variable definitions and data sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
D.3 Sample insurance companies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
E Supplementary Material for Chapter 6 190
E.1 Variable definitions and data sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
E.2 Institutional details on the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation . . 192
E.3 Further description of the sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
E.4 Further analyses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
E.5 Robustness checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
E.6 Heckman two-stage selection procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
Bibliography 212
LIST OF FIGURES I
List of Figures
2.1 Time evolution of the systemic risk measures in the period from 2000
to 2012. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.2 Time evolution of systemic risk measures for (systemically relevant)
insurers in the period from 2000 to 2012. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.3 Time evolution of CATFIN. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
4.1 Time evolution of bank stock performances. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.2 Time evolution of banks’ stock performances by country. . . . . . . . 82
5.1 Google search volume indices for “financial crisis” and related search
terms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
5.2 Crisis sentiment and insurer stock prices 2004-2013. . . . . . . . . . 115
6.1 Comparing the search terms “FDIC” and “deposit insurance” with
Google Trends. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
6.2 Distribution of states with high and low search volume. . . . . . . . . 143
6.3 Time evolution of FDIC-index. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
6.4 Heat maps of changes in demand deposits. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
6.5 Heat maps of changes in time deposits. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
6.6 Time evolution of changes in deposits. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
D.1 International bank and insurer stock prices 2006-2013. . . . . . . . . 183
D.2 Illustration of Google Trends search. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
D.3 Time evolution of the Crisis Sentiment Index. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
E.1 Number of banks per state. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
E.2 Distribution of demand deposits across the United States . . . . . . . 194
LIST OF FIGURES II
E.3 Time evolution of changes in deposits (10% winsorization). . . . . . . 204
LIST OF TABLES III
List of Tables
2.1 Descriptive statistics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.2 Descriptive statistics for main variables of interest: life and non-life
insurer. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.3 Descriptive statistics for main variables of interest: Global Systemi-
cally Important Insurers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.4 Baseline panel regressions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.5 Panel regressions - Large insurers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.6 Panel regressions for U.S. and non-U.S. insurers. . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.7 Panel regressions for the crisis period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.1 Geographic sample distribution. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.2 Descriptive statistics: banks and insurers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.3 Cross-sectional regression of systemic risk of banks. . . . . . . . . . 56
3.4 Cross-sectional regression of systemic risk of banks. . . . . . . . . . 57
3.5 Cross-sectional regression of systemic risk of insurers. . . . . . . . . 58
3.6 Cross-sectional regression of systemic risk of insurers. . . . . . . . . 59
3.7 Systemic relevance of banks: probit regressions. . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.8 Systemic relevance of insurers: probit regressions. . . . . . . . . . . . 62
4.1 Distribution of bank years. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
4.2 Summary statistics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.3 Correlations of independent variables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.4 Correlations of independent variables (continued). . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.5 Regressions of a bank’s stock performance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.6 Tier 1 capital and banks’ stock performance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
LIST OF TABLES IV
4.7 Regressions of a bank’s stock performance and interconnectedness. . . 97
4.8 Systemic size and bank’s stock performance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
4.9 Bank-specific and regulatory interactions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
5.1 Descriptive statistics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
5.2 Descriptive statistics for insurer-quarters in the first and fourth crisis
sentiment quartiles (Q1 2006 - Q4 2010). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
5.3 Panel regressions of insurer performance 2004-2012. . . . . . . . . . 124
5.4 Robustness checks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
6.1 Summary Statistics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
6.2 GMM-sys regressions of changes in deposits. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
6.3 GMM-sys regressions on changes in deposits with interaction terms. . 159
6.4 Panel logistic regression of large withdrawals and gains in demand de-
posits. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
6.5 Why do depositors search for deposit insurance? . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
A.1 Sample insurance companies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
A.1 Sample insurance companies (continued). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
A.2 Variable definitions and data sources. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
A.2 Variable definitions and data sources (continued). . . . . . . . . . . . 175
B.1 Variable definitions and data sources. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
B.1 Variable definitions and data sources (continued). . . . . . . . . . . . 178
C.1 Variable definitions and data sources. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
C.1 Variable definitions and data sources (continued). . . . . . . . . . . . 181
D.1 Variable definitions and data sources. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
D.1 Variable definitions and data sources (continued). . . . . . . . . . . . 187
D.2 Sample insurance companies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
D.2 Sample insurance companies (continued). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
E.1 Variable definitions and data sources. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
E.2 Additional GMM-sys regressions of changes in deposits. . . . . . . . 196
LIST OF TABLES V
E.3 GMM-sys regressions of changes in deposits (TARP). . . . . . . . . . 197
E.4 GMM-sys regressions of changes in deposits for banks in quartiles of
non-performing loans ratio and insured deposits ratio. . . . . . . . . . 199
E.5 Panel logistic regression of large withdrawals and gains in demand de-
posits for banks in quartiles of non-performing loans ratio and insured
deposits ratio. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
E.6 GMM-sys regressions of changes in demand deposit ratios. . . . . . . 202
E.7 GMM-sys regressions of changes in deposits (5% winsorization). . . . 203
E.8 Pooled OLS regression. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
E.9 Panel logistic regression of large withdrawals and gains in demand de-
posits (other definitions). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206
E.10 GMM-sys regressions of changes in deposits (mean FDIC). . . . . . . 208
E.11 Panel logistic regression of large withdrawals and gains in demand de-
posits (other FDIC). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209
E.12 Heckman two-stage selection model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211
1Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
In October 2008, the U.S. congress authorized a total of $ 700 billion for the stabiliza-
tion of heavily distressed financial institutions via the Emergency Economic Stabiliza-
tion Act. Not only banks but also insurance companies unexpectedly had to be bailed
out by the government to rebuild confidence in the stability of the financial system.
Since then, financial economists and regulators are having ongoing discussions about
the origins and consequences of the near collapse of the financial sector and about the
actions required to preserve financial stability in the future.
This dissertation empirically discusses and investigates the impact of regulation,
monitoring, and supervision of banks and insurers on financial stability. Further, it
investigates how investor sentiment, as a measure of individual or market participants’
perceptions of financial institutions and firm fundamentals, affects the shareholder val-
ues of insurers and movements in bank deposits.
The financial system faces numerous risks that could lead to its, at least partial, col-
lapse. As the recent financial crisis has revealed, the default of single institutions can
create distress across other business partners and thereby, trigger a cascade of events
that destabilize the (financial) system. For example, banks that are connected through
the interbank market are more likely to be exposed to the default or to toxic assets
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of a counterparty and thus, face higher systemic risk. On the other hand, the default
of financial institutions with a high market share could pose and spread devastating
risks across other entities. Clearly, this situation is more likely for larger banks that
excessively engage in financial markets. Not only word of mouth but also regulators
denote such institutions as “too-big-to-fail”, “too-interconnected-to-fail”, or formally
“Systemically Important Financial Institutions” (SIFIs) as their default would cause
severe damages to the financial system (see Financial Stability Board, 2011). Conse-
quently, these institutions have a higher probability to be bailed out by governments.
Before the financial crisis, these financial institutions were thought to be banks only,
but since the government bailout of the insurance company American International
Group (AIG), it is clear that systemic risk is not limited to the banking sector. How-
ever, the exposure and contribution of insurers to systemic financial distress is thought
to be tied to those insurers who engage more in non-core activities such as extensive
use of derivatives. In reaction to the global financial crisis, the Bank for International
Settlements (BIS), the Financial Stability Board (FSB), and the International Associa-
tion of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) published a list of systemically important banks
and insurers along with a methodology to identify these relevant banks and insurers
(see Financial Stability Board, 2011, IAIS, 2013, BIS, 2011). In this framework, the
key indicators of systemic relevance include the size, leverage, complexity, and inter-
connectedness of a financial firm. Members of this list of institutions are subject to
stronger monitoring and have tighter capital restrictions to mitigate the likelihood of
failure. While this might be useful to limit the default risk of an individual institution, it
could also limit business opportunities as well as profits and create moral hazard since
financial managers could be driven to higher risk-taking strategies, e.g., using more
investment banking instead of the core banking business to cope with the restrictions.
Another facet that is sometimes neglected in the dicussion of financial stability is
the behavioral aspect to analyze investors’ decisions. For example, some insurers ex-
perienced huge losses in shareholder value, even though most of the insurers were not
distressed and thus, contributors to the banking crisis. This valuation might have orig-
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inated in the attitudes of investors measuring insurer stocks with the same yardstick
as bank stocks. Market-wide or idiosyncratic sentiment not only affects asset prices
but also influences decision-making in the real economy. It has been shown that nega-
tive sentiment, past experiences, or possible “too-big-to-fail” perceptions can prevent
investors from using specific vehicles or institutions for their investments (see, e.g.,
Osili and Paulson, 2014, Oliveira et al., 2014). Also, a “bank run” as a classical exam-
ple of the impact of investor behavior on financial stability has long been a motivator
for financial regulation. Thus, the importance of analyzing the influence of investor
behavior on financial stability is not negligible.
This dissertation contributes to the discussion on financial stability and regulation
in the form of five independent articles that empirically explore different facets of
systemic risk of banks and insurers.
Chapter two and three deal with the topic of systemic risk in the insurance sector
and explore the methodology of regulators to identify systemically important banks
and insurers. Before the bailout of AIG, neither economists nor regulators expected
insurance companies to suffer from systemic risk effects or to be systemically rele-
vant enough to even contribute to it. Insurers are not as vulnerable to runs or liquidity
shortages as banks and also smaller in size and less interconnected. The paper in
chapter two is the first to empirically investigate the time evolution of the proposed
systemic risk measures for an international panel of insurers. Despite ongoing de-
bates on the key elements that induce systemic risk, there is still no consensus on the
proper measurement of such risks. The three most prominent systemic risk measures
suggested in the literature are the Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES) proposed by
Acharya et al. (2010), ∆CoVaR by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2014), and SRISK by
Brownlees and Engle (2012), which are used in this study. Systemic risk in the insur-
ance sector is expected to be driven by the insurer’s size, its interconnectedness with
the rest of the financial sector, and the engagement in non-core activities that do not
underwrite risk. Key variables in this analysis include the size and leverage of an in-
surer but also a measure of interconnectedness introduced in Billio et al. (2012) that
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is constructed using a principal component analysis of the covariance of financial in-
stitutions’ stock returns. The regression analyses reveal that the interconnectedness of
a large insurer drives its exposure to systemic risk and that the systemic risk contri-
bution is higher for levered insurers. Although the proposed measures are considered
by regulators, they have been heavily critized to fall short in measuring systemic risk
accurately, since they are mostly based on the equity returns of the firms (see, e.g.,
Benoit et al., 2013).
The follow-up study presented in chapter three explores the methodology of regu-
lators to identify systemically important banks and insurers using cross-sectional re-
gressions for the crisis period. Using the two common measures MES and ∆CoVaR as
dependent variables yields counterintuitive results when employing the key indicators
of systemic risk as explanatory variables. For example, size does not play a major role
for both exposure and contribution to systemic risk of banks and insurers and higher
leverage and interconnectedness even decrease MES and ∆CoVaR. Furthermore, the
study explains the nomination of banks and insurers to be “systemically relevant” via
probit regressions on proposed drivers of systemic relevance. Interestingly, the size of
a bank or insurer seems to be the key indicator when identifying SIFIs.
The fourth chapter of this dissertation is dedicated to the relation of stock perfor-
mance and differences in regulation and supervision of banks around the world. While
economists and regulators are calling for increased supervision and higher capital re-
quirements, banks argue that these tougher restrictions dramatically decrease profits
and, eventually, shareholder value and capital buffers. As the first comprehensive study
on the interplay of annual stock performance and bank regulation and bank supervi-
sion standards in different countries, a large international panel is analyzed over the
time period from 1999 to 2012, which makes use of a database on a country’s regula-
tory and supervisory system taken from Barth et al. (2013a). The main finding is that
higher capital requirements (Tier-one capital) are indeed negatively related to a bank’s
stock performance. This relation, however, is reversed in times of crisis, during which
stocks of well-capitalized banks perform significantly better.
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In great parts, regulation and supervision of financial institutions are intended to
limit excessive risk-taking of financial managers and shareholders, which displays the
importance of behavioral facets of financial stability. Therefore, the final two chapters
of this dissertation deal with the measurement of risks associated with investor behav-
ior. It has long been recognized that sentiment plays an important role in financial
markets, e.g., asset prices that are affected by noise traders (see, e.g., De Long et al.,
1990), and the decision making of investors. Very often, sentiment measures have
been derived by analyzing media outlets and by using linguistic techniques (see, e.g.,
Tetlock, 2007, Baker and Wurgler, 2006, Antweiler and Frank, 2004). In the informa-
tion age, however, researchers are given new tools to measure active investor attention
to specific topics instead of relying on passive sentiment measures. A new branch of
literature is benefiting from internet search volume data, which has been used to detect
and predict economic trends, such as unemployment claims or influenza epidemics
(see, e.g., Choi and Varian, 2009, Ginsberg et al., 2009). The final two chapters build
upon this growing literature and analyze the impact of investor sentiment on insurer
stocks and movements in U.S. bank deposits.
Chapter five follows Da et al. (2011) and employs internet search volume data from
Google Inc. for stock ticker symbols to propose an index for “crisis sentiment”. The
Crisis Sentiment Index is constructed using correlations of search volumes of crisis
related search terms and the search volume for ticker symbols to proxy the association
of a single insurer stock with financial crises. Using these indices, the hypothesis that
insurer stocks suffered to a large extent from bad sentiment and association with ad-
verse effects from the banking crisis is then tested. The results of panel regressions of
the insurers’ stock performance on market-level and individual crisis sentiment show
that stocks of large insurers were indeed negatively affected by idiosyncratic crisis sen-
timent and thus, were assessed irrationally rather than by actual exposure to the crisis.
Also, market-level crisis sentiment is found to be highly significant factor explaining
negative insurers’ stock performance for the period from 2004 to 2012.
The final chapter of this dissertation empirically investigates the impact of deposi-
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tor attention and depositor sentiment on movements in bank deposits. Building upon
the ideas of the theoretical framework for bank run models from Diamond and Dybvig
(1983), the internet search volume on the “Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation”
(FDIC) is used as a proxy for household-level attention to deposit insurance to test
whether more knowledge of deposit insurance mitigates the likelihood of a bank run.
In theory, a deposit insurance scheme is the optimal way to hinder rational and in-
formed depositors from withdrawing their bank deposits out of fear that a bank might
fail. Analyzing a panel of FDIC-insured banks in the United States reveals that higher
levels of attention to deposit insurance are positively related to quarterly changes in
deposits and thus, supports the theoretical results. Additionally, a measure for house-
hold sentiment (see Da et al., 2015) is included in the panel regressions and is found
to have a strong negative influence on movements in demand and time deposits for
smaller and medium-sized banks. For larger banks, however, a higher level of bad sen-
timent induces positive flows in bank deposits, which is in line with many analyses that
propose “too-big-to-fail”-effects for larger banks. Also, the results from logistic panel
regressions in chapter six suggest that more information retrieval on deposit insur-
ance mitigates the probability of extreme deposit withdrawals. Thus, the final chapter
stresses the importance of an adequate assessment of behavioral risks for preserving
financial stability.
This dissertation consists of five chapters that can be read independent of each other
and are based on distinct research papers. The following section gives an overview of
the papers and provides publication details.
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1.2 Publication details
Paper I (Chapter 2):
Systemic Risk of Insurers Around the Globe
Authors:
Christopher Bierth, Felix Irresberger, Gregor Weiß
Abstract:
We study the exposure and contribution of 253 international life and non-life insurers
to systemic risk between 2000 and 2012. For our full sample period, we find systemic
risk in the international insurance sector to be small. In contrast, the contribution
of insurers to the fragility of the financial system peaked during the recent financial
crisis. In our panel regressions, we find the interconnectedness of large insurers with
the insurance sector to be a significant driver of the insurers’ exposure to systemic risk.
In contrast, the contribution of insurers to systemic risk appears to be primarily driven
by the insurers’ leverage.
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performance of insurers during the crisis was due to such negative investor sentiment
accounting for the insurer’s actual exposure to systemic risk. We find that market-
level crisis sentiment was a highly significant predictor of stock performance between
2004 and 2012. During the financial crisis, market-level crisis sentiment affected the
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Chapter 2
Systemic Risk of Insurers Around the
Globe
“SIFIs are financial institutions whose distress or disorderly failure, because of their
size, complexity and systemic interconnectedness, would cause significant disruption
to the wider financial system and economic activity.”
Financial Stability Board, 11/04/2011
2.1 Introduction
At the climax of the financial crisis of 2007-2009, American International Group
(AIG) became the first example of an insurance company that required (and received)
a bailout due to it being regarded as systemically important. Not only did AIG’s near-
collapse come to the surprise of most economists who considered systemic risk to be
confined to the banking sector, but it also spurred a realignment of insurance regula-
tion towards a macroprudential supervision of so-called global systemically important
insurers (G-SIIs). As a consequence, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) together with
the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) recently published a list
of nine G-SIIs which will ultimately face higher capital and loss absorbency require-
ments. In their methodology, insurers are deemed to be of systemic relevance to the
2.1. INTRODUCTION 13
global financial sector, if they are of such size and global interconnectedness that their
default would cause severe disruptions in the financial sector and subsequently the real
economy.
However, the (heavily criticized)1 methodology proposed by the IAIS has only un-
dergone limited empirical scrutiny so far. Most importantly, the relation between the
interconnectedness and systemic risk of insurers has not been analyzed before. In this
paper, we intend to fill this gap in the literature by investigating whether the intercon-
nectedness of insurers with the global financial sector in addition to their size increased
the insurers’ individual contribution to systemic risk. As the main result of our analysis
of a panel of global insurers from 2000 to 2012, we find that interconnectedness only
increases the systemic vulnerability of large life and non-life insurers. In contrast, the
impact of an insurer’s interconnectedness on its contribution to systemic risk is much
less clear.
Economists have long neglected the potential of the insurance sector to destabilize
the whole financial system. In contrast to banks, insurers are not subject to depositor
runs and thus do not face the risk of a sudden liquidity drain,2 hold more capital (see
Harrington, 2009) and are less interconnected horizontally with the rest of the financial
sector. However, the case of American International Group (AIG) showed that insurers
can become systemically important nonetheless if they engage too heavily in business
activities outside the traditional insurance sector. As a consequence, the Financial Sta-
bility Board urged the IAIS to identify G-SIIs that could potentially destabilize the
global financial sector and to implement new regulation for these insurers. Building on
the experiences made during the AIG case, the IAIS (2013) recently published a pro-
posal for a methodology for identifying G-SIIs that cites non-core and non-insurance
activities, insurer size and interconnectedness as the major drivers of systemic risk in
1For example, the Secretary General of the Geneva Association, John Fitzpatrick, criticized the IAIS
indicators for penalizing risk diversification.
2Although one could possibly think of an “insurer run” on life insurance policies, this possibility appears
to be highly unlikely as insurance customers are often protected by guarantees and as cancelling a long-
term life insurance policy often implies the realization of severe losses. Consequently, there exists
no example of a default of an insurer in the past that caused significant contagion effects (see, e.g.,
Eling and Pankoke, 2014).
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the insurance industry.
Both the question whether insurers can actually become systemically important and
the question whether the IAIS’s proposed methodology is suitable for identifying G-
SIIs remain relatively unanswered in the literature. Early treatments of the topic of sys-
temic risk in insurance include the works by Acharya et al. (2009), Harrington (2009)
and Cummins and Weiss (2014).3 In the latter, it is hypothesized that non-core ac-
tivities and high degrees of interconnectedness are the primary causes of insurers’
systemic relevance. The interconnectedness of insurers is also empirically analyzed
by Billio et al. (2012) who argue that illiquid assets of insurers could create systemic
risks in times of financial crisis. In a related study, Baluch et al. (2011) conclude that
systemic risks exist in the insurance sector even though they are smaller than in bank-
ing. More importantly, systemic risk in insurance appears to have grown partly as a
consequence to the increasing interconnectedness of insurers and their activities out-
side the traditional insurance business. Chen et al. (2014) put a special emphasis on the
insurance sector but find in their analysis of credit default swap and intraday stock price
data that the insurance sector is exposed but does not contribute to systemic risks in
the banking sector. While the former two studies are only concerned with the intercon-
nectedness of banks and insurers, Weiß and Mu¨hlnickel (2014b) also study the impact
of size, leverage and other idiosyncratic characteristics included in the IAIS methodol-
ogy on the systemic risk exposure and contribution of U.S. insurers during the financial
crisis.4 Most importantly, they find that insurer size seems to have been a major driver
of the systemic risk exposure and contribution of U.S. insurers. Several of the IAIS
indicators (like, e.g., geographical diversification), however, do not appear to be signif-
icantly related to the systemic risk of insurers. Finally, Weiß and Mu¨hlnickel (2014a)
support the too-big-to-fail conjecture for insurers by showing that insurer mergers tend
to increase the systemic risk of the acquiring insurers.
3Other analyses of systemic risk in insurance include the works of Eling and Schmeiser (2010),
Lehmann and Hofmann (2010) and van Lelyveld et al. (2011).
4In a related study, Cummins and Weiss (2014) analyze the characteristics of U.S. insurers that are
systemically important based on the insurers’ SRISK (see Acharya et al., 2012).
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We complement the existing empirical literature on systemic risk in insurance by
performing the first panel regression analysis of the systemic risk exposure and con-
tribution of international insurers. In particular, we test hypotheses that size and inter-
connectedness could drive the systemic importance of international insurers. To mea-
sure an insurer’s exposure and contribution to the fragility of the financial sector, we
follow Anginer et al. (2014b,a) and Weiß and Mu¨hlnickel (2014a,b) and employ the
Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES) of Acharya et al. (2010) and ∆CoVaR methodol-
ogy of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2014), respectively. We then estimate these mea-
sures for a sample of 253 international life and non-life insurers for the period from
2000 to 2012 and perform panel regressions of the quarterly MES and ∆CoVaR esti-
mates. As independent variables, we use insurer-specific and macroeconomic variables
that have been discussed in the literature as potential drivers of systemic risk. Most
importantly, we employ the measure of interconnectedness proposed by Billio et al.
(2012) which is based on a principal component analysis of the stock returns of finan-
cial institutions.5
Based on a sample of 253 life and non-life insurers, we find systemic risk in the
international insurance sector to be small in comparison to previous findings in the
literature for banks. However, confirming the results of Baluch et al. (2011), we find a
strong upward trend in both the exposure and contribution of insurers to the fragility
of the global financial system during the financial crisis. In our panel regressions, we
find the interconnectedness of large insurers with the financial sector to be a signif-
icant driver of the insurers’ exposure to systemic risk. In contrast, the contribution
of insurers to systemic risk appears to be primarily driven by the insurers’ size and
leverage.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Section 2.2 introduces the
data and the methodology used in our empirical study. Section 2.3 presents the results
of our investigation into the determinants of systemic risk in the insurance industry.
5Other potential measures of the interconnectedness of financial institutions include the measures pro-
posed by Billio et al. (2012) and Chen et al. (2014) which are both based on Granger causality tests.
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Concluding remarks are given in Section 2.4.
2.2 Data
This section describes the construction of our sample and presents the choice of our
main independent variables as well as descriptive statistics of our data.
2.2.1 Sample construction
We construct our data sample by first selecting all publicly listed international insurers
from the dead and active firm lists in Thomson Reuters Financial Datastream. For
reasons of relevance, we concentrate on insurance firms with total assets in excess of
$ 1 billion at the end of 2000. We then omit all firms for which stock price data are
unavailable in Datastream. Next, we exclude all secondary listings and nonprimary
issues from our sample. Further, we exclude Berkshire Hathaway which is listed as
an insurance company in Datastream due to its unusually high stock price. Balance-
sheet and income statement data are retrieved from the Thomson Worldscope database
and all stock market and accounting data are collected in U.S. dollars to minimize a
possible bias in our results stemming from currency risk.
Finally, we split our data sample into life and non-life insurers. The definition of
life and non-life insurance companies in the company lists of Datastream is some-
what fuzzy.6 Therefore, the industry classification of Datastream is cross-checked
with the firms’ SIC code (Worldscope data item WC07021, SIC codes 6311, 6321,
6331) and the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) code (Worldscope data item
WC07040, ICB supersector 8500) to exclude firms which cannot be clearly classified
as life or non-life insurance companies.7 Additionally, all company names are manu-
ally screened for words suggesting a non-insurance nature of the companies’ business
and the respective companies being excluded from the sample. In total, we end up with
6For example, several medical service plans and medical wholesale companies are listed as life insurance
companies in Datastream’s company lists.
7Consequently, HMO, managed care and title insurance companies are not included in the final sample.
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an international sample of 253 insurers, containing 112 life insurers and 141 non-life
insurers. For increased transparency, the names of all insurers in our sample are listed
in Appendix A.1.
In the following subsections, we define and discuss the different dependent and in-
dependent variables we use in our empirical study. An overview of all variables and
data sources is given in Appendix A.2.
2.2.2 Systemic risk measures
Our analysis focuses on the exposure and contribution of individual insurers to the
systemic risk of the global financial sector during the period 2000 through 2012. Con-
sequently, we employ an insurer’s Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES), Systemic Risk
Index/Capital Shortfall (SRISK) and ∆CoVaR as main dependent variables in our re-
gression analyses. We estimate the three measures of systemic risk for each quarter in
our sample using daily stock market data for our sample insurers. Our choice of these
systemic risk measures is motivated by the fact that these measures have been ex-
tensively discussed in the literature and are also used by regulators and central banks
for monitoring financial stability (see Benoit et al., 2013).8 As our first measure of sys-
temic risk, we use the quarterly Marginal Expected Shortfall which is a static structural
form approach to measure an individual insurers’ exposure to systemic risk. It is de-
fined by Acharya et al. (2010) as the negative average return on an individual insurer’s
stock on the days a market index experienced its 5% worst outcomes. As a proxy for
the market’s return, we use the World Datastream Bank Index in our main analysis.
Next, we implement the ∆CoVaR method proposed by Adrian and Brunnermeier
(2014), which is based on the tail covariation between the returns of individual finan-
cial institutions and the financial system. We use ∆CoVaR as an additional measure
of an insurer’s contribution to systemic risk as Adrian and Brunnermeier (2014) criti-
8All three systemic risk measures we employ share the property that they are all based on economic
theory and capture different aspects of systemic risk. Since the recent financial crisis, several other
measures of systemic risk have been proposed in the literature. Further examples for such measures
apart from those used in this study are due to De Jonghe (2010), Huang et al. (2012), Schwaab et al.
(2011), Hautsch et al. (2014), Hovakimian et al. (2012) and White et al. (2012).
2.2. DATA 18
cize the MES measure for not being able to adequately address the procyclicality that
arises from contemporaneous risk measurement.9 While the unconditional ∆CoVaR
estimates are constant over time, the conditional ∆CoVaR is time-varying and esti-
mated using a set of state variables that capture the evolution of tail risk dependence
over time. However, since we calculate ∆CoVaR based on stock prices for a given quar-
ter, the standard state variables used for estimating the conditional CoVaR show almost
no time-variation. Consequently, we focus on estimating the unconditional version of
∆CoVaR in our analysis. An insurer’s contribution to systemic risk is then measured
as the difference between CoVaR conditional on the insurer being under distress and
the CoVaR in the median state of the institution. A lower value of ∆CoVaR indicates
a higher contribution to systemic risk, while a positive MES indicates an exposure to
systemic risk rather than a stabilizing effect.
As our third systemic risk measure, we use SRISK which attempts to measure
the expected capital shortfall of a firm. SRISK is given as the average quar-
terly estimate of the Systemic Risk Index as proposed by Acharya et al. (2012) and
Brownlees and Engle (2012). An insurer’s SRISK is estimated by the insurer’s book
value of debt weighted with a regulatory capital ratio (set to 8%) plus the weighted long
run Marginal Expected Shortfall multiplied by the insurer’s market value of equity.
2.2.3 Explanatory variables
In this subsection, we characterize the main independent variables we use in our panel
regressions and robustness checks later on. In our analysis we attempt to capture the
key features that make insurers become systemically relevant. We thus concentrate on
the factors that have recently been suggested by the IAIS (2011, 2013) as potential
sources of systemic risk in insurance. We therefore include in our regressions proxies
for an insurer’s size, its capital structure, non-core activities, and interconnectedness
with the financial system.
9Conversely, Acharya et al. (2010) criticize the ∆CoVaR measure as being based on a non-coherent risk
measure.
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To proxy for the latter, we make use of the measure of interconnectedness of a
financial institution proposed by Billio et al. (2012). Let Zi be the standardized stock
returns of the ith institutions and G = Cov(Zi,Z j)i j be the covariance matrix of the
institutions’s daily stock returns. Using principal component analysis, we are able to
decompose this matrix into a matrix Λ, which is a diagonal matrix of the eigenvalues
λ1, . . . , λN of G, and a matrix L = (Lik)ik that contains the eigenvectors of the returns’
correlation matrix. Billio et al. (2012) then define the system’s variance as
σ2S =
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
N∑
l=1
σiσ jLikL jkλk.
In their work, Billio et al. (2012) argue that the more interconnected a system is, the
less eigenvalues are necessary to explain a proportion of H of the system’s variance
σ2S .
10 A univariate measure of an institution’s interconnectedness with the system of
N financial institutions is then given by
PCAS i,n :=
n∑
k=1
σ2i
σ2S
L2ikλk
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
hn>H
,
where PCAS i,n is the contribution of institution i to the risk of the system, and hn is
∑n
k=1 λk∑N
k=1 λk
with a prescribed threshold H.11
The more interconnected an insurer is with the rest of the financial sector, the higher
its systemic relevance will be. We therefore expect our proxy for interconnectedness to
enter our regressions of ∆CoVaR with a significant negative sign. Similarly, we expect
interconnectedness to have a positive effect on both MES and SRISK, since being more
interconnected with the financial system exposes insurers to contagion risks from other
banks and insurers.
To proxy for the size of an insurer, we use the natural logarithm of an insurer’s total
10Following a suggestion in Billio et al. (2012), we set H = 0.33.
11We calculate the proxy for interconnectedness using data on insurers and banks. To be precise, we
employ data on all insurance companies in our sample as well as data on all banks available from
Datastream with total assets in excess of $ 1 billion at the end of 2000. The total sample used for
estimating the interconnectedness of individual insurers comprises 1,491 banks and 253 insurers.
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assets.12 We expect insurer size to be an economically significant driver of systemic
risk. On the one hand, a larger company is less likely to suffer from cumulative losses
due to its broader range of pooled risks and better risk diversification. On the other
hand, an insurer could become more systemically relevant by being too-big-to-fail and
too-complex-to-fail (see IAIS, 2013).
Another important explanatory variable in our regressions is an insurer’s leverage
ratio. We follow Acharya et al. (2010) and Fahlenbrach et al. (2012) and approximate
an insurer’s leverage as the book value of assets minus book value of equity plus market
value of equity, divided by market value of equity. We have no prediction for the sign of
the coefficient on leverage in our regression. High leverage is a factor that incentivizes
managers into excessive risk-taking to increase a firm’s profitability.13 In contrast,
Vallascas and Hagendorff (2011) argue that managers of companies with high leverage
could feel pressured by investors to provide enough liquid assets to cover the payment
of interests. Consequently, a higher leverage could exert a disciplining function on
managers leading to a decrease in an insurer’s total risk.
Furthermore, we employ several other insurer- and country-specific characteristics
as control variables. We include the variable debt maturity which is defined as the
ratio of total long term debt to total debt. There exists a wide consensus among
economists and regulators that the dependence of certain banks and insurers on short-
term funding exposed these institutions to liquidity risks during the financial crisis
and ultimately led to significant systemic risks (see Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009,
Cummins and Weiss, 2014, Fahlenbrach et al., 2012). Consequently, the IAIS has in-
cluded the ratio of the absolute sum of short-term borrowing and total assets in its
methodology as a key indicator of systemic relevance. We adopt their line of thought
but use total long-term debt instead of short term debt.
To include a proxy for an insurer’s investment success in our panel regression, we
12In our robustness checks, we use net revenues, given as the log value of an insurer’s total operating
revenue, as an alternative proxy for firm size.
13Support for this view is found by Acharya et al. (2010), Fahlenbrach et al. (2012) and
Hovakimian et al. (2012) who present empirical evidence that banks with low leverage during the
crisis performed better and had a smaller contribution to systemic risk.
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use the ratio of investment income to net revenues. It is defined as the ratio of an
insurer’s absolute investment income to the sum of absolute investment income and
absolute earned premiums. To characterize the quality of the insurance portfolio, in
our analysis we compute the insurer’s loss ratio, constructed by adding claim and loss
expenses plus long term insurance reserves and dividing by premiums earned. We
expect insurers with higher loss ratios to contribute more to systemic risk. In our
regressions, we also use an insurer’s market-to-book ratio, defined as the market value
of common equity divided by the book value of common equity.
Next, we employ the insurers’ operating expense ratio, given by the ratio of operat-
ing expenses to total assets, to control for the quality of management.14 Furthermore,
we follow the reasoning of the IAIS (2013) and control for the degree to which an
insurer engages in non-traditional and non-insurance activities. We use the variable
Other income defined as other pre-tax income and expenses besides operating income.
If an insurer operates more outside the traditional insurance business, e.g., by mimick-
ing banks or becoming a central counterparty for credit derivatives, the more will it be
exposed to systemic risks from the financial sector as its interrelations with other fi-
nancial institutions increase. Therefore, we expect a positive correlation between other
income and systemic risk.
Another variable that captures the non-core activities of insurers is non-policyholder
liabilities, which is given by the total on balance-sheet liabilities divided by total in-
surance reserves. We suspect a positive correlation of non-policyholder liabilities and
systemic risk as policyholder liabilities are indicative of traditional insurance activities
(see IAIS, 2013). To proxy for an insurer’s profitability and past performance in our re-
gressions, we use the standard measures Return on Equity (ROE) and Return on Assets
(ROA). Higher profits can act as a buffer against future losses thus shielding an insurer
against adverse effects spilling over from the financial sector. Additionally, we employ
the quarterly buy-and-hold returns on an insurer’s stock as an independent variable. It
14In our robustness checks, we also compute the operating expense ratio by dividing operating expenses
by earned premiums.
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is very likely that insurers that performed well in the past will continue to perform well
over time. However, institutions that took on too many risks in the past could also stick
to their culture of risk-taking (see Fahlenbrach et al., 2012) and increase their exposure
and contribution to systemic risk. We therefore expect this measure to have a positive
impact on the systemic risk of insurers.
Finally, we also consider macroeconomic and country-specific variables like the
GDP growth rate (in %) and the log of the annual change of the GDP deflator. More-
over, we employ a country’s stock market turnover defined as the total value of shares
traded in a given country divided by the average market capitalization to proxy for
the development of a country’s equity market (see, e.g., Levine and Zervos, 1998,
Bartram et al., 2012).
2.2.4 Descriptive statistics
Table 2.1 presents descriptive statistics for the dependent and explanatory variables we
use in our analysis.
For our full sample of life and non-life insurers, we only find limited evidence of a
systemic importance of insurers. Although weakly economically significant, insurers
had mean estimates of MES and ∆CoVaR of only 1% during our full sample period.
The summary statistics on SRISK also underline the finding that the majority of insur-
ers did not significantly contribute to the instability of the financial sector. However,
the minimum estimate of ∆CoVaR and the maximum SRISK estimate show that at
least some insurers contributed significantly to systemic risk at some point during our
sample period. Intuitively, we would expect insurers to have experienced the extreme
values of systemic relevance during the financial crisis. This intuition is proven in Fig-
ure 2.1 in which we plot the time evolution of the three systemic risk measures we use
over the course of our complete sample period.
We can see from Figure 2.1 that the mean MES is relatively constant over time,
showing a significant peak during the financial crisis. The exposure to systemic risk
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Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics.
The table presents descriptive statistics of the quarterly estimates of different systemic risk measures for a sample of 253 international insurers. The sample period runs
from Q1 2000 to Q4 2012. Additionally, the table presents descriptive statistics for our set of explanatory variables. We report the number of observations, minimum and
maximum values, percentiles and moments. All variables and data sources are defined in Appendix A.2.
Percentiles Moments
Obs Min 1th 5th 20th 80th 95th 99th Max Mean St. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis
MES 12,808 -0.11 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.09 0.45 0.01 0.020 3.44 35.53
∆CoVaR 4,893 -0.12 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.010 0.010 -3.90 29.98
SRISK (in billions) 8,997 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.065 2.457 12.298 42.091 166.22 2.8 8.5 7.56 81.36
Interconnectedness 11,361 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.158 2.370 123.990 399,010.800 386.980 8,929.084 29.260 982.910
Total assets (in billions) 10,998 0.02 0.59 1.18 29.03 61.37 331.62 865.13 2076.19 65.63 165.79 5.40 38.05
Leverage 12,066 1.01 1.32 1.77 3.10 13.37 30.41 86.80 44,180.69 30.27 819.12 52.16 2,796.82
Debt maturity 11,104 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.58 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.78 0.32 -1.45 0.78
Foreign sales 7,131 -63.41 0.00 0.00 0.00 50.42 82.85 109.82 202.64 23.63 30.11 1.23 1.26
Investment success 12,065 -22.10 0.04 0.23 0.59 0.89 0.95 1.03 4.13 0.71 0.49 -34.67 1,614.19
Loss ratio 11,994 -1,717.91 3.39 38.53 64.26 109.65 196.19 770.70 8,439.29 107.48 211.37 20.09 681.64
Market-to-book 12,038 -14.10 0.26 0.55 0.91 2.27 4.16 7.49 45.12 1.78 1.67 8.32 167.10
Non-policyholder liabilities 12,025 0.56 1.01 1.05 1.12 1.70 4.78 35.67 1,144.63 4.03 35.510 21.250 524.18
Operating expenses 12,510 -0.18 0.01 0.05 0.11 0.32 0.54 0.78 1.39 0.23 0.16 2.06 7.81
Other income (in millions) 12,669 -4.87 -0.93 -0.10 -0.00 0.01 0.17 1.19 17.95 0.02 0.53 0.00 0.00
ROA 12,423 -30.22 -5.56 -1.09 0.39 3.44 6.94 10.90 38.08 1.88 3.22 1.30 30.09
Performance 12,744 -0.91 -0.43 -0.25 -0.09 0.12 0.30 0.57 10.64 0.02 0.21 11.83 559.55
Net Revenues (in billions) 10,954 0.00 0.08 0.26 0.73 11.40 44.61 105.30 172.37 9.70 19.15 3.95 18.57
ROE 9,853 -77.86 -66.22 -6.84 5.66 16.29 25.82 34.29 36.69 10.16 12.84 -3.39 19.27
GDP Growth 12,598 -8.54 -5.49 -3.11 0.81 4.10 5.54 9.30 14.78 2.21 2.57 -0.45 2.25
Inflation 12,598 -14.45 -2.22 -1.20 0.88 3.12 6.01 8.86 27.57 2.15 2.16 1.49 12.38
Stock market turnover 12,648 0.15 1.99 6.80 63.14 189.07 348.58 404.07 404.07 130.21 85.64 1.17 1.78
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Figure 2.1: Time evolution of the systemic risk measures in the period from 2000 to
2012.
This figure plots the evolution of the systemic risk measures Marginal Expected Shortfalls (MES),
SRISK, and ∆CoVaR over our full sample period from 2000 to 2012. The sample consists of 253
international life and non-life insurers. In each plot, the mean of the respective risk measure (black line)
is plotted against the corresponding 10% and 90% percent quantiles (grey lines). All variables and data
sources are defined in Appendix A.2.
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during this peak, however, is highly economically significant with insurers, on aver-
age, suffering losses of 5% on their stocks on those days the market plummeted. Some
insurers were hit even harder with MES estimates of up to 10%. The second plot
for our estimates of the insurers’ ∆CoVaR shows a similar picture. The contribution to
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systemic risk by insurers was low to non-existent until 2007 when both mean and mini-
mum ∆CoVaR estimates decreased dramatically. After the crisis, the average ∆CoVaR
of insurers increased again showing that the average contribution of insurers to sys-
temic risk was again limited. This result is corroborated by the plot of the insurers’
SRISK estimates.15
Although the summary statistics for our full sample yield some instructive infor-
mation on our sample, some of our variables differ significantly for life and non-life
insurers. To get a better understanding of the composition of our sample, we therefore
split our sample into life and non-life insurers and compare selected summary statistics
across both lines of business. The resulting summary statistics and tests of the equality
of sample means are presented in Table 2.2. Summary statistics are given separately
for our full sample period in Panel A and for the sub-sample of the quarters during the
financial crisis in Panel B.
In Panel A of Table 2.2, we compare the values of the systemic risk measures to-
gether with the three main (presumed) determinants of systemic risk (size, leverage,
and interconnectedness) for the life and non-life insurers in our sample.
We can see from both Table 2.2 that the means of the variables differ substantially
for life and non-life insurers. First, both the mean estimates of MES and ∆CoVaR
are higher for life insurers than for non-life insurers. In contrast, on average, non-life
insurers have significantly higher SRISK estimates than life insurers. These differences
are statistically significant although the absolute levels of the average contribution and
exposure to systemic risk are again not economically significant (at least not across our
full panel).16
Concerning the potential drivers of systemic risk in insurance, the univariate analysis
15Further summary statistics for our explanatory variables given in Table 2.1 show that the average
interconnectedness of the insurers in our sample is limited. Some insurers, however, are strongly
interconnected with the rest of the global insurance sector. Most notably, AIG, AON, AXA, Genworth,
and MunichRe are above the 99% quantile of our interconnectedness variable. The average size of a
sample insurer is ca. $ 65 billion. Note that our sample includes both very small (5% quantile: $ 1.2
billion) and very large insurers (95% quantile: $ 331.6 billion).
16Furthermore, the differences in the mean SRISK and ∆CoVaR estimates are most likely due to the
different sizes of the samples for which both measures can be computed.
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Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics for main variables of interest: life and non-life insurer.
The table compares the characteristics of insurers in the life insurance sector relative to those in the non-life sector. Our sample consists of 253 international insurers (listed
in Appendix A.1) and covers the period from Q1 2000 to Q4 2012 (Panel A) and from Q3 2008 to Q2 2009 (Panel B). We report the minimum, maximum, mean, 5%-
and 95%-quantiles, and the standard deviation of the variables. The equality of means of the different variables is tested using Welch’s t test for unequal sample sizes and
possibly unequal variances of the two samples. All variables and data sources are defined in Appendix A.2. ***,**,* denote estimates that are significant at the 1%, 5%, and
10% level, respectively.
Non-life Life
No. obs. Min 25% Mean 75% Max St. dev. No. obs. Min 25% Mean 75% Max St. dev. t-statistic
Panel A: Q1 2000 - Q4 2012
MES 6,386 -0.082 0.003 0.014 0.019 0.452 0.020 4,991 -0.047 0.004 0.016 0.023 0.304 0.020 -7.274***
∆CoVaR 2,272 -0.119 -0.009 -0.007 -0.003 0.001 0.010 1,582 -0.089 -0.010 -0.008 -0.003 0.001 0.010 2.331**
SRISK (in billions) 5,150 0.000 0.103 3.210 1.718 1.662 10.280 3,847 0.000 0.108 2.242 1.836 79.23 5.190 5.842***
Interconnectedness 6462 0.000 0.000 679.690 0.100 399010.800 11831.450 4899 0.000 0.000 0.879 0.095 350.900 9.680 4.6116***
Total assets (in billions) 6,180 0.020 2.748 43.00 24.13 1,483.00 134.65 4,818 0.114 7.22 94.66 93.280 2,076.00 194.91 -15.706***
Leverage 5,974 1.01 2.89 16.01 8.606 7,100.00 200.04 4,588 1.25 6.25 56.52 16.22 44,180.00 1,308.26 -2.079**
Panel B: Q3 2008 - Q2 2009
MES 520 -0.032 0.012 0.034 0.049 0.195 0.031 388 -0.032 0.009 0.040 0.059 0.227 0.039 -2.591***
∆CoVaR 109 -0.100 -0.021 -0.018 -0.006 -0.001 0.017 84 -0.089 -0.024 -0.020 -0.009 -0.003 0.019 0.957
SRISK (in millions) 369 0.000 0.440 5.988 4.863 88.650 13.040 262 0.000 0.376 4.970 5.156 79.230 9.330 1.144
Interconnectedness 529 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.295 0.014 405 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.296
Total assets (in billions) 443 0.16 3.63 47.89 27.45 1476.00 143.59 328 0.73 12.38 126.30 125.90 2076.00 248.28 -5.120***
Leverage 443 1.32 3.02 11.67 9.88 210.60 23.42 322 1.50 7.18 297.00 22.93 44180.00 3475.01 -1.473
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given in Table 2.2 shows that non-life insurers are, on average, slightly more intercon-
nected but are significantly smaller and less levered than life insurers. Non-life insurers
have mean total assets of $ 43 billion while life insurers are significantly larger with
mean total assets of $ 94.66 billion. The leverage of the average non-life insurer is 16
whereas the average life insurer has a leverage 56. Although the mean estimates are
again distorted in part by the presence of few extreme outliers, the quantiles presented
in Table 2.2 underline the finding that life insurer are significantly larger and more
levered.
Before turning to our panel regression analysis of the systemic relevance of global
insurers, we shortly comment on the subset of nine Global Systemically Important
Insurers (G-SIIs) as identified by the Financial Stability Board in July 2013. In Table
2.3, we repeat our analysis of the summary statistics of our systemic risk measures and
selected explanatory variables for the nine G-SIIs.
Table 2.3: Descriptive statistics for main variables of interest: Global Systemically
Important Insurers.
This table shows the respective descriptive statistics for the nine global systemically important insurers
(G-SIIs) as defined by the international association of insurance supervisors (IAIS) in the period from
Q1 2000 to Q4 2012 (Panel A) and from Q3 2008 to Q2 2009 (Panel B). The nine G-SIIs are Allianz,
American International Group, Assicurazioni Generali, Aviva, Axa, MetLife, Ping An Insurance
(Group) Company of China, Prudential Financial and Prudential. All variables and data sources are
defined in Appendix A.2.
G-SIIs
No. obs. Min 25% Mean 75% Max St. dev.
Panel A: Q1 2000 - Q4 2012
MES 434 -0.001 0.011 0.028 0.035 0.452 0.031
∆CoVaR 249 -0.119 -0.014 -0.011 -0.004 0.000 0.012
SRISK (in billions) 378 0.000 2.065 18.209 27.387 125.494 21.956
Interconnectedness 460 0.000 0.000 0.352 0.094 30.800 1.785
Total assets (in billions) 424 24.55 293.00 521.20 730.90 1483.00 315.38
Leverage 416 1.36 3.71 10.69 14.67 55.08 10.76
Panel B: Q3 2008 - Q2 2009
MES 36 0.000 0.035 0.065 0.090 0.169 0.042
∆CoVaR 20 -0.100 -0.039 -0.028 -0.012 -0.008 0.025
SRISK (in billions) 28 0.037 6.544 25.198 36.902 79.229 24.351
Interconnectedness 32 0.000 0.000 0.113 0.037 0.850 0.239
Total assets (in billions) 32 107.80 438.20 615.00 844.80 1476.20 330.19
Leverage 32 2.918 16.909 42.930 32.141 210.612 62.609
During our full sample period, the nine G-SIIs had average MES and ∆CoVaR es-
timates that did not significantly differ from those of insurers that were not deemed
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to be systemically important by the Financial Stability Board. However, global sys-
temically important insurers had a significantly higher mean SRISK than insurers in
our full sample. Most importantly, however, average estimates for the three systemic
risk measures of G-SIIs increased significantly during the financial crisis as shown in
Figure 2.2.
Figure 2.2: Time evolution of systemic risk measures for (systemically relevant)
insurers in the period from 2000 to 2012.
This figure plots the evolution of the systemic risk measures Marginal Expected Shortfalls (MES),
SRISK, and ∆CoVaR over a sample period from 2000 to 2012. The sample consists of 253 interna-
tional life and non-life insurers. In each plot, the mean of the respective risk measure in each quarter is
given for a sample of 253 international insurers (yellow shaded area) and for the nine insurers identified
as global systemically important by the IAIS (2013) (black bars). All data are winsorized at the 1%
level. Variables and data sources are defined in Appendix A.2.
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As expected, G-SIIs, on average also had significantly higher total assets and were
more interconnected. Interestingly, the mean leverage of the nine G-SIIs was lower
than the leverage of both the average life and non-life insurer in our full sample. Not
surprisingly, all variables are on average significantly higher during the crisis than in
our full sample. Again, however, these univariate results for our full sample period do
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not take into account the (possibly strong) correlations between size, interconnected-
ness, and leverage.
2.3 The determinants of systemic risk of insurers
In this section, we investigate the question which factors determine an insurer’s contri-
bution and exposure to systemic risk. First, we comment on the results of our baseline
panel regressions. Afterwards, we report and comment the results of various robust-
ness checks.
2.3.1 Panel regressions
Based on the findings from our univariate analysis, we now perform a multivariate
panel regression analysis of our sample of international insurers. In particular, we
intend to test the hypothesis that systemic risk in insurance is predominantly driven by
an insurer’s size, its leverage, and its interconnectedness with the rest of the insurance
sector. In our baseline setting, we perform several panel regressions with the three
systemic risk measures introduced in Section 2.2 as our dependent variables. The set
of independent variables includes both the set of key features of systemic relevance as
proposed by the IAIS (2013) and various control variables as outlined in Section 2.2.3
and Table A.2. The econometric strategy we use is illustrated below.
S ystemicRiski,t = β0 + β1 · Interconnectednessi,t−1 + β2 · Leveragei,t−2
+ β3 · Total assetsi,t−2 + Ω · Insurer controlsi,t−2
+ Θ · Country controlsi,t−1 + εi,t,
(2.1)
where S ystemicRiski,t is the value of one of the three systemic risk measures for insurer
i in quarter t and Insurer controlsi,t−2 as well as Country controlsi,t−1 are various firm-
specific and country-specific control variables, respectively. To mitigate the possibility
of reverse causality between our dependent and explanatory variables driving our re-
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sults, we lag all explanatory variables based on accounting statements by two quarters.
The interconnectedness measure and country controls are lagged by one quarter. Fur-
thermore, we perform separate regressions for life and non-life insurers to account for
systematic differences in accounting in different lines of insurance business. In addi-
tion, we estimate all panel regressions with clustered standard errors on the country
level and with insurer- and time-fixed effects to account for unobserved heterogeneity.
The results of our baseline regressions are presented in Table 2.4.
Starting with regressions (1) and (2) of the insurers’ ∆CoVaR, we can see that nei-
ther the life insurers’ interconnectedness nor their size is a significant driver of the
contribution to systemic risk. This first finding is in striking contrast to the hypotheses
formulated by the IAIS on the pivotal role of size and interconnectedness for an in-
surer’s systemic importance. For the leverage of a firm, we find that leverage enters the
regressions with a negative sign. Our results suggest that the more levered a life insurer
is, the more it contributes to the system’s fragility. This result is statistically significant
at the 10%- and 1% level, respectively. Furthermore, the effect is also economically
significant. For life insurers, an increase in leverage by one standard deviation leads
to a decrease of -13% in ∆CoVaR (1308.26 × -0.0001) whereas for non-life insurers,
such an increase is associated with an increase in the contribution to systemic risk by
4% (200.04 × -0.0002). Our result implies that the use of high leverage in the insur-
ance business therefore decreases the value of ∆CoVaR and consequently increases a
non-life insurer’s contribution to systemic risk.
Next, we report the results of our regressions (3) and (4) of the insurers’ Marginal
Expected Shortfall as the dependent variable. Interestingly, we find a positive rela-
tion between the interconnectedness of a non-life insurer and its exposure to systemic
risk spilling over from the insurance sector. We thus conclude that being highly inter-
connected does not necessarily lead to a significantly higher contribution to systemic
fragility, but rather to a higher exposure to adverse spillover effects. Additionally,
leverage enters both regressions for life and non-life insurers with a statistically and
economically significant positive sign. In our regressions, a one standard deviation
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Table 2.4: Baseline panel regressions.
This table shows the results of panel regressions of quarterly estimates of three systemic risk measures
for a sample of international insurers on key indicators of systemic relevance and various control vari-
ables. All panel regressions are estimated with insurer- and quarter-fixed effects and with clustered
standard errors on the country level. The estimated model is:
S ystemicRiski,t = β0 + β1 · Interconnectednessi,t−1 + β2 · Leveragei,t−2 + β3 · Total assetsi,t−2
+ Ω · Insurer controlsi,t−2 + Θ · Country controlsi,t−1 + εi,t,
where S ystemicRiski,t is the value of one of the three systemic risk measures for insurer i in quarter t
and Insurer controlsi,t−2 as well as Country controlsi,t−1 are various firm-specific and country-specific
control variables. The sample includes insurer-quarter observations of 112 international life insurers
and 141 international non-life insurers over the time period Q1 2000 to Q4 2012. P-values are reported
in parentheses. All insurer characteristics based on accounting statements are lagged by two quarters
and Interconnectedness and country control are lagged by one quarter. Variable definitions and data
sources are provided in Table A.2 in the Appendix. ***,**,* denote coefficients that are significant at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Adj. R2 is adjusted R-squared.
Dependent variable: ∆CoVaR ∆CoVaR MES MES SRISK SRISK
Sample: Life Non-Life Life Non-Life Life Non-Life
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Interconnectedness 0.0000 0.0000*** 0.0000 0.0000** -0.0021 0.0000**
(0.728) (0.002) (0.308) (0.011) (0.556) (0.047)
Total assets -0.0030 0.0005 0.0049* -0.0004 1.0075* 5.5704**
(0.216) (0.568) (0.051) (0.820) (0.094) (0.016)
Leverage -0.0001* -0.0002*** 0.0002* 0.0004*** -0.0072 -0.1228***
(0.056) (0.000) (0.094) (0.000) (0.443) (0.000)
Debt maturity -0.0011 -0.0006 0.0019 0.0009 0.0754 -3.1216*
(0.403) (0.485) (0.309) (0.580) (0.837) (0.097)
Investment success 0.0008 -0.0067 -0.0049*** 0.0091 -0.4141 -2.1429
(0.652) (0.281) (0.004) (0.221) (0.434) (0.484)
Loss ratio 0.0000 0.0000* 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0015
(0.183) (0.067) (0.128) (0.898) (0.666) (0.156)
Market-to-book ratio 0.0005* 0.0004 -0.0006 0.0002 0.1047 0.0943
(0.096) (0.348) (0.177) (0.155) (0.176) (0.486)
Non-policyholder liabilities -0.0002** 0.0012** 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0043*** 0.0149
(0.030) (0.035) (0.637) (0.376) (0.003) (0.611)
Operating expenses -0.0291** -0.0041 0.0253** 0.0155* -1.9027 14.5905
(0.034) (0.304) (0.022) (0.050) (0.437) (0.101)
Other income 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.226) (0.875) (0.441) (0.947) (0.521) (0.461)
ROA (0.0002) 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 0.0158 0.1567
(0.649) (0.802) (0.512) (0.820) (0.693) (0.147)
Performance -0.0012 0.0011 -0.0027 -0.0001 -0.3072 0.1843
(0.409) (0.471) (0.158) (0.966) (0.165) (0.726)
GDP growth 0.0003 0.0002 -0.0002 0.0002 -0.0796 -0.0908
(0.150) (0.365) (0.516) (0.499) (0.150) (0.424)
Inflation -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0004* -0.0011*** -0.0269 -0.2008*
(0.397) (0.750) (0.074) (0.002) (0.648) (0.051)
Stock market turnover 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0019 0.0268***
(0.801) (0.225) (0.008) (0.003) (0.520) (0.000)
Insurer-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 925 1333 2658 3569 2508 3426
Adj. R2 0.5865 0.5752 0.4422 0.4225 0.2040 0.1412
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increase in the leverage of life insurers is associated with a 26.1% higher MES and
therefore an increase of an insurer’s exposure to systemic risk (1308.26 × 0.0002). For
comparison, a one standard deviation increase in the leverage of a non-life insurer is
associated with an 8% increase in MES (200.04 × 0.0004). In line with our expec-
tation, higher leverage thus appears to significantly increase an insurer’s exposure to
systemic risk. Higher operating to total assets ratios are associated with a higher MES
of insurers.
Finally, in model specifications (5) and (6), we employ the insurers’ SRISK as
the dependent variable. Underlining our previous findings from the regressions of
∆CoVaR, we find no evidence for the hypothesis that the contribution of insurers to
systemic risk is significantly affected by the interconnectedness of an individual life
insurer within financial system. For non-life insurers, we again find leverage to have a
mitigating effect on systemic risk with the effect being both statistically and economi-
cally significant. However, in contrast to our previous regressions, insurer size is now
statistically and economically significantly related to the SRISK of insurers. For the
life insurers in our sample, we find an increase of total assets to be associated with
an increase in SRISK of approx. 196 million (194.91 × 1.0075). For non-life insur-
ers, we find the economic significance of size to be even larger with a one standard
deviation increase in size being associated with an increase in SRISK by approx. 750
million (134.65 × 5.5704). These findings for SRISK have to be taken with careful
consideration, however, since the adjusted R-squared in the regressions of SRISK is
considerably lower than in the regressions of MES and ∆CoVaR.
2.3.2 Additional analyses
The results of our baseline regressions have produced only weak evidence that size, in-
terconnectedness, and leverage are fundamental drivers of systemic risk in insurance.
To get a deeper understanding of the relation between idiosyncratic insurer character-
istics and systemic risk, we perform several additional analyses in this subsection.
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First, we examine the question whether the exposure and contribution of large in-
surers to systemic risk are driven by different factors than the systemic risk measures
of insurers in our full sample. To this end, we restrict our sample to insurer-quarter
observations of institutions in the top 75% quantile of total assets. The motivation be-
hind our analysis is that the relation between some of our explanatory variables and
the systemic risk of an insurer might be mitigated or exacerbated by the insurer’s size.
The results for the regression using insurers in the top total assets quartile only are
presented in Table 2.5.
Several of the results from our baseline regressions carry over to our analysis of
large insurers. For example, the inferences for the insurers’ leverage remain more or
less unchanged. Higher leverage increases both the contribution and the exposure of
large life and non-life insurers to systemic risk. While leverage is positively related to
the purely equity-based measures of systemic risk, we find a significant negative corre-
lation between leverage and SRISK as our third measure of systemic risk. However, in
regression (2) in Table 2.5 we find one striking difference. In contrast to our baseline
regressions, the interconnectedness of an insurer is now positively related to its con-
tribution to systemic risk. An increased interconnectedness of large insurers induces
more contribution to overall systemic risk. This is intuitive, since an interconnected
insurance company could possibly contribute to systemic risk, but only if it is relevant
or large enough to have devastating effects through a default. Similarly to the analysis
of our full sample, insurer size is significant in the regression of the SRISK of non-life
insurers. Furthermore, and in line with our expectation, we find higher loss ratios to be
positively associated with the contribution of large insurers to systemic risk.
Next, we address the question whether the drivers of systemic risk in insurance differ
across countries. In fact, it is very possible that insurance companies and even whole
sectors function in a different way than their counterparts in foreign countries. Even
more importantly, insurance regulation differs substantially from country to country.
Although we control for these systematic differences by the use of country-fixed ef-
fects in our robustness checks, it is nevertheless instructive to analyze these country
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Table 2.5: Panel regressions - Large insurers.
This table shows the results of panel regressions of quarterly estimates of three systemic risk measures
for a sample of international insurers on key indicators of systemic relevance and various control vari-
ables. All panel regressions are estimated with insurer- and quarter-fixed effects and with clustered
standard errors on the country level. The estimated model is:
S ystemicRiski,t = β0 + β1 · Interconnectednessi,t−1 + β2 · Leveragei,t−2 + β3 · Total assetsi,t−2
+ Ω · Insurer controlsi,t−2 + Θ · Country controlsi,t−1 + εi,t,
where S ystemicRiski,t is the value of one of the three systemic risk measures for insurer i in quarter t
and Insurer controlsi,t−2 as well as Country controlsi,t−1 are various firm-specific and country-specific
control variables. The sample includes insurer-quarter observations of 112 international life insurers
and 141 international non-life insurers over the time period Q1 2000 to Q4 2012. In contrast to
our baseline setting, in these regressions, we only use insurer-quarters of insurers in the top total
assets quartile. P-values are reported in parantheses. All insurer characteristics based on accounting
statements are lagged by two quarters and Interconnectedness and country control are lagged by one
quarter. Variable definitions and data sources are provided in Table A.2 in the Appendix. ***,**,*
denote coefficients that are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Adj. R2 is adjusted
R-squared.
Dependent variable: ∆CoVaR ∆CoVaR MES MES SRISK SRISK
Sample: Life Non-Life Life Non-Life Life Non-Life
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Interconnectedness 0.0011 -0.0003** 0.0000 0.0005 0.0004 -0.2056
(0.179) (0.023) (0.120) (0.112) (0.337) (0.500)
Total assets -0.0008 -0.0037 0.0016 -0.0026 4.6792 11.8426***
(0.885) (0.117) (0.626) (0.415) (0.122) (0.000)
Leverage 0.0001 -0.0001*** 0.0004*** 0.0003*** -0.0616 -0.0758**
(0.297) (0.001) (0.003) (0.000) (0.242) (0.047)
Debt maturity -0.0032 0.0032 -0.0007 -0.0082 -1.3610 -19.8851
(0.243) (0.292) (0.867) (0.208) (0.330) (0.105)
Investment success -0.0114 -0.0347** 0.0174 0.0232 3.8998 -20.3975**
(0.212) (0.032) (0.147) (0.418) (0.380) (0.023)
Loss ratio -0.0001** -0.0001* 0.0000** 0.0000 0.0000 0.0019
(0.022) (0.097) (0.028) (0.362) (0.987) (0.892)
Market-to-book ratio 0.0026** -0.0013 0.0004 0.0021 -0.4833 8.5890*
(0.011) (0.447) (0.605) (0.547) (0.294) (0.065)
Non-policyholder liabilities 0.0005 -0.0010 0.0000 -0.0002 0.0100 -0.0592
(0.685) (0.306) (0.341) (0.800) (0.367) (0.877)
Operating expenses 0.0220 -0.0730*** 0.0331** 0.0722 14.8526 79.9298*
(0.482) (0.004) (0.025) (0.119) (0.165) (0.056)
Other income 0.0000*** 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000*** 0.0000
(0.003) (0.767) (0.872) (0.774) (0.004) (0.306)
ROA -0.0006* -0.0007 0.0005* 0.0020* 0.1670 0.9932**
(0.078) (0.183) (0.099) (0.070) (0.290) (0.038)
Performance -0.0046** 0.0047** -0.0081** -0.0147*** -0.9752 -2.4596
(0.037) (0.024) (0.013) (0.005) (0.132) (0.298)
GDP growth 0.0000 0.0003 -0.0006 0.0002 -0.2241 -0.6056
(0.984) (0.421) (0.233) (0.837) (0.115) (0.337)
Inflation -0.0004 -0.0011 0.0005 0.0007 0.6069** 0.7485
(0.465) (0.120) (0.415) (0.670) (0.019) (0.494)
Stock market turnover 0.0000 0.0000** 0.0000 0.0001* -0.0083 0.0686***
(0.167) (0.027) (0.315) (0.055) (0.185) (0.002)
Insurer-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 377 296 858 560 843 554
Adj. R2 0.630 0.840 0.556 0.512 0.300 0.395
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differences in the relation between systemic risk and the insurers’ idiosyncratic char-
acteristics in more detail. Our sample is composed of 95 insurers with headquarters
located in the United States and 158 insurers from other countries. To analyze the dif-
ferential drivers of systemic risk, we estimate separate panel regressions for U.S. and
non-U.S. insurers. The results are given in Table 2.6.
For U.S. non-based life insurers, interconnectedness enters the regression of
∆CoVaR with a positive coefficient that is statistically significant at the 1% level while
for non-U.S. insurers it is significant for both lines of business. On the other hand,
interconnectedness seems to slightly increase the values of SRISK for non-life insur-
ers in the U.S. and for life insurers outside the United States. These mixed findings
indicate no clear trend on the impact of our interconnectedness measure on the contri-
bution of insurers to systemic risk. With the exception of the regressions of the SRISK
estimates of non-life insurers outside the U.S., total assets is not a statistically signif-
icant determinant of systemic risk. In contrast, leverage is significantly related to the
exposure to systemic risk of non-life insurers (U.S. and non-U.S.) and life insurers
(only non-U.S.). Our results suggest that the impact of leverage on the exposure and
contribution of systemic risk does not vary across countries or lines of business.
Finally, we investigate the question whether our results change significantly if we
restrict our sample to the time period of the financial crisis. In particular, we hypoth-
esize that size, interconnectedness, and leverage might only have been key drivers of
systemic risk in insurance during the financial crisis. To this end, in Table 2.7, we re-
peat our previous baseline regressions but restrict our sample to a smaller time period
covering the period from Q1 2006 to Q4 2010 (i.e., the time around and during the
financial crisis).
This time, we find no statistically significant impact of interconnectedness on any of
the systemic risk measures. Again, insurer size does not appear to be systematically
related to systemic risk of insurers except for SRISK of non-life insurers where we,
again, find a positive relation. While the signs of the coefficients for leverage remain
the same, we only find a statistically significant impact on systemic risk for non-life
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Table 2.6: Panel regressions for U.S. and non-U.S. insurers.
This table shows the results of panel regressions of quarterly estimates of three systemic risk measures for a sample of international insurers on key indicators of systemic
relevance and various control variables. All panel regressions are estimated with insurer- and quarter-fixed effects and with clustered standard errors on the country level.
The estimated model is:
S ystemicRiski,t = β0 + β1 · Interconnectednessi,t−1 + β2 · Leveragei,t−2 + β3 · Total assetsi,t−2
+ Ω · Insurer controlsi,t−2 + Θ · Country controlsi,t−1 + εi,t,
where S ystemicRiski,t is the value of one of the three systemic risk measures for insurer i in quarter t and Insurer controlsi,t−2 as well as Country controlsi,t−1 are various
firm-specific and country-specific control variables. The samples include insurer-quarter observations of 95 U.S. and 158 non-U.S. insurers over the time period Q1 2000 to
Q4 2012. P-values are reported in parentheses. All insurer characteristics based on accounting statements are lagged by two quarters and Interconnectedness and country
control are lagged by one quarter. Variable definitions and data sources are provided in Table A.2 in the Appendix. ***,**,* denote coefficients that are significant at the
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Adj. R2 is adjusted R-squared.
US Non-US
Dependent variable: ∆CoVaR ∆CoVaR MES MES SRISK SRISK ∆CoVaR ∆CoVaR MES MES SRISK SRISK
Sample: Life Non-Life Life Non-Life Life Non-Life Life Non-Life Life Non-Life Life Non-Life
Interconnectedness 0.0000 0.0000*** -0.0001 0.0000* 0.0036 0.0000* 0.0000*** 0.0000** 0.0000* 0.0000 0.0000* -0.0001
(0.470) (0.000) (0.295) (0.085) (0.810) (0.064) (0.000) (0.041) (0.085) (0.771) (0.064) (0.833)
Total assets 0.0005 0.0026 0.0070 -0.0021 0.9090 1.6734 0.0026 0.0002 -0.0021 -0.0012 1.6734 6.1613**
(0.952) (0.126) (0.105) (0.340) (0.272) (0.124) (0.126) (0.919) (0.340) (0.555) (0.124) (0.021)
Leverage 0.0002 -0.0002*** 0.0001 0.0004*** 0.0020 -0.1180*** -0.0002*** -0.0002** 0.0004*** 0.0006** -0.1180*** 0.0368
(0.545) (0.000) (0.537) (0.000) (0.822) (0.000) (0.000) (0.046) (0.000) (0.016) (0.000) (0.573)
Other control varialbes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Insurer-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 258 812 723 1917 678 1807 812 521 1917 1652 1807 1619
Adj. R2 0.589 0.574 0.452 0.540 0.379 0.221 0.574 0.689 0.540 0.377 0.221 0.195
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Table 2.7: Panel regressions for the crisis period
This table shows the results of panel regressions of quarterly systemic risk of international insurers on
key indicators of systemic relevance and various control variables. All panel regressions are estimated
with insurer- and quarter-fixed effects and with clustered standard errors country level. The conceptual
approach is the following:
S ystemicRiski,t = β0 + β1 · Interconnectednessi,t−1 + β2 · Leveragei,t−2 + β3 · Total assetsi,t−2
+ Ω · Insurer controlsi,t−2 + Θ · Country controlsi,t−1 + εi,t,
The sample includes insurer-quarter observations of 253 international insurers over the time period Q1
2006 to Q4 2010. P-values are reported in parantheses. All insurer characteristics based on accounting
statements are lagged by two quarters and Interconnectedness and country control are lagged by one
quarter. Variable definitions and data sources are provided in Table A.2 in the Appendix. ***,**,*
denote coefficients that are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Adj. R2 is adjusted
R-squared.
Dependent variable: ∆CoVaR ∆CoVaR MES MES SRISK SRISK
Sample: Life Non-Life Life Non-Life Life Non-Life
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Interconnectedness 0.0006 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0298 -0.0023
(0.252) (0.920) (0.962) (0.377) (0.833) (0.851)
Total assets -0.0192 0.0042 -0.0001 -0.0072 3.9042 6.9138**
(0.269) (0.539) (0.994) (0.537) (0.214) (0.016)
Leverage 0.0002 -0.0003*** 0.0005 0.0006*** 0.2112 -0.0841***
(0.480) (0.000) (0.254) (0.000) (0.180) (0.000)
Debt maturity -0.0146 -0.0049 0.0015 0.0061 -2.0916 1.1335
(0.226) (0.274) (0.774) (0.251) (0.547) (0.684)
Investment success -0.0281 -0.0585** -0.0127 -0.0016 -6.1390 -0.5964
(0.316) (0.020) (0.555) (0.722) (0.439) (0.581)
Loss ratio -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0096* -0.0011*
(0.432) (0.979) (0.298) (0.941) (0.062) (0.057)
Market-to-book ratio 0.0011 -0.0003 -0.0002 0.0000 -1.4385 -0.0573
(0.686) (0.732) (0.930) (0.754) (0.305) (0.471)
Non-policyholder liabilities -0.0108*** -0.0017 0.0005 -0.0002 -0.7026 0.0131
(0.001) (0.233) (0.764) (0.340) (0.370) (0.787)
Operating expenses 0.0157*** -0.0061 0.0031 0.0187 5.1510 -1.1348
(0.005) (0.476) (0.820) (0.316) (0.538) (0.796)
Other income 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000**
(0.224) (0.429) (0.182) (0.970) (0.597) (0.021)
ROA -0.0009 -0.0034** 0.0003 0.0005 0.0776 0.0673
(0.776) (0.023) (0.549) (0.559) (0.628) (0.422)
Performance -0.0091** -0.0031 0.0088 0.0004 2.4556** 4.7450
(0.024) (0.294) (0.356) (0.947) (0.046) (0.180)
GDP growth 0.0003 -0.0002 0.0011 0.0007 0.1959 0.3530
(0.770) (0.753) (0.243) (0.328) (0.373) (0.517)
Inflation 0.0004 0.0019 -0.0003 -0.0024 0.2310 -0.4832*
(0.656) (0.107) (0.801) (0.143) (0.320) (0.058)
Stock market turnover 0.0000 0.0000* 0.0001** 0.0001** 0.0043 0.0346**
(0.679) (0.068) (0.018) (0.035) (0.654) (0.012)
Insurer-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 130 239 387 788 379 772
Adj. R2 0.787 0.847 0.575 0.470 0.244 0.155
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insurers. The economic significance of this effect is, however, moderate with a one
standard deviation increase in leverage causing a change of almost minus one percent
in ∆CoVaR during the crisis period (23.42 × -0.0003=-0.7026). In the cross-section
of non-life insurers’ MES during the crisis period, a one standard deviation increase in
leverage is associated with an 1.4% higher exposure to systemic risk (23.42 × 0.0006).
2.3.3 Insurers and the systemic risk in the financial sector
While we have investigated the factors influencing the marginal systemic risk of insur-
ers at the micro-level, we have not yet addressed the overall level of systemic risk that
emanates from the insurance sector (and its possible macroeconomic consequences).
In our final analysis, we therefore employ a macro-level measure of systemic risk
to capture the insurance sector’s propensity to cause real macroeconomic downturns.
More, specifically, we employ the CATFIN measure introduced by Allen et al. (2012)
and compare their results with the CATFIN measure estimated for our sample of in-
surers. CATFIN is defined as the average of three Value-at-Risk estimates of monthly
stock returns in excess of the 1-month treasury bill rate. We fit the Generalized Pareto
Distribution and the Skewed Generalized Error Distribution to generate Value-at-Risk
estimates from the cross-section of our insurers’ monthly stock returns at the 99%
level. Additionally, the third estimate is from the cross-sectional 1% sample quantile.
The resulting CATFIN measures are plotted in Figure 2.3 for the time period 07/2001
to 12/2012.
From the figure, we can see that the time evolution of the two time series of CATFIN
estimates are very similar, but vary in magnitude. Before the crisis, the estimated index
values are closely together until the beginning of the crisis. While the insurer CATFIN
peaks at around 60% in the beginning of 2009, the original estimates from Allen et al.
(2012) reach a maximum of over 70%. The monthly values for the original CATFIN
index seem to be higher than the insurer CATFIN for the most part after the crisis.
Despite the small difference in the magnitude of the peaks of both CATFIN time series,
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Figure 2.3: Time evolution of CATFIN.
This figure plots the time evolution of the CATFIN measure introduced in Allen et al. (2012). CATFIN
is calculated by averaging the three Value-at-Risk estimates from the Generalized Pareto Distribution,
the Skewed Generalized Error Distribution, and the nonparametric sample quantiles for the cross-
section of stock returns of financial institutions in excess of the 1-month treasury bill rate. The red
line represents the CATFIN measure for the cross section of insurers in our sample and the black line
is the original CATFIN measure calculated in Allen et al. (2012) taken from the authors’ website at
http://faculty.msb.edu/tgb27/workingpapers.html. The sample used for calculating the CATFIN of the
insurance sector consists of 253 international life and non-life insurers.
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the plot in Figure 2.3 underlines the finding that the overall level of systemic risk in
the insurance sector was significant and high, especially during the crisis. However,
another important insight from Figure 2.3 is that the overall level of systemic risk in
the insurance sector fails to predict economic downturns, since insurer stocks seem to
lag behind the overall financial sector.
2.3.4 Robustness checks
We also estimate regressions in which we employ alternative measures of an insurer’s
size (net revenues instead of total assets), profitability (ROE instead of ROA) and in-
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vestment activity (ratio of the insurers investment income to net revenues instead of
the ratio of the insurers absolute investment income to the sum of absolute investment
income and absolute earned premiums), respectively. Additional regressions using the
beta of an insurer’s stock yield no change in our results. As mentioned before, we also
replace total assets with premiums earned in the calculation of our variable operating
expenses. However, our previous conclusions remain valid.
Next, it could be argued that our results are driven by the specific manner in which
we estimate the Marginal Expected Shortfall and the other systemic risk measures. To
control for this potential bias, we recalculate MES and ∆CoVaR using three alternative
indexes. To be precise, we employ the World DS Full Lin Insurer Index, the MSCI
World Banks Index and the MSCI World Insurance Index taken from Datastream. The
results show that our conclusions remain unchanged.
Another potential concern with our analysis could be that some of the insurers in
our sample might in fact just be locally rather than internationally active market partic-
ipants. Consequently, the presence of local insurers in our sample could bias our results
on systemic risk as the systemic relevance of locally active insurers should generally
lower than for globally important insurers. However, we believe that the inclusion of
locally active insurers in the context of our analysis is sensible for the following rea-
sons. First, we cannot rule out the possibility that insurers with insurance activities in
only their home country contribute to global systemic risk due to off-balance sheet and
non-insurance activities. Second, sheer size and relevance in an insurer’s home country
might be enough to destabilize a nation’s economy and thus cause global financial sta-
bility.17 Nevertheless, we perform an additional robustness check in which we include
in our baseline regressions the variable Foreign sales, which is the ratio of an insurer’s
international sales to its total sales, to control for business activities abroad. Including
this factor does neither change our main results, nor is the variable significant in any
of the regressions.
17The anecdotal evidence of the inclusion of the Ping An Insurance Group in the list of the nine G-SIIs
underlines this notion.
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Additionally, we employ GMM-sys regressions (see Blundell and Bond, 1998) that
include one lag of our dependent variables and explanatory variables lagged by one
quarter. In these regressions, double-lagged values of the insurer characteristics are
used as instruments for estimation. In doing so, we mitigate concerns on possible
endogeneity in our regression models. Our main results, however, remain valid.
Finally, we winsorize all data at the 1% and 99% quantiles to minimize a possible
bias due to outliers and reestimate all our regressions using winsorized data. The
results of these alternative regressions are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to
those reported in the paper.
2.4 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze the exposure and contribution of 253 international life and
non-life insurers to global systemic risk in the period from 2000 to 2012. As our main
result, we find systemic risk in the international insurance sector to be small in com-
parison to previous findings in the literature for banks in our full sample. During the
financial crisis, however, insurers did contribute significantly to the instability of the
financial sector. Further, we conclude that systemic risk of insurers is determined by
various factors including an insurer’s interconnectedness and leverage, the magnitudes
and significances of these effects, however, differ depending on the systemic risk mea-
sure used and with the analyzed insurer line and geographic region. Most interestingly,
we find the interconnectedness of large insurers with the insurance sector to be a signif-
icant driver of the insurers’ exposure to systemic risk. In contrast, the contribution of
insurers to systemic risk appears to be driven by (among others) leverage, loss ratios,
and the insurer’s funding fragility.
Our results also show that life insurers do not contribute significantly more to global
systemic risk than non-life insurers. In addition, there seems to be little difference in
the interconnectedness of life and non-life insurers. In our study, we find no convinc-
ing evidence in support of the hypothesis that insurer size is a fundamental driver of
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the contribution of an insurer to systemic risk. In contrast to the banking sector, we
show that the insurance sector predominantly suffers from being exposed to systemic
risk, rather than adding to the financial system’s fragility. Finally, our study reveals
that both the systemic risk exposure and the contribution of international insurers were
limited prior to the financial crisis with all measures of systemic risk increasing signifi-
cantly during the crisis. In contrast to the banking sector, however, systemic risk in the
insurance sector does not appear to lead but rather follow macroeconomic downturns
as evidenced by our analysis of the insurers’ CATFIN estimates.
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Chapter 3
Size Is Everything: How Should We
Measure Systemic Relevance of Banks
and Insurers?
“The omission of Standard Chartered from the list of G-Sifis (global systemically
important financial institutions) shows size is not everything.”
The Observer, 11/06/2011
3.1 Introduction
At the climax of the financial crisis of 2007-2009, American International Group (AIG)
became the first international insurer that required (and ultimately received) a bailout
as regulators considered AIG to be too systemically important to default. At the time,
AIG’s near-collapse came to the surprise of most analysts and also financial economists
as systemic risk was considered to be a problem confined to banking, but not insurance.
As a response to this wakeup-call, regulators have recently started to realign the reg-
ulation of international insurance companies towards a macroprudential supervision.
Most prominently, on July 18th, 2013, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) together
with the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) published a list of
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nine Global Systemically Important Insurers (G-SIIs) which will ultimately face higher
capital and loss absorbency requirements. In essence, insurers are deemed to be glob-
ally systemically important in the views of regulators if they are of such size and global
interconnectedness that their default would trigger severe adverse effects on the finan-
cial sector. Similarly, in November 2011, the FSB had previously identified a set of 29
banks as Global Systemically Important Financial Institutions (G-SIFIs). However, the
validity of these classifications and the actual determinants of the decision of regulators
to designate a financial institution as global systemically important remain relatively
unknown.
Until the financial crisis, economists had never expected systemic risks to arise from
the insurance sector. In contrast to banking, insurance companies are not vulnerable to
runs by customers and thus are not subject to sudden shortages in liquidity. Although
theoretically, one could think of runs on life insurance policies, there has not been a
single example in history for such a run to take place and cause systemwide defaults of
insurers (see, e.g., Eling and Pankoke, 2014).18 Furthermore, even the largest interna-
tional insurers are significantly smaller in size, are less interconnected and hold more
capital (see Harrington, 2009) than the largest global banks. In light of this, the case
of AIG seems to have been a major exception to the rule that insurers do not create
systemic risks.
Based on the experiences from the financial crisis, the IAIS (2013) published in
2012 a methodology for assessing the systemic risk of international insurers. In this
methodology, the key determinants of systemic risk in insurance are non-core and non-
insurance activities, insurer size and interconnectedness.19
However, the empirical evidence on the questions whether insurers can become
systemically relevant and whether these factors really drive systemic risk is lim-
18An “insurer run” is regarded as unlikely by most economists as customers are often protected by
guarantees that are similar to explicit deposit insurance schemes in banking.
19The non-core activities listed by the IAIS include credit default swaps (CDS) transactions for non-
hedging purposes, leveraging assets to enhance investment returns, as well as products and activities
that concern bank-type (or investment bank-type) activities. Furthermore, the IAIS argues that in-
surance companies which engage in non-traditional insurance activities are more affected to financial
market developments and contribute more to systemic risk of the insurance sector.
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ited. Shortly after the financial crisis, Acharya et al. (2009), Harrington (2009), and
Cummins and Weiss (2014) discussed the role of insurers during the financial crisis.20
More recently, due to the increased attention regulators are giving this topic, several
studies have analyzed different aspects of systemic risk in insurance. For example,
Cummins and Weiss (2014) and Weiß and Mu¨hlnickel (2014b) study the effect of dif-
ferent factors from the IAIS methodology on the systemic risk of U.S. insurers.
In this paper, we analyze the question whether common measures of systemic
risk are significantly driven by the size, the interconnectedness, and the leverage of
global banks and insurers. As systemic risk measures, we employ the institutions’
Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES) (see Acharya et al., 2010) and their ∆CoVaR (see
Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2014). We then perform separate quantile regressions for
both a sample of the world’s largest banks and insurers of these two measures of sys-
temic risk on size, interconnectedness, leverage, and a set of control variables. For both
banks and insurers, the results of these quantile regressions are inconclusive to coun-
terintuitive. While the extreme quantiles of both MES and ∆CoVaR (i.e., institutions
that are most exposed and contribute the most to systemic risk) are not significantly
affected by size, higher leverage and interconnectedness counterintuitively seem to
decrease systemic risk. We then turn to probit regressions of the probability of mem-
bership in the groups of G-SIFIs and G-SIIs. Our results are extremely revealing: the
decision of regulators to declare a financial institution (bank or insurer) as systemically
relevant is only driven by the institution’s size.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Related literature is presented in
Section 3.2. The data and variables used in our empirical study are discussed in Section
3.3. The outline and the results of our empirical study are given in Section 3.4. Section
3.5 concludes.
20Additional analyses of systemic risk in insurance are due to Eling and Schmeiser (2010),
Lehmann and Hofmann (2010), and van Lelyveld et al. (2011).
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3.2 Related literature
The case of systemic risk in the banking sector has been discussed extensively in the
recent literature. However, the question whether insurers can actually become system-
ically relevant for the financial system and the question whether the IAIS’s proposed
methodology is suitable for identifying G-SIIs remain relatively unanswered in the lit-
erature so far. Only few studies focus on the exposure and contribution of insurers
to systemic risk and the key determinants that could cause severe consequences for
insurers. Reviewing the academic literature, Trichet (2005) argued that the traditional
insurance business is not vulnerable to “insurance runs” and that interconnectedness in
the insurance sector is weak in contrast to the banking sector. After the financial crisis,
this view changed significantly. For example, Baluch et al. (2011) conclude that sys-
temic risks exist in the insurance sector even though they are smaller than in banking.
More importantly, systemic risk in insurance appears to have grown partially as a con-
sequence to the increasing interconnectedness of insurers to other financial institutions
and their activities outside of the traditional insurance business.
In the empirical literature, several studies have focused on the the interconnected-
ness of insurers as a primary driver of systemc risk. Billio et al. (2012) analyze the
interconnectedness of global financial institutions based on their stock prices and ar-
gue that illiquid assets of insurers could create systemic risks in times of financial
crisis. In a related study, Chen et al. (2014) analyze the interconnectedness of banks
and insurers but find in their analysis of credit default swap and intraday stock price
data that the insurance sector is exposed but does not contribute to systemic risks in
the banking sector.
While the former two studies are only concerned with the interconnectedness of
banks and insurers, the effect of additional factor like size, leverage, and profitability on
systemic risk in insurance is studied by Weiß and Mu¨hlnickel (2014b).21 Most impor-
21In a related study, Cummins and Weiss (2014) also analyze the characteristics of U.S. insurers that are
systemically important.
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tantly, they find that insurer size seems to have been a major driver of the systemic risk
exposure and contribution of U.S. insurers. Several of the IAIS indicators (like, e.g.,
geographical diversification), however, do not appear to be significantly related to the
systemic risk of insurers. The hypotheses behind these suspected causal relations are
similar to arguments brought forward in banking. Insurer size, for example, could have
an increasing effect on systemic risk in insurance, because larger insurance companies
have a wider range of different risks insured and thus are less prone to suffer from
cumulative losses (see Hagendorff et al., 2011). Yet, larger insurance companies could
become too-interconnected-to-fail and thus systemically relevant (see Acharya et al.,
2009).
Additionally, the IAIS has also argued that high leverage could increase the sys-
temic importance of individual insurers (especially in combination with size and in-
terconnectedness). High leverage incentivizes managers into excessive risk-taking to
increase a firm’s profitability (see, e.g., Acharya et al., 2010, Fahlenbrach et al., 2012).
However, leverage is obviously not bad per se. For example, Vallascas and Hagendorff
(2011) stress the disciplining function of leverage as it pressures managers into se-
curing the payment of interest to investors and to secure firm liquidity. In addition,
insurers that engage too heavily in non-core activities as well as derivatives trading
could also single-handedly destabilize the financial sector.
Probably the most fundamental question, however, remains whether systemic risk
in insurance companies (even if it exists) is large enough to destabilize the whole fi-
nancial sector. In this respect, Weiß et al. (2014) find systemic risk in the international
insurance sector to be small in comparison to previous findings in the literature for
banks.
3.3 Data
This section describes the construction of our sample of banks and insurers and
presents the choice of our dependent and main independent variables as well as de-
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scriptive statistics of our data.
3.3.1 Sample construction
Balance-sheet and income statement data are retrieved from the Thomson Worldscope
database and all stock market and accounting data are collected in U.S. dollars to min-
imize a possible bias as a result from currency risk. To construct our sample, we select
all publicly listed international insurers from the dead and active firm list in Thomson
Reuters Financial Datastream and omit all firms for which stock price data are unavail-
able in Datastream. We exclude Berkshire Hathaway due to its unusually high stock
price, although it is listed as an insurer in Datastream. For our analysis we restrict
our dataset to the one-hundred largest insurance companies, measured by their total
assets at the end of the fiscal year 2006. A similar procedure is used for the construc-
tion of our international sample of banks. Initially, we start with a sample of all firms
in the active and dead-firm “banks” and “financial services” lists in Thomson Reuters
Financial Datastream. 22 As in Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011), we then select all com-
panies with SIC codes between 6000 and 6300 (i.e., we eliminate insurers, real estate
operators, holding and investment offices as well as other non-bank companies in the
financial service industry from our sample of banks). It is crucial for our analysis that
we have accounting price and stock price data available in Thomson Worldscope and
Datastream and we therefore exclude firms where these data are not available. We ex-
clude a stock from our sample if it is identified in Datastream as a non-primary quote
or if it is an American Depositary Receipt (ADR). All OTC traded stocks and prefer-
ence shares are also removed. Similar to the insurer sample, we restrict our data set to
the 150 largest banks, measured by their total assets at the end of the fiscal year 2006.
Due to secondary listings, we have to remove another two banks and two insurers from
the samples. The geographical distribution of our sample banks and insurers covers 36
countries where the most banks (25 out of 148) and insurers (27 out of 98) come from
22Since we cannot rule out that some banks are erroneously listed in the “financial services” instead of
the “banks” category in Datastream, we use both lists to generate our final sample.
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the United States. After the U.S., the four most prominent countries in our samples
are China (10/2), Japan (16/6), the United Kingdom (11/8), and Germany (8/11). The
geographical spread of our sample firms is shown in Table 3.1. 23
Next, we define and discuss the main dependent and independent variables for our
analysis in the subsequent sections. Appendix B.1 gives an overview of all variable
definitions and data sources in our empirical study. To minimize the possibly biasing
effect of extreme outliers in our sample on our results, all data are winsorized at the
1% and 99% levels.
3.3.2 Systemic risk measures
In our study, we employ two different measures of systemic risk that proxy for an in-
stitution’s sensitivity or exposure and contribution to systemic risk in a larger financial
system. Systemic risk is calculated for the crisis period which we define as the period
between July 2007 and the end of december 2008 (see Fahlenbrach et al., 2012). Sim-
ilar to the recent literature (see, e.g., Anginer et al., 2014b,a, Weiß and Mu¨hlnickel,
2014b), we use as our measures of systemic risk the unconditional ∆CoVaR as defined
by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2014) and the Marginal Expected Shortfall as defined by
Acharya et al. (2010).
One of the more established measures of systemic risk that is also used by regulators
is the unconditional ∆CoVaR measured as the difference of the Value-at-risk (VaR) of
a financial sector index24 conditional on the distress of a particular insurer and the VaR
of the sector index conditional on the median state of the insurer. Therefore, ∆CoVaR
could be interpreted as the actual contribution to systemic risk in the financial system
by the respective observed company.
In contrast, the Marginal Expected Shortfall is defined as the negative average return
on a firm’s stock on the days an index (in our case the MSCI World index) experienced
23The names of the 98 insurers and 148 banks in our final sample are available from the authors upon
request.
24In our main analysis, we employ the MSCI World Index. For further robustness checks, we also
employ the the World DS Full Line Insurer Index, the MSCI World Banks Index, and the MSCI World
Insurance index for the calculation of ∆CoVaR and Marginal Expected Shortfall.
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Table 3.1: Geographic sample distribution.
The table shows the geographic spread for the sample of the largest 148 banks and for
the 98 largest international insurers. The minimum and maximum values for the total
assets in 2006 are given in billion US$.
Banks Insurer
Country Number Min Max Number Min Max
AT 4 65.81 213.96 2 25.86 26.98
AU 5 77.73 453.41 4 19.04 72.99
BE 3 97.64 667.95 1 979.41 979.41
BM - - - 1 19.55 19.55
BR 1 123.21 123.21 - - -
CA 6 99.94 458.57 7 19.48 326.43
CH 3 84.34 1815.56 6 25.1 327.94
CN 10 56.62 930.42 2 61.96 96.71
DE 8 76.7 1324.18 11 24.24 1311.58
DK 1 433.14 433.14 - - -
ES 5 85.01 972.82 1 28.07 28.07
FI - - - 1 58.96 58.96
FR 5 252.57 1697.21 4 20.38 907.91
GB 10 77.85 1841.03 7 22.03 527.71
GR 3 58.42 90.01 - - -
HK 1 86.29 86.29 - - -
IE 4 86.41 262.94 2 59.49 94.49
IL 2 61.37 62.59 - - -
IN 2 61.48 154.75 - - -
IS 1 64.03 64.03 - - -
IT 6 80.59 963.16 7 23.68 454.27
JP 15 58.02 1578.76 5 26.12 143.65
KR 6 70.71 209.69 - - -
LU 1 72.85 72.85 - - -
MY 1 59.01 59.01 - - -
NG 1 130.39 130.39 - - -
NL 1 1160.22 1160.22 2 404.42 1318.22
NO 1 194.97 194.97 1 33.67 33.67
PT 2 69.66 92.84 - - -
RU 1 120.62 120.62 - - -
SE 4 170 393.23 - - -
SG 3 90.91 118.69 1 25.83 25.83
TR 1 63.15 63.15 - - -
TW 3 68.09 72.33 3 44.97 107.62
US 25 56.62 1841.03 27 17.91 985.44
ZA 3 78.04 152.69 3 29.89 51.96
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its 5% worst outcomes. 25 A positive MES thus indicates a positive exposure to sys-
temic risk rather than a stabilizing effect.
3.3.3 Explanatory variables
The focus of our analyses is to shed more light on the interplay of systemic risk and
possible determining factors proposed by the Financial Stability Board and the IAIS
(2013). Thus, we concentrate on size, leverage, and the interconnectedness of banks
and insurers. We intend to show whether these factors can explain the decisions of
regulators to propose global systemic relevance for some of the banks and insurers in
the financial system. Furthermore, we compare the predictive power of these factors
for explaining the cross-sectional variation in both the institutions’ MES and ∆CoVaR.
As a standard proxy for size we employ the natural logarithm of an institution’s total
assets at the end of the fiscal year 2006. The effect of size on systemic risk could be am-
biguous. On the one hand, if a bank or insurer is deemed “too-big-to-fail”, and hence
might receive subsidies from safety net policies in a situation of undercapitalization,
this could incentivize managers to take on more risks than socially optimal. Conse-
quently, large banks or insurers should contribute significantly more to systemic risk
than smaller institutions (see, e.g., O’Hara and Shaw, 1990, Acharya and Yorulmazer,
2008, Anginer et al., 2014a). On the other hand, a larger firm generally has more op-
portunities to diversify and thus hedge against times of financial turmoil, which could
decrease the firm’s systemic risk.
As the next main variable of interest, we measure a firm’s leverage as the book
value of assets minus book value of equity plus market value of equity, divided by
market value of equity (see Acharya et al., 2010). High leverage is a factor that
incentivizes managers into excessive risk-taking to increase a firm’s profitability.26
In contrast, managers could be disciplined by higher leverage since they could feel
25Additionally, we employ the Dynamic Marginal Expected Shortfall calculated following the procedure
laid out by Brownlees and Engle (2012) for robustness checks later on.
26Support for this view is found by Acharya et al. (2010), Fahlenbrach et al. (2012) and
Hovakimian et al. (2012) who empirically show that banks with low leverage during the crisis per-
formed better and had less contribution to systemic risk as firms with high leverage ratios.
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more pressured to provide enough liquid assets to cover interest payments (see, e.g.,
Vallascas and Hagendorff, 2011). This could in turn decrease a bank’s or insurer’s total
risk. We therefore include leverage as a main independent variable in our regressions
with no prediction for the sign of the coefficient.
The third important factor entering our analyses is the interconnectedness of banks
and insurers within the financial system. Since we do not have information on, e.g.,
interbank lending markets, we make use of the measure of interconnectedness of a fi-
nancial institution proposed by Billio et al. (2012) based on standardized stock returns
of individual banks and insurers. Billio et al. (2012) propose a univariate measure
PCAS of an institution’s interconnectedness with the system of all financial institu-
tions in our sample (i.e., banks and insurers) which is based on a principal component
analysis of the correlations between all institutions’ stocks. The measure then compute
the contribution of an individual institution to the overall risk of the financial system.
The more interconnected an insurer or bank is with the rest of the financial sector,
the higher its systemic relevance will be. We therefore suspect PCAS to enter our re-
gressions with a significant increasing effect on systemic risk (see Arnold et al., 2012,
Black et al., 2013, IAIS, 2013).
In addition to our three main independent variables that cover the most important
(presumed) driving factors of systemic relevance, we include in our regressions several
firm-specific characteristics that have shown to be significant drivers of performance
and systemic risk of banks and insurers in the recent literature. An overview of all the
variable definitions, data sources and our hypotheses regarding the analyses is given in
Appendix B.1.
3.3.4 Descriptive statistics
Table 3.2 shows summary statistics for our two dependent variables for the time period
July 2007 to the end of 2008 (crisis period) and for our three main explanatory variables
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of interest, total assets, leverage and interconnectedness in the year 2006.27
The summary statistics for the banks in our sample are given in Panel A and for
the insurers in Panel B of Table 3.2. First, we notice that the means of the variables
differ substantially for the banking and insurance sector. The average MES is higher
for insurers than for banks while the opposite is true for ∆CoVaR. One explanation for
this finding could be the fact that both measures are purely based on stock market data.
As insurers will most likely have a higher sensitivity of their asset side to downturns
in equity markets, so will their own equity. Consequently, the higher MES estimates
for insurers could be indicative of a) a higher overall (average) systemic importance
of insurers or b) a higher sensitivity of their equity to market crashes (which in part
could also indicate a higher systemic risk). Conversely, the sheer size of the asset
management activities of the larger insurance companies and crisis-related shifts in
their asset portfolios could also explain the lower average ∆CoVaR in our sample.
Insurers have mean total assets of $ 158 billion while banks are significantly larger
with mean total assets of $ 350 billion. Furthermore, the leverage of banks on average
is 13.430 whereas the average insurer has a leverage of 9.285, underlining the usually
increased leverage in banking compared to other industries. As expected, on average,
banks had significantly higher total assets, leverage and were more interconnected than
insurers. Additionally, we find only little evidence of strong interconnectedness of the
insurers in our sample compared to the bank sample. Based on the univariate analysis,
we could hypothesize that size and leverage appear to be driving systemic risk while
interconnectedness does not play such an important role for explaining differences in
MES and ∆CoVaR.
3.4 The determinants of systemic relevance
In this section, we investigate the question which (possibly differential) factors deter-
mine the systemic relevance of banks and insurers. We first present the results of our
27Note that the sample size is slightly reduced by the unavailability of some balance sheet items for
smaller banks and insurers in Worldscope.
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Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics: banks and insurers.
The table shows summary statistics for the sample of the largest 148 banks and for the 98 largest international insurers. The values for the
systemic risk measures MES and ∆CoVaR are given for the crisis period (July 2007 to December 2008) and the values for the three independent
variables are calculated for the fiscal year 2006. Variable definitions and data sources are documented in Appendix B.1. All data are winsorized
at the 1% and 99% levels.
Banks
No. Obs. Min. 10% 25% Median Mean 75% 90% Max.
MES 148 -0.166 -0.048 0.001 0.033 0.025 0.064 0.097 0.137
∆CoVaR 148 -0.021 -0.015 -0.010 -0.001 -0.005 0.000 0.000 0.001
Total assets (in billions) 148 56.620 65.278 85.010 151.200 350.800 345.500 1046.447 1841.000
Leverage 146 4.071 5.221 6.585 9.046 13.430 14.110 22.114 96.060
Interconnectedness (in 10−9) 148 0.000 0.000 0.012 15950.000 108900.000 149556.000 328951.000 1211000.000
Insurers
No. Obs. Min. 10% 25% Median Mean 75% 90% Max.
MES 98 0.009 0.020 0.034 0.051 0.056 0.073 0.098 0.150
∆CoVaR 98 -0.021 -0.019 -0.018 -0.015 -0.015 -0.013 -0.011 -0.004
Total assets (in billions) 98 17.910 23.187 27.080 56.390 158.700 147.300 405.449 131.000
Leverage 98 1.729 3.322 5.273 7.309 9.285 11.350 17.265 42.260
Interconnectedness (in 10−9) 98 0.000 0.003 0.012 0.078 0.078 0.211 0.368 1.001
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cross-sectional OLS and quantile regressions of the institutions’ MES and ∆CoVaR
during the crisis. Afterwards, we report and comment on the results of our probit re-
gressions for the determination of factors influencing systemic relevance as stated by
regulators.
3.4.1 Cross-sectional regressions
Instead of only using the standard OLS approach for cross-sectional regressions, we
perform our multivariate analysis of the determinants of extreme values of MES and
∆CoVaR in two ways. In particular, we employ cross-sectional quantile regressions
with bootstrapped standard errors28 and simple OLS regressions with robust standard
errors of our systemic risk proxies during the crisis on our (lagged) main independent
and the various control variables in 2006. The use of quantile regressions leaves us
with reasonable benefits compared to OLS regressions. OLS models the relationship
between the conditional mean of the dependent variable and the independent vari-
ables. Generally, we could have included all active banks and insurance companies
from Datastream with available data in our study. However, including every firm will
bias the results of our regressions, since we would simply add a high number of insti-
tutions that are not systemically relevant and thus, skew the values of our systemic risk
measures (or the dummy variables for our probit regressions) in a mechanical way. The
quantile regression approach by Koenker and Basset (1978) circumvents the problems
that arise in OLS due to heteroskedasticity in the data by estimating the change in a
specified quantile of the dependent variable given the covariates produced by the inde-
pendent variables. Quantile regression models the quantiles of the dependent variable’s
distribution and therefore does not suffer from the usual heteroskedasticity problem.
For the MES, we investigate the 95%-percentile and for ∆CoVaR we are interested
in the 5%-percentile, with both indicating extreme systemic risk. The results of our
cross-sectional analysis for banks are shown in Table 3.4 and 3.3.
28By using bootstrapped standard errors, we are able to partially obviate possible biases by the non-i.i.d.
character of our data.
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Table 3.3: Cross-sectional regression of systemic risk of banks.
The table shows the OLS and quantile regression results using a sample of the 148
largest banks. Independent variables are calculated for the fiscal year 2006 and the
systemic risk measures are calculated for the crisis period (July 2007 to December
2008). Regressions on MES are on the 95%-percentile. The OLS regressions are esti-
mated using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors and the quantile regression uses
bootstrapped standard errors. P-values are given in parentheses. ***,**, and * denote
statistical significance at the 1%-,5%- and 10%-level respectively. Variable definitions
and data sources are documented in Appendix B.1. Interconnectedness is given in
millions. Test statistics and p-values for Breusch-Pagan tests on heteroskedasticity are
reported below.
Dependent variable: ∆CoVaR ∆CoVaR ∆CoVaR ∆CoVaR ∆CoVaR ∆CoVaR ∆CoVaR ∆CoVaR
Estimation: OLS regression Quantile regression
Log(Total assets) 0.0008 0.0022 0.0008 0.0034*
(0.121) (0.100) (0.527) (0.090)
Leverage 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0006
(0.529) (0.986) (0.914) (0.178)
Interconnectedness 0.0118*** 0.0000** 0.0153 0.0061
(0.001) (0.049) (0.410) (0.259)
Performance -0.0040 -0.0096*
(0.176) (0.082)
ROA -0.0019 -0.0012
(0.177) (0.528)
Debt maturity -0.0021 -0.0033
(0.469) (0.647)
Deposits -0.0016 -0.0037
(0.761) (0.709)
Loan loss provision -0.0016 -0.0031
(0.346) (0.283)
Loans 0.0048 -0.0036
(0.371) (0.839)
Tier-1-capital 0.0939 0.1515
(0.175) (0.115)
Non-interest income -0.0024 -0.0074**
(0.340) (0.045)
No. Obs. 148 146 148 92 148 146 148 92
R2 0.0169 0.0025 0.1360 0.3204 - - - -
Pseudo R2 - - - - 0.0108 0.0012 0.1066 0.4826
χ2 1.01 0.05 4.02 23.23 - - - -
p-value 0.316 0.817 0.045 0.000 - - - -
The first three regressions in all settings are concerned with the individual effects
of our three main dependent variables, size, leverage and interconnectedness with the
financial system, and systemic risk.
In the OLS regressions of banks, we find no significant effect of the variables total
assets and leverage on our systemic risk measures except for a strong signifiance at
the 1% level of interconnectedness on ∆CoVaR. Surprisingly, the variable enters the
quantile regression with a positive coefficient and thus increases the value of ∆CoVaR,
which we interpret as a decrease in the systemic risk contribution of the bank, since
smaller values of ∆CoVaR indicate a higher contribution to systemic risk. However,
by adding our control variables, we lose only some of the significance of interconnect-
edness and find no statistically significant influence of any other variable on ∆CoVaR.
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Table 3.4: Cross-sectional regression of systemic risk of banks.
The table shows the OLS and quantile regression results using a sample of the 148
largest banks. Independent variables are calculated for the fiscal year 2006 and the
systemic risk measures are calculated for the crisis period (July 2007 to December
2008). Regressions on ∆CoVaR are on the 5%-percentile. The OLS regressions are
estimated using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors and the quantile regression
uses bootstrapped standard errors. P-values are given in parentheses. ***,**, and *
denote statistical significance at the 1%-,5%- and 10%-level respectively. Variable
definitions and data sources are documented in Appendix B.1. Interconnectedness is
given in millions. Test statistics and p-values for Breusch-Pagan tests on heteroskedas-
ticity are reported below.
Dependent variable: MES MES MES MES MES MES MES MES
Estimation: OLS regression Quantile regression
Log(Total assets) 0.0042 0.0062 0.0071 0.0022
(0.389) (0.669) (0.311) (0.888)
Leverage -0.0002 -0.0007 -0.0003 -0.0046
(0.475) (0.530) (0.589) (0.205)
Interconnectedness -0.1150** -0.2070*** 0.0192 -0.1920*
(0.018) (0.000) (0.483) (0.069)
Performance -0.0030 -0.0267
(0.889) (0.385)
ROA -0.0132 -0.0451**
(0.196) (0.027)
Debt maturity 0.0153 0.0382
(0.592) (0.462)
Deposits -0.0422 -0.2903*
(0.383) (0.051)
Loan loss provision 0.0040 0.0254
(0.844) (0.333)
Loans -0.0287 0.1026
(0.704) (0.197)
Tier-1-capital 0.5999 1.3814
(0.196) (0.173)
Non-interest income -0.0122 -0.0283
(0.567) (0.281)
No. Obs. 148 146 148 92 148 146 148 92
R2 0.0047 0.0028 0.1409 0.2975 - - - -
Pseudo R2 - - - - 0.0212 0.0053 0.0003 0.2319
χ2 5.71 0.02 34.21 0.14 - - - -
p-value 0.017 0.895 0.000 0.713 - - - -
Looking at the respective quantile regressions on the 5%-quantile of ∆CoVaR reveals
that only bank size is a slightly statistically significant predictor of extreme contri-
bution of banks to systemic risk. The variable enters the quantile regression with a
positive sign of the coefficient at a 10% level, which indicates an unintuitive impres-
sion that larger banks contribute less to systemic risk.
The OLS regressions of MES on our main variables of interest show that only the
interconnectedness of banks influenced the exposure of banks to external shocks during
the crisis. The coefficient of interconnectedness enters both the OLS and the quantile
regression with a negative sign that is significant at the 1% level in the regression of the
conditional mean and at the 10% level for the regression of the 95%-quantile. Thus, at
least for this sample, we find the counterintuitive result that being more interconnected
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does not necessarily increase the exposure of banks to systemic risk. Interestingly,
we note a slightly significant decreasing effect of the variable deposits on MES which
leaves us with the interpretation that banks with higher deposit financing were more
stable and less sensitive to external shocks during the financial crisis.
The regressions of banks’ systemic risk on the indicators of systemic relevance re-
veal that only the interconnectedness of banks with the financial sector helps in ex-
plaining the magnitude of the contribution or exposure to systemic risk. In Tables 3.5
and 3.6, we show the results from the OLS and quantile regressions of ∆CoVaR and
MES on the proposed factors of systemic relevance for insurers.
Table 3.5: Cross-sectional regression of systemic risk of insurers.
The table shows the OLS and quantile regression results using a sample of the 98
largest insurance companies. Independent variables are calculated for the fiscal year
2006 and the systemic risk measures are calculated for the crisis period (July 2007
to December 2008). Regressions on ∆CoVaR are on the 5%-percentile. The OLS
regressions are estimated using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors and the
quantile regression uses bootstrapped standard errors. P-values are given in paren-
theses. ***,**, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%-,5%- and 10%-level
respectively. Variable definitions and data sources are documented in Appendix B.1.
Test statistics and p-values for Breusch-Pagan tests on heteroskedasticity are reported
below.
Dependent variable: ∆CoVaR ∆CoVaR ∆CoVaR ∆CoVaR ∆CoVaR ∆CoVaR ∆CoVaR ∆CoVaR
Estimation: OLS regression Quantile regression
Log(Total assets) -0.0006* -0.0009 0.0003 0.0007
(0.082) (0.408) (0.367) (0.237)
Leverage 0.0001* 0.0002** 0.0001 0.0002*
(0.063) (0.043) (0.214) (0.078)
Interconnectedness 0.0032* 0.0022 0.0021 0.0058*
(0.089) (0.468) (0.344) (0.087)
Performance -0.0003 0.0006
(0.873) (0.743)
ROA 0.0006 0.0011***
(0.237) (0.000)
Debt maturity 0.0014 -0.0006
(0.550) (0.804)
Investment success 0.0064 0.0063
(0.305) (0.094)
Loss ratio 0.0000 0.0000**
(0.651) (0.015)
Non-policyholder liab. -0.0004 0.0000
(0.283) (0.974)
Operating expenses -0.0124 -0.0036
(0.111) (0.353)
Other income 0.0000 0.0000
(0.623) (0.853)
Fixed income 0.0000 -0.0012**
(0.999) (0.025)
No. Obs. 98 98 98 71 98 98 98 71
R2 0.0307 0.0307 0.0315 0.1973 - - - -
Pseudo R2 - - - - 0.0092 0.0283 0.0332 0.3263
χ2 0.01 0.37 0.40 0.75 - - - -
p-value 0.909 0.544 0.53 0.385 - - - -
From Table 3.5, we can see that an insurer’s size decreases ∆CoVaR (significant
at the 10% level) and thus, indicates a higher contribution to systemic risk by larger
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Table 3.6: Cross-sectional regression of systemic risk of insurers.
The table shows the OLS and quantile regression results using a sample of the 98
largest insurance companies. Independent variables are calculated for the fiscal year
2006 and the systemic risk measures are calculated for the crisis period (July 2007
to December 2008). Regressions on MES are on the 95%-percentile. The OLS
regressions are estimated using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors and the
quantile regression uses bootstrapped standard errors. P-values are given in paren-
theses. ***,**, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%-,5%- and 10%-level
respectively. Variable definitions and data sources are documented in Appendix B.1.
Test statistics and p-values for Breusch-Pagan tests on heteroskedasticity are reported
below.
Dependent variable: MES MES MES MES MES MES MES MES
Estimation: OLS regression Quantile regression
Log(Total assets) 0.0095*** 0.0019 0.0111 -0.0106
(0.000) (0.806) (0.269) (0.442)
Leverage -0.0006 -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0013
(0.131) (0.204) (0.752) (0.575)
Interconnectedness -0.0275** 0.0156 -0.0734 -0.0141
(0.020) (0.453) (0.179) (0.795)
Performance -0.0390*** -0.0594**
(0.001) (0.012)
ROA 0.0024 -0.0018
(0.551) (0.805)
Debt maturity 0.0048 -0.0022
(0.762) (0.967)
Investment success 0.1042* 0.1318
(0.063) (0.199)
Loss ratio -0.0001** -0.0001
(0.025) (0.363)
Non-policyholder liab. 0.0006 -0.0055
(0.858) (0.651)
Operating expenses -0.0934 -0.1014
(0.277) (0.497)
Other income 0.0000 0.0000
(0.422) (0.691)
Fixed income 0.0077 0.0188
(0.210) (0.206)
No. Obs. 98 98 98 71 98 98 98 71
R2 0.1128 0.0154 0.0339 0.4932 - - - -
Pseudo R2 - - - - 0.0432 0.0098 0.0394 0.4905
χ2 0.88 0.02 1.55 5.13 - - - -
p-value 0.347 0.880 0.213 0.024 - - - -
insurers. This signifiance, however, vanishes when including other control variables
and is also never significant when we regress the conditional quantile of systemic risk.
A very similar pattern can be found when looking at the results concerning insurer size
in Table 3.6, where total assets seems to increase the exposure to systemic risk. On the
other hand, we find that a higher leverage induces a lower systemic risk contribution.
Again, this counterintuitive result could be due to our proxies of systemic risk not
being able to fully capture all facets of an institution’s systemic relevance. For the
interconnectedness variable, we find the same effects on systemic risk as in the models
involving our sample of banks, but with statistically less significant results.
Additionally, we find that profitability and higher loss ratios also have a decreasing
effect on the contribution to systemic risk. Throughout all of the regressions, neither
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size nor leverage consistently enters the analysis with a significant coefficient. Conse-
quently, a simple analysis of MES and ∆CoVaR could lead to the conclusion that both
size and leverage are not significant drivers of systemic risk in banking and insurance.
3.4.2 Probit regressions
In this section, we try to explaing the probability of being declared a global systemi-
cally important bank or insurer by regulators. To this end, we employ a probit regres-
sion approach. Employing a probit regression model allows us to explain the probabil-
ity that a bank or an insurer will be declared systemically relevant or not. To this end,
we employ the same set of explanatory variables as before in our quantile regressions.
The results of the probit regressions for the 148 largest banks, measured by their
total assets in 2006, are presented in Table 3.7.
The Table 3.7 shows the results of several probit regressions on a dummy variables
that takes on the value of one if a bank was declared global systemically important by
the Financial Stability Board, and zero otherwise.
Starting with probit regressions (1) to (3) of systemic relevance of banks, we can see
that neither the banks’ leverage nor their interconnectedness are significant indicators
of an institution’s systemic importance. This first finding is in striking contrast to the
hypotheses formulated by the Financial Stability Board on the pivotal role of lever-
age and interconnectedness for a bank’s systemic relevance. Interestingly, our results
in regression (4) imply that the banks’ Marginal Expected Shortfalls has a significant
influence on the global importance of a bank as perceived by regulators (from model
(5) we see that ∆CoVaR is not statistically significant). In model specifications (6)
and (7), we include several control variables in our regressions but only find size to
be the driving factor for the nomination to be systemically important. More precisely,
the MES of the banks which previously entered the regression with a significant pos-
itive coefficient now loses all its statistical significance. Consequently, we find strong
evidence that the nomination as a G-SIFI is only driven by the institution’s size.
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Table 3.7: Systemic relevance of banks: probit regressions.
The table shows the results of several probit regressions on a dummy variables that
is one if a bank was nominated as global systemically important by the Financial
Stability Board and zero otherwise. Our sample consists of the 148 largest banks
measured by their total assets at the end of the fiscal year 2006. Stock market data
are retrieved from Thomson Reuters Financial Datastream while financial accounting
data are taken from the Worldscope database. P-values are given in parentheses and
***,**,* denote statistical significance at the 1%,5% and 10% level. Definitions of
variables as well as descriptions of the data sources are given in Table B.1 in the
Appendix.
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Log(Total assets) 1.5630*** 1.5620*** 1.8896***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Leverage 0.0020 -0.0157 0.0336
(0.811) (0.574) (0.480)
Interconnectedness 0.0000 0.0000
(0.939) (0.743)
MES 5.1186** 3.0310 3.4083
(0.031) (0.327) (0.325)
∆CoVaR 14.5811
(0.462)
Market-to-book ratio 0.2961
(0.532)
Performance -0.0411
(0.975)
ROA 0.4492
(0.304)
Debt maturity 0.5344
(0.685)
Deposits 0.9625
(0.621)
Non-interest income 1.4046*
(0.052)
Observations 146 144 146 146 146 141 108
AIC 55.43 140.74 141.57 136.36 141.02 59.68 55.14
The probit regression results for the sample of insurers are shown in Table 3.8.
Similar to the results for the banks, we can see from the probit regressions (1) to
(5) that neither the insurers’ leverage nor their interconnectedness are significant in-
dicators of the nomination as a G-SII by the FSB and the IAIS. These findings are
also in striking contrast to the hypotheses on the pivotal role of leverage and intercon-
nectedness for an insurer’s systemic importance. In regression (5) we find an insurer’s
∆CoVaR to be a significant determinant of the probability to be included in the list of
G-SIIs. However, this effect vanishes as soon as we add total assets and other con-
trols to our regression model. Similar to the probit regressions for banks, we find in
regression (6) that size is the only reliable predictor of systemic relevance according to
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Table 3.8: Systemic relevance of insurers: probit regressions.
The table shows the results of several probit regressions on a dummy variables that
is one if an insurer was nominated as global systemically important by the Financial
Stability Board and zero otherwise. Our sample consists of the 98 largest insurers
measured by their total assets at the end of the fiscal year 2006. Stock market data
are retrieved from Thomson Reuters Financial Datastream while financial accounting
data are taken from the Worldscope database. P-values are given in parentheses and
***,**,* denote statistical significance at the 1%,5% and 10% level. Definitions of
variables as well as descriptions of the data sources are given in Table B.1 in the
Appendix.
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log(Total assets) 0.9546*** 1.526***
(0.000) (0.005)
Leverage 0.0287 -0.0760
(0.188) (0.482)
Interconnectedness -0.1704 1.468
(0.844) (0.567)
MES 7.0939
(0.177)
∆CoVaR -145.0350** -64.3375
(0.032) (0.526)
Market-to-book ratio -0.027
(0.950)
Performance 1.9750
(0.227)
ROA -0.354
(0.672)
Debt maturity -0.3316
(0.810)
Observations 96 96 96 96 96 96
AIC 37.95 62.67 64.08 62.51 58.28 41.86
regulators. This holds true even when we include various control variables.
In summary, the results of our probit regression analyses show that the inclusion of
an institution in the list of G-SIFIs or G-SIIs is only a question of size. While MES
and ∆CoVaR do appear to capture some of aspects of systemic risk, these measures
cannot explain the point of view of regulators. For them, the systemic importance of a
financial institution (regardless whether it is a bank or insurer) is only determined by
the institutions size.
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3.4.3 Robustness checks
To underline the validity of our results, we perform additional robustness checks. First,
our results could be biased by the manner in which we calculate the systemic risk mea-
sures ∆CoVaR and Marginal Expected Shortfall. Therefore, we reestimate the mea-
sures using the MSCI World Banks Index and MSCI World Insurance Index, but find
no significant changes in our main results. For our cross-sectional analysis, we rees-
timate the OLS and quantile regression models with alternative definitions of our key
variables leverage (ratio of total liabilities to total assets) and size (natural logarithm
of net revenues). Except for the OLS regression for banks of MES on control vari-
ables, where we find a statistical significance of leverage at the 10% level, our main
inferences appear to be robust to these changes. Also, to control for an insurer’s line
of business, we include in our cross-sectional analyses a dummy variable that is one
if the company is a life insurer (SIC code 6311), and zero otherwise. Including this
variable does neither change our main inferences, nor do we find it to be significant
in most of the regressions. However, in the regression of an insurer’s ∆CoVaR on the
control variables, we find a positive relation of the life insurer dummy and ∆CoVaR
that is significant at the 10% level indicating that life insurers in our sample have a
lower contribution to systemic risk than non-life insurers. Finally, we reestimate our
probit regressions for banks and insurers using data from later years, i.e., 2009 and
2010 (if available) as it could be argued that regulators identified systemically relevant
financial institutions based on post-crisis data rather than data from 2006. Our addi-
tional analyses, however, reveal no new information and also suggest that size was the
most common factor when constructing the list of systemically relevant institutions.
3.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we study the determinants of the systemic importance of the world’s
largest banks and insurers during the financial crisis. Using a sample of the largest
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148 banks and 98 insurers in the world, we analyze the cross-sectional variation in two
popular measures of systemic risk of financial institutions during the crisis. In the sec-
ond step of our analysis, we try to explain the decision of regulators to include certain
banks and insurers in the lists of global systemically important financial institutions
and global syetemically important insurers.
Our results show that our quantile regressions of banks’ and insurers’ MES and
∆CoVaR as our systemic risk proxies mainly produce counterintuitive results. We
find little to none evidence that higher leverage and interconnectedness increase the
exposure or contribution of individual institutions to systemic risk.
As our second main finding, we show that regulators only seem to care about an
institution’s size proxied by its total assets in their decision to declare the institution
global systemically important. Although we find some correlation between the prob-
ability of being a G-SIFI and G-SII, and the institution’s MES (banks) and ∆CoVaR
(insurers), these proxies of systemic risk cannot explain the classification of regulators
as soon as size is included in our probit regressions. We thus conclude that despite
the methodologies published by regulators themselves, the decision to include a bank
in the G-SIFI list was purely a question of bank size. Interestingly, and despite the
experiences made during the AIG episode, insurance regulators share the same point
of view. Global systemically important insurers are clearly identifieable by a simple
look at the total assets in their balance sheet.
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Chapter 4
Bank Stock Performance and Bank
Regulation Around the Globe
“Banks are somehow making gigatons of money despite onerous new regulations and
capital requirements. Why, it’s almost like they’re not telling the truth when they
warn, repeatedly, that these new rules will destroy their profits and the economy.”
The Huffington Post, 07/16/2013
4.1 Introduction
Following the collapse of Lehman Brothers, excessive risk-taking caused by a “search
for yield” (see Rajan, 2005) and the tendency of deposit-taking banks to earn more non-
interest income through activities like, e.g., investment banking have been criticized for
contributing to the severity of the recent financial crisis (see, e.g., Laeven and Levine,
2009, Brunnermeier et al., 2012).29 Responding to these claims, many commenta-
tors have called for stricter bank regulation, bank supervision, and, in particular,
for higher capital requirements (see, e.g., Kashyap et al., 2008, Acharya et al., 2011,
Calomiris and Herring, 2011, Hart and Zingales, 2011).30 Perhaps most prominently,
29The adverse side-effects of bank risk-taking on financial stability have also been addressed earlier by,
e.g., Bernanke (1983), Keeley (1990) and Calomiris and Mason (1997).
30The diverse causes of and lessons from the recent financial crisis are also discussed by Brunnermeier
(2009) and Gorton (2010).
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Ben Bernake argued in 2010 that “stronger regulation and supervision [...] would have
been a more effective and surgical approach to constraining the housing bubble than
a general increase in interest rates”.31 On the other side, banks have repeatedly and
insistently contended that tougher capital requirements will ultimately decrease their
profitability, thus in turn decreasing effective capital buffers (see Matutes and Vives,
2000).32 In the aftermath of the financial crisis, several studies in the financial eco-
nomics literature have tried to examine these claims more objectively and in more
detail (see, e.g., Aiyar et al., 2012, Jime´nez et al., 2012). The relation between the dif-
ferent facets of bank regulation and supervision on the one hand and bank performance
on the other hand, however, remains empirically unexplored. We investigate in this pa-
per how bank regulation and supervision can explain differences in the performance
of banks around the world. In particular, we address the question whether higher cap-
ital, tougher supervision, incentives and capabilities for the private sector to monitor
banks, and higher capital requirements have led to shrinking bank profits and losses in
shareholder value.
The theoretical and empirical literature suggests several distinct channels through
which the performance of banks might be related to bank regulation. With bank capi-
tal requirements at its core, the regulation of financial institutions predominantly aims
at limiting the risk-taking of banks by reducing the incentives of shareholders and
managers to take on more risks than socially optimal (see Kim and Santomero, 1988).
At the same time, requirements to hold more bank capital might also prove counter-
productive as banks might react to more stringent capital requirements by pursuing a
riskier investment strategy (see Koehn and Santomero, 1980, Buser et al., 1981). Fur-
thermore, Laeven and Levine (2009) show that the relation between bank risk-taking
and bank regulation depends critically on each bank’s ownership structure. Turning
to the second facet of bank regulation, policy-makers could also attempt to limit bank
31Joseph Stiglitz took the same line and argued that the lax regulation of U.S. banks prior to the Subprime
crisis was to be blamed for contributing significantly to the build-up of systemic risk.
32Economic theory does not completely negate the possibility that higher capital requirements could
have adverse side-effects. As, e.g., Diamond and Rajan (2001) show in their model that a bank has to
trade off liquidity creation against the cost of a bank run when deciding on its capital structure.
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risk-taking by introducing activity restrictions. For example, banks could be prohib-
ited to engage in activities that are not related to deposit-taking and lending and that
are deemed to be too risky by regulators (see Boyd et al., 1998). The empirical evi-
dence on the effects of activity restrictions, however, is mixed with findings differing
significantly over the past decades. For instance, Cornett et al. (2002) show in their
study that Section 20 activities undertaken by banks after 1987 resulted in increased
industry-adjusted operating cash flow return on assets with bank risk remaining un-
changed. The argument that banks profit from less restrictions on their activities is
also taken up by Barth et al. (2004) who argue that activity restrictions reduce compe-
tition, limit economies of scope, and may ultimately result in a loss in bank efficiency.
Further key aspects of a regulatory regime include entry requirements, the supervisory
policy, and governance (see, e.g., Ellis et al., 2014).
As economic theory and empirical work provide conflicting results, our paper con-
tributes significantly to this rich literature in banking. We address the need for a com-
prehensive analysis of the relation between bank regulation and bank performance and
study the determinants of the buy-and-hold return for a large sample of international
banks from 1999 to 2012. We concentrate on the banks’ regulatory and supervisory
environment and estimate panel regressions of the stock performance of banking firms
on variables on a country’s regulatory and supervisory system taken from the database
of Barth et al. (2013a) while controlling for several idiosyncractic factors (e.g., bank
size, Tier 1 capital, non-interest income, interconnectedness, and leverage).
We empirically test various hypotheses from the financial intermediation literature
on the effects of bank capital, bank regulation, and supervision using a sample of
11,803 bank-year observations from 1,659 publicly listed international banks from
74 countries. Over our complete sample period, we find evidence in support of the
view that higher bank capital decreases a bank’s stock performance. However, we
find strong evidence that higher Tier 1 capital ratios significantly increase banks’ stock
performance during times of a financial crisis. Additionally, we observe that private
monitoring, guidelines on asset diversification, and entry requirements into the bank-
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ing sector are negatively related to the performance of banking firms. In contrast, we
show that with the ability of supervisory authorities to discipline banks, their annual
buy-and-hold returns increase. Also, better corporate governance yields better stock
performance. Analyzing the effect of implicit government bailout guarantees, we find
that banks that are more likely to receive government support realize an inferior stock
performance. In particular, we find that both a bank’s size and a bank’s interconnect-
edness with the global financial sector are negatively related to its stock performance.
Interestingly, while we do find that higher Tier 1 capital decreases performance, we
find no convincing evidence that the extent to which banks generate non-interest in-
come significantly influences a bank’s performance. Moreover, our analysis of a large
sample of international banks yields insights to the influence of financial crises on the
drivers of a banking firm’s performance. For example, we find that while leverage is
not a significant driver of bank performance over the whole sample, it plays a signifi-
cant role during crisis periods.
The empirical work in this study is related to several recent papers on the factors that
influence banks’ performance. Our paper is most closely related to the recent study by
Berger and Bouwman (2013) which is concerned with the effects of bank capital on
both, survival rate and market share. The authors find that capital helps small banks
to increase the probability of survival and their market share during crises and nor-
mal periods while medium and large banks only have higher survival rates and market
shares during crises periods. However, their study is restricted to U.S. banks and fo-
cuses on survival rates and market shares. Our analysis on the other hand focuses on
the effects of regulation on banks’ stock performance for a large panel of international
banks. Fahlenbrach et al. (2012) analyze the bank performance of 347 U.S. banks us-
ing stock return data for 1998 and 2006. The authors find that banks that performed
poorly during the 1998 crisis also performed poorly during the financial crisis of 2006.
As they further show, banking firms that relied more on short-term funding and had
more leverage are more likely to perform poorly during both crises. However, the
authors are only concerned with U.S. banks during 1998 and 2006 while our study
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exploits the variation in national bank regulation and supervision over the period from
1999 to 2012 to explore the determinants of banks’ stock performance. Also, our study
is related to Beltratti and Stulz (2012) who study the buy-and-hold stock returns of a
sample of large international banks over the crisis period from July 2007 to December
2008. The authors find evidence that banks that rely on short-term financing had poor
performance during the crisis. They show that better-performing banks had less lever-
age and lower returns immediately before the crisis. However, the authors restrict their
study to large banks with total assets larger than $50bn and only consider the crisis
period. In contrast, our paper studies both crises and non-crises periods for a large
comprehensive panel of international banks. Hence, we also include smaller banks
in our analyses. Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt et al. (2013) analyze the effect of different types of
capital ratios on bank stock returns and show that a higher capital position leads to
stronger performance during the latest crisis. The authors find that this effect is partic-
ularly pronounced for large banks and stronger when higher quality forms of capital
are considered. Finally, Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) study the connection between
bank performance and CEO incentives before the crisis using a sample of 95 U.S.
banks from 2006.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 4.2, we describe our data and discuss
the expected influence of various idiosyncratic and regulatory variables on financial
stability. In Section 4.3, we document our main findings on the drivers of systemic
risk. Section 4.4 concludes.
4.2 Data
This section describes the construction of our sample and presents the choice of our
main independent variables as well as descriptive statistics of our data.
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4.2.1 Sample construction
Our initial sample consists of all 22,560 firms included in the active and dead-firm
“banks” and “financial services” lists in Thomson Reuters Financial Datastream. To
rule out the possibility that some commercial and investment banks are erroneously
listed in the “financial services” instead of the “banks” category in Datastream, we
build our initial sample using both lists. We then follow Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011)
and select all companies with SIC codes between 6000 and 6300 (i.e., we eliminate
insurers, real estate operators, holding and investment offices as well as other non-
bank companies in the financial service industry from our sample). Furthermore, we
require a bank to have available accounting data in Thomson Worldscope to be included
in our sample. Next, we omit a stock from our sample if it is identified in Datastream
as a non-primary quote, if it is a secondary listing or if it is an American Depositary
Receipt (ADR). Additionally, we exclude from our sample all OTC traded stocks and
preference shares. Our final sample consists of 3,813 international banks for which we
have at least one year of accounting data available. For our sample banks, we need to
have daily stock price data available in Datastream. Consequently, we remove another
45 banks from our sample, due to missing stock price data. In the following, we apply
the filtering process proposed by Hou et al. (2011) and Karolyi et al. (2012).
As noted first by Ince and Porter (2006), stock prices in Datastream suffer from
several minor data errors. To correct for the confounding effect of these errors, we
perform several screening procedures on the daily return of the banks’ stock prices.
First, we require a bank to have a minimum share price of $1 at the end of a month
for the bank-month to be included in our sample. We treat as missing any return above
300 percent that is reversed within one month. In case the number of zero return days
exceeds 80 percent of a given month, we follow Hou et al. (2011) and exclude the
entire bank-month. Furthermore, we define non-trading days as those days on which
90 percent or more of the listed stocks have zero returns. All non-trading days are then
excluded from our sample. Finally, as we are interested in the influence of regulatory
4.2. DATA 71
capital on banks’ stock performance, we exclude all banks with missing data on Tier
1 capital from our sample. In case we have no remaining bank-year for an individual
bank, we exclude the bank from our sample. In total, we end up with a sample of
1,659 international banks from 74 countries for the time period 1999 to 2012. Table
4.1 shows the distribution of the 11,803 bank-years across each country.
Table 4.1: Distribution of bank years.
The table shows the distribution of the 11,803 bank years from 1999 to 2012 among the countries in
our sample. The international sample consists of 1,659 banks and is constructed as documented in
Section 4.2 and by applying several filters as introduced by Ince and Porter (2006) and Hou et al. (2011).
Country No. of bank-years Country No. of bank-years
Abu Dhabi 28 Lebanon 3
Argentina 7 Lithuania 7
Australia 80 Luxembourg 5
Austria 98 Macedonia 4
Bahrain 10 Malaysia 128
Bangladesh 21 Malta 1
Belgium 25 Mauritius 3
Botswana 1 Mexico 2
Brazil 11 Namibia 2
Bulgaria 3 Netherlands 35
Canada 97 Norway 281
Chile 7 Oman 21
China 69 Pakistan 30
Colombia 1 Peru 3
Croatia 4 Philippines 50
Cyprus 11 Poland 40
Czech Republic 9 Portugal 52
Denmark 441 Qatar 54
Dubai 13 Romania 2
Egypt 13 Russian Federation 32
Finland 32 Saudi Arabia 80
France 111 Serbia 3
Germany 167 Singapore 48
Greece 63 Slovakia 10
Hong Kong 97 Slovenia 3
Hungary 12 South Africa 62
Iceland 7 South Korea 9
India 80 Spain 118
Indonesia 25 Sri Lanka 21
Ireland 26 Sweden 63
Israel 79 Switzerland 148
Italy 398 Taiwan 57
Japan 1,263 Thailand 110
Jordan 69 Turkey 74
Kazakhstan 6 Ukraine 1
Kenya 24 United Kingdom 138
Kuwait 35 United States 6,660
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4.2.2 Bank characteristics
Our analysis is concerned with the factors influencing stock performances of banks
around the globe. Consequently, we use a bank’s annual buy-and-hold stock return as
dependent variable in our panel regressions. In the following, we describe our indepen-
dent variables. To begin with, we control for several idiosyncratic bank characteristics
that are well-known to influence bank stock prices. Furthermore, for each nation in our
sample, we collect a set of country-specific variables that proxy for a bank’s regulatory
environment and other macroeconomic factors.
First, we include information on a bank’s regulatory capital as the main independent
variable in our regressions. We use the variable Tier 1 capital which is defined as the
ratio of Tier 1 capital to total risk weighted assets. 33 Tier 1 capital is the component
of a bank’s capital that has the highest quality and is therefore capable to absorb losses
without affecting the day-to-day business of the bank and may thus improve overall
bank performance.34 As already pointed out, regulators use capital requirements to
limit the risk-taking of banks by having shareholders participate in the losses. For
example, Ciha´k et al. (2012) find that crisis countries used lower actual capital ratios.
Conversely, higher Tier 1 capital could induce less profitability of a bank, since it is
the most costly form of capital that a bank can raise. Also, bank managers argue that
more bank capital might lead banks to a riskier investment strategy. As a result, we
do not have an undisputed expectation of the influence on banks’ stock performance.
By including Tier 1 capital in our regression analyses, we (indirectly) control for pos-
sible positive and negative effects of stricter capital requirements on a bank’s stock
performance.
Next, we control for differences in the size of a bank by taking the natural logarithm
33Das and Sy (2012) study the usefulness of risk weighted assets and argue that they do not predict
market measures of risk. Additionally, Mariathasan and Merrouche (2014) find that risk weighted
assets predict bank failure only when the risk of a crisis is very low. See, e.g., Gauthier et al.
(2012), Hanson et al. (2011) for a more detailed discussion of the potential disadvantages associated
with the use of risk weighted assets. Further studies concerning risk weighted assets include, e.g.,
Acharya et al. (in press).
34We focus on the effect of Tier 1 capital on bank performance as, e.g., Anginer and Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt
(2014) show that Tier 2 capital has a destabilizing effect as it is less able to absorb losses.
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of a bank’s total assets at the end of the fiscal year. The literature reveals ambiguous
findings on the interplay of the size of a bank and its individual stock performance.
Gandhi and Lustig (2015) find that, in contrast to non-financial firms, size is a priced
factor in the cross-section of bank stock return. They show that this finding is due to
the pricing of implicit bailout guarantees by stock market investors. Irrespective of the
banks’ leverage, larger commercial bank stocks have significantly lower risk-adjusted
returns than small- and medium-sized bank stocks. Underlining this finding, Aebi et al.
(2012) show that bank size was negatively related to the stock performance of banks
during the recent financial crisis. On the other hand, increased bank size might result in
a higher market power and as a consequence increase stock performance. As a result,
we have no clear prediction for the sign of the coefficient on bank size in our panel
regressions.
In our analysis, we use several measures to control for different types of bank risk.
To proxy for a bank’s systematic risk and thus a bank stock’s sensitivity to a given
benchmark market index, we employ in our regressions the bank’s beta. We calcu-
late a bank’s beta as the covariance between the returns on the bank’s stock and the
returns of the MSCI World index divided by the variance of the bank’s stock returns.
A higher beta denotes a positive correlation of the benchmark index and the stock’s
movements and should therefore reflect a good performance during good economic
times and worse stock performance in financial crises.
To additionally control for the systemic risk of a bank, we use two measures for
the exposure and contribution of an individual bank to systemic risk. To be precise,
we employ two prominent measures of systemic risk from the literature: the Marginal
Expected Shortfall (MES) and a bank’s ∆CoVaR. Formally, the Marginal Expected
Shortfall is defined as
MES jp% = E
w
j
1
w
j
0
− 1
∣∣∣∣∣Ip%
 ,
where w
j
1
wi0
− 1 are the net equity returns of bank j during the bad market outcomes and
Ip% is an indicator variable for the market return being in its left p%-tail. Hence, the
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Marginal Expected Shortfall is then computed as the average return on any given bank
(Rb) conditional on the market return being in the p% left tail:
MES bp% =
1
# days
∑
system is in p% tail
Rb,t.
In our analysis, the MES of an individual bank’s stock is calculated as the negative
average stock return on the days the MSCI World Index experienced its 5% worst out-
comes (see Acharya et al., 2010). Adrian and Brunnermeier (2014) define the uncon-
ditional ∆CoVaR as the difference of the Value-at-risk (VaR) of a financial sector index
conditional on the distress (in the 5% quantile) of a particular bank and the VaR of the
sector index conditional on the median state of the bank. Formally, the CoVaR j|iα of the
financial sector s is defined as the Value-at-Risk (VaR) given by Pr(Ri ≤ VaRiα) = α
conditional on some event C(Ri) of institution i, where Ri is the return of institution i
for which the VaRiα is defined. The CoVaR
s|i
α is implicitly defined by the α-quantile of
the conditional probability distribution:
Pr
(
Rs ≤ CoVaR j|C(Ri)α | C(Ri)
)
= α.
Thus, the contribution of institution i to the VaR of the financial system s is given by
∆CoVaRs|C(Ri)α = CoVaR
s|Ri=VaRiα
α − CoVaRs|Ri=Median
i
α .
Consequently, the measure captures an individual bank’s contribution to systemic risk.
Hence, ∆CoVaRs|C(Ri)α or simply ∆CoVaRiα denotes the difference between the financial
system’s VaR conditional on a particular financial institution i being in distress and the
VaR of the financial system conditional on the median state of the institution i.35 We
would expect a bank’s exposure to crises to be negatively associated with the bank’s
stock performance. At the same time, however, we also expect a bank’s contribution to
systemic risk to be negatively correlated with its stock performance as higher systemic
35We use the MSCI World Index for our calculations.
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importance increases the probability of a bailout (and thus reduces the risk premia in
stock returns).
As a way of measuring firm value, we employ a bank’s market-to-book ratio cal-
culated as the market value of common equity divided by the book value of common
equity. Fahlenbrach et al. (2012) for instance find evidence for a positive relation of
a bank’s buy-and-hold returns and the market-to-book ratio. Therefore, we would ex-
pect a positive impact of market-to-book ratio on a bank’s stock performance. Next,
we include in our analysis the variable return on assets (ROA) as a standard measure of
a firm’s profitability. Naturally, we would expect a positive relation between a bank’s
profitability and its stock performance. Finally, to control for differences in the banks’
stocks, we employ the Amihud measure of an individual stock’s illiquidity adjusted
following the procedure proposed by Karolyi et al. (2012) as a further control variable
(Liquidity).36
We include several variables to control for differences in the business model of a
bank. First, we define the variable Loans as the ratio of a bank’s total loans to total
assets. When loans are higher, banks’ regulatory capital is expected to be less impacted
by increases in credit spreads, which could reduce the values of securities (see, e.g.,
Beltratti and Stulz, 2012). Additionally, we define the variable Loan loss provisions
as the natural logarithm of a bank’s expenses set aside as allowances for uncollectable
or troubled loans divided by total loans. Uhde and Heimeshoff (2009) show that this
proxy for a bank’s quality of its loan portfolio is negatively related to the bank’s per-
formance.
Another bank-specific variable we consider in our main regressions is Deposits,
which is calculated as total deposits divided by total liabilities. A higher value for
Deposits indicates a less fragile funding of the bank, which could serve as a stabiliz-
ing factor for firm performance.37 On the other hand, a bank that is mainly funded by
36Note that, in contrast to the original Amihud measure, the adjusted Amihud measure proposed by
Karolyi et al. (2012) is increasing in the stock’s liquidity.
37A low value for Deposits indicates high overnight money market funding and hence, fragile funding.
A a consequence, Basel III integrates a ratio for stable funding.
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deposits might be less active in non-traditional banking activities, which could limit
possible streams of income. To investigate this hypothesis, we also include the ra-
tio of non-interest income and total interest income in our main regressions. In a
related study, Brunnermeier et al. (2012) empirically show that banks that generate
higher non-interest income have a higher contribution to systemic risk than traditional
banks. Next, we consider a bank’s funding in our analyses by including the variable
Debt maturity. The latter is the ratio of total long term debt (due in more than one
year) to total debt. Fahlenbrach et al. (2012) find evidence that the poor performance
of banks during the recent financial crisis was partly due to a stronger reliance on short-
term funding. In our analyses, we expect the coefficient of debt maturity to enter our
regressions with a positive sign (see also Adrian and Shin, 2010). Fahlenbrach et al.
(2012) find empirical evidence that the leverage of a bank has a negative influence on
a bank’s stock return during the crisis period. Therefore, we add a proxy for a bank’s
leverage to our set of independent variables. In particular, we follow Acharya et al.
(2010) and calculate the variable leverage as book value of assets minus book value of
equity plus market value of equity, divided by market value of equity and expect it to
enter our regressions with a negative coefficient.
4.2.3 Regulatory and macroeconomic environment
The focus of our empirical study lies on an analysis of the relation between the reg-
ulation of domestic banking sectors and an individual bank’s stock performance. In
particular, we investigate whether differences in stock performance can be explained
by differences in the bank’s country-specific regulatory environment. We obtain data
on the regulatory environments from the database of Barth et al. (2013a) that is based
on four surveys performed between 1999 to 2012 on the regulation and supervision of
banks in 180 countries. Unfortunately, not every variable is available for every year
of our full sample period from 1999 to 2012. Nevertheless, we update missing data
points with the most recent data since adjustments of the regulatory and supervisory
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environment are relatively rare and result from a relatively slow political process (see
Barth et al., 2004, Anginer et al., 2014b). First, we employ a measure of the degree
to which official supervisory authorities are allowed to actively prevent or correct in-
stances of corporate wrongdoing by banks. The index of the official supervisory power
ranges from zero to 14, where higher values denote greater power of the authorities.
One could argue that more powerful regulators are able to prevent excessive risk-taking
by banks before and during crises. At the same time, however, more powerful super-
visors could also limit banks in their range of investment opportunities. Therefore, we
have no expectation regarding the sign of the coefficient in our regressions.
As our next step, we take advantage of a variable that proxies for differences across
countries in the way firms are restricted in their engagement in banking activities or
are ostracized from banking markets. For example, Ongena et al. (2013) find that the
lower the barriers to entry and the tighter the restrictions on bank activities in do-
mestic markets are, the more they are associated with lower banking standards in do-
mestic and foreign markets. Additionally, empirical investigations show that the risk-
taking of banks is sensitive to domestic regulation and restrictions on (foreign) mar-
ket entry and bank activities (see, e.g., Barth et al., 2004, Laeven and Levine, 2009,
Buch and DeLong, 2008). Ellis et al. (2014) identify key planks of any well-defined
regulatory regime, one of which are entry requirements. As a consequence, we also
control for differences in entry requirements in a country by employing an index of
the legal requirements that need to be fulfilled before a banking license is issued. The
entry requirements index ranges from zero to eight, where eight denotes the greatest
stringency. Next, we consider the private monitoring index and diversification index
from the database of Barth et al. (2013a). The former describes the incentives and ca-
pabilities that are provided by regulatory and supervisory authorities to encourage the
private monitoring of banks. Ciha´k et al. (2012) find evidence that the private sector in
crisis countries had weaker incentives to monitor banking firms’ risks. Additionally,
Caprio Jr. et al. (2014) find that higher levels of private monitoring negatively impinge
the probability of a crisis. Thus, we expect that a small score of the index (which
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ranges from 0 to 12) is associated with weaker stock performance. The diversifica-
tion index proxies for a country’s guidelines for asset diversification and loan giving
abroad. Higher guidelines on diversification lead to a more balanced investment port-
folio. However, diversification does not necessarily increase value for shareholders.
Also, one might argue that more diversification leads to the lack of a core business.
This line of argumentation is also supported by the rich literature on mergers (see, e.g.,
DeYoung et al., 2009). Additionally, Mercieca et al. (2007) find no evidence in support
of beneficial effects of direct diversification on bank performance. Finally, we control
for the stringency of capital regulation on the banking system. The capital regulatory
index captures whether capital requirement reflects certain risk elements and deducts
certain market value losses from capital before minimum capital adequacy is deter-
mined. It ranges from zero to ten, where ten indicates the highest degree of stringency
of capital regulation. Barth et al. (2013a) show that capital requirements have been ad-
justed to greater stringency over the last decade. Unfortunately, the capital regulatory
index is not available for all countries in our sample for the whole sample period.
To control for the overall economic conditions and possible business cycle fluctu-
ations in each country, we obtain data from the World Bank’s World Development
Indicator (WDI) database on the annual growth rate of the real gross domestic product
(in %) and the inflation rate. We suspect that a bank’s opportunities for investments
are correlated with different business cycles. These opportunities might arise in times
of economic growth and, consequently, have a positive effect on the overall perfor-
mance of a bank. For example, Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) find evidence
that both a low GDP growth and a high inflation rate increase the likelihood of sys-
temic banking sector problems which could worsen a bank’s stock performance due to
spillover effects.
Finally, to control for the competition in a given country’s banking sector, we employ
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index computed as the sum of the squared market shares of
a country’s domestic and foreign banks. Anginer et al. (2014a) find a positive relation
between bank competition and systemic stability as greater competition encourages
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banks to take on more diversified risks, hence making the banking system as a whole
less fragile to shocks. Consequently, we expect an ambiguous effect of competition
on banks’ stock performances. On the one hand, competition should decrease the
profit margins of banks, leading to less pronounced buy-and-hold returns. However,
on the other hand, following the argumentation of Anginer et al. (2014a), competition
protects investors from an otherwise higher exposure to systemic risk, thus leading to
a better bank stock performance.
4.2.4 Additional variables controlling for possible government
bailouts
It could be argued that a bank’s interconnectedness rather than its size drives its sys-
temic risk and thus the probability of a potential bailout by the government in a scenario
of market stress.38 Consequently, a bank’s stock performance could also be affected
by the bank’s degree of interconnectedness with the financial sector as investors price
implicit bailout guarantees for too-interconnected-to-fail banks. To control for this, we
employ our variable Interconnectedness which is defined as the number of in- and out-
going granger causalities of the banks’ stock returns as proposed by Billio et al. (2012).
As before for bank size, we expect an ambiguous influence of interconnectedness on
the banks’ stock performance.
Next, Bertray et al. (2013) show that bank shareholders differentiate between a
bank’s absolute size and its systemic size. Thus, while we check for size and sys-
temic relevance of a bank, it is crucial to include an indicator of systemic relevance
relative to the local economic environment in our regressions. Therefore, we define
the variable Systemic size as the ratio of a bank’s total liabilities to national GDP. As
Bertray et al. (2013) show that growing to a size that is systemic is not in the interest of
a bank’s shareholders, we expect a negative influence of systemic size on banks’ stock
performance.
38For the importance of the interconnectedness of financial institutions for global financial stability, see,
e.g., Black et al. (2013), Arnold et al. (2012) and Billio et al. (2012).
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Another key plank of a well-defined regulatory regime is governance (see Ellis et al.,
2014). Hence, in our further analyses, we additionally include an index that measures
the quality of corporate governance in a given country. As Santos (2001) notes, capi-
tal standards may be an important instrument to implement the optimal governance of
banks because they can be used to define the threshold for the transfer of control from
shareholders to regulators. Ideally, a good governance environment should be the ba-
sis of a smooth bank business operation and should therefore be reflected in the annual
stock performance. Ellis et al. (2014) argue that this aspect of a regulatory regime is
often neglected. We calculate two versions of a corporate governance index, employ-
ing the Worldwide Governance Indicators provided by the World Bank. The simpler
version is calculated as the arithmetic mean of the six constituent variables. Addition-
ally, we consolidate the six factors using a principal component analysis to account
for possible commonalities in the variables (see also Barth et al., 2013b). Aebi et al.
(2012) study bank performance during the financial crisis 2007/2008 and find evidence
that better corporate governance is related to better performance.
4.2.5 Bank stock performance
In the first step of our empirical study, we analyze several descriptive statistics of our
sample banks’ stock performance, the bank-specific explanatory variables as well as
our controls regarding the banks’ regulatory environment. Figure 4.1 plots the time
evolution of the mean, 10%-, and 90%-quantile of the sample banks’ buy-and-hold
returns across our full sample.
Average stock performance peaked in the year 2003 during which banks even in the
10% quantile of stock performance experienced a stock performance of above 10%. As
expected, overall stock performance dropped in the years of the financial crisis with its
minimum in the year 2008. Here, the top-performing bank stocks achieved an annual
return of 8.4% on average. A similar result holds for the year 2011. Interestingly,
the 90%-percentile of the annual buy-and-hold returns had its peak in 2009, directly
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Figure 4.1: Time evolution of bank stock performances.
The figure shows the time evolution of the annual buy-and-hold returns across our full international
sample of banks. We report the 90%-quantiles (black bars) and the 10%-quantiles (green bars) as well
as the mean values (red areas) of annual buy-and-hold returns.
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after the crisis years, whereas the bottom percentiles remain relatively low. These first
findings show that bank stocks performed quite differently both before, during, and
after the financial crisis, thus underlining the importance of our main research question.
In Figure 4.2, we further investigate this differential stock performance of banks in our
sample by comparing the stock performance of banks in six selected countries.
A first striking finding in Figure 4.2 is that while the U.S. banking sector’s aver-
age stock performance began to rise from 1999 to 2003, the 90%-quantile of the stock
performance of Japanese banks declined. Interestingly, the opposite trend can be ob-
served for the period from 2003 to 2005. However, for all of the six countries, we
find a sudden and steep drop in the average bank’s stock performance in 2008 with
only slightly positive buy-and-hold returns in the 90%-quantile in the U.S. and Japan.
After the crisis, the bank stocks recovered to a certain amount with some banks in the
United Kingdom and Germany having annual buy-and-hold returns of above 50%. In
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Figure 4.2: Time evolution of banks’ stock performances by country.
The figure shows the time evolution of the annual buy-and-hold returns across our full international sample of banks. We report the 10%- (green area) and 90%-percentiles
(black bars) of annual buy-and-hold returns in a given country.
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contrast, banks in India and Malaysia had extremely high stock returns both before and
after 2008, with banks in the top 90%-percentile of annual buy-and-hold returns being
well above 100%.
Next, we comment on several descriptive statistics for our dependent and indepen-
dent variables presented in Table 4.2 that are later used in our panel regressions.
From Table 4.2, we can see that all our variables exhibit significant variation, both
across time and across banks. First, we can see that banks in our sample differ con-
siderably with respect to their respective business model and funding strategy. In par-
ticular, the variables Loans and Non-interest income as well as Leverage and Debt
Maturity show significant variation in our panel data set. On average, the variable
Loans decreases steadily across all banks in our sample (from 65% to 61%) while
Non-interest income increases significantly. However, Non-interest income shows a
significant spike in 2009 and 2010. Also, the debt maturity of banks increases, on av-
erage, across all banks in our sample, as does leverage. However, the average leverage
of banks exhibits a significant drop between 2005 and 2007.
Even more interestingly, the amount of regulatory capital also shows significant vari-
ation, both across time and banks. For example, several banks from the United States
feature high Tier 1 capital ratios, whereas 143 banks from different countries show
regulatory capital ratios below 1% over our entire sample period. However, from 1999
to 2012, we observe a significant upward trend in average Tier 1 capital ratios.39
As far as the Interconnectedness between banks is concerned, we find that the ten
most interconnected banks from our sample are all from the United States. Surprisingly
though, we observe the highest degree of interconnectedness in 2000. This is surprising
because, for example, Engle et al. (2014) argue that the degree of interconnectedness
between banks has increased as a result of rising globalization. Nevertheless, we find
average values of our measure of a bank’s interconnectedness to have increased from
1999 to 2012. Finally, we also find significant time variation in the variables on the
39These findings are also underlined by Cohen and Scatigna (2014) who confirm that capital ratios have
increased steadily since the financial crisis and analyze different channels of adjustment.
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Table 4.2: Summary statistics.
This table shows selected descriptive statistics of variables used in our regressions. The sample consists of 1,659 publicly traded international banks from 74 countries over
the period 1999-2012. Stock market data are retrieved from Thomson Reuters Financial Datastream while financial accounting data are taken from the Worldscope database.
Regulation variables come from Barth et al. (2013a) and country characteristics are retrieved from the World Bank’s World Development Indicator (WDI) Database.
Definitions of variables as well as descriptions of the data sources are given in Appendix C.1. Total assets is measured in billion U.S. Dollars; the Systemic Size is given in
terms of 10−3.
Variable Observations Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Between Variation Within Variation
banks bank-years
Buy-and-hold return 1,659 11,803 0.053 0.398 -0.982 4.273 0.209 0.372
Beta 1,659 11,803 0.041 0.083 -0.531 1.760 0.092 0.045
MES 1,659 11,803 0.015 0.075 -0.111 1.819 0.042 0.066
CoVaR 1,656 10,566 -0.897 4.947 -37.615 37.301 2.983 4.450
Total assets 1,659 11,803 0.005 0.233 0.0000 4.770 0.167 0.109
Market-to-book 1,656 11,761 1.538 3.203 -293.851 93.803 2.126 2.823
Leverage 1,656 11,761 14.969 21.523 1.033 716.452 14.102 16.678
Non-interest income 1,659 11,806 0.362 4.890 -0.909 468.005 6.500 2.449
Loans 1,603 11,270 0.677 0.138 0 0.933 0.134 0.059
Loan loss provisions 1,600 11,248 0.007 0.019 -0.226 1.570 0.025 0.012
Debt maturity 1,644 11,648 0.499 0.293 0 1 0.256 0.191
Deposits 1,659 11,801 0.768 0.191 0 0.9922 0.184 0.059
Return on assets 1,558 10,644 1.090 1.417 -27.600 20.640 1.525 0.964
Tier 1 capital 1,659 11,803 0.088 0.703 0.001 0.224 0.171 0.672
Liquidity 1,643 11,362 -0.001 0.003 -0.140 0.000 0.003 0.002
Interconnectedness 1,599 9,619 0.073 0.065 0.009 0.578 0.050 0.053
Systemic size 1,659 11,803 0.060 0.335 0.000 10.97 0.249 0.117
Official Supervisory Power 1,586 10,114 12.281 2.169 4 16 2.002 0.795
Diversification Index 1,645 11,513 1.404 0.502 0 2 0.393 0.367
Entry requirements 1,645 11,440 7.480 0.789 0 8 0.697 0.477
Private Monitoring Index 1,628 11,295 8.966 1.189 5 11 0.999 0.798
Capital Requirements 925 3,678 6.785 1.322 3 10 1.211 0.637
Corp. Governance (PCA) 1,659 11,803 -0.231 1.173 -4.157 3.207 1.088 0.325
Corp. Governance 1,659 11,803 1.192 0.500 -1.177 1.986 0.629 0.088
GDP growth 1,656 11,802 2.445 2.672 -13.127 26.750 2.552 1.607
Inflation 1,643 11,700 2.276 3.264 -21.582 75.271 3.688 2.139
HHI 1,448 10,039 0.088 0.066 -2.459 0.760 0.060 0.021
Crisis dummy 1,659 11,803 0.270 0.444 0 1 0.302 0.377
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banks’ regulatory environment.
In Table 4.3, we present the Pearson correlations between the independent variables
used in our regression analyses.
As can be seen from the estimates in Table 4.3, most variables are not signifi-
cantly correlated with each other. However, several of our regulatory variables exhibit
stronger correlations with the macroeconomic controls. Consequently, these variables
are not used jointly in the regressions presented in the next section to minimize the risk
of multicollinearity biasing our findings.
In the upcoming sections, we try to explain the found differences in the stock perfor-
mance of banks by estimating panel regressions in which we employ both our country-
specific variables on bank regulation and the idiosyncratic bank characteristics.
4.3 The influence of regulation on stock performance
In this section, we present the results of our panel regression in which we analyze
the determinants of the banks’ stock performance. We begin by analyzing whether
stricter regulation, e.g., in the form of higher regulatory capital requirements leads to a
decrease in stock performance. Next, we investigate whether bank stock performance
is significantly affected by regulators via implicit bailout guarantees. Finally, we take
a closer look at the determinants of banks’ stock performance during times of financial
crises.
4.3.1 Does stricter bank regulation lead to worse stock perfor-
mance?
For the analysis of the determinants of a bank’s stock performance, we estimate panel
regressions with time-fixed and bank-fixed effects. The standard errors are clustered at
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Table 4.3: Correlations of independent variables.
This table shows Pearson correlations between the independent variables used in our main regressions. The sample consists of 1,659 publicly
traded international banks from 74 countries over the period 1999-2012. Stock market data are retrieved from Thomson Reuters Financial
Datastream while financial accounting data are taken from the Worldscope database. Regulation variables come from Barth et al. (2013a) and
country characteristics are retrieved from the World Bank’s World Development Indicator (WDI) Database. Definitions of variables as well as
descriptions of the data sources are given in Appendix C.1.
Log return MES ∆CoVaR Beta Total assets Market-to-
book
Leverage Non-interest
income
Loans Loan loss pro-
vision
Debt maturity Deposits Return on as-
sets
MES -0.07
∆CoVaR 0.10 -0.01
Beta 0.02 -0.27 0.21
Total assets -0.17 0.20 -0.18 -0.07
Market-to-book -0.18 0.10 0.00 -0.04 0.27
Leverage -0.10 -0.07 -0.08 -0.10 0.03 -0.15
Non-interest income 0.04 0.15 -0.13 -0.18 0.41 0.05 -0.03
Loans -0.09 -0.10 -0.09 0.05 -0.15 0.01 0.00 -0.36
Loan loss provisions 0.01 -0.08 -0.07 -0.11 -0.07 -0.12 0.16 -0.03 0.12
Debt maturity 0.15 -0.09 0.02 0.04 -0.30 -0.14 0.07 -0.16 0.13 0.08
Deposits 0.26 -0.04 0.22 0.03 -0.58 -0.16 -0.15 -0.20 -0.02 0.10 0.21
Return on assets 0.05 0.10 -0.05 0.16 0.24 0.25 -0.38 0.08 -0.01 -0.50 -0.10 -0.22
Tier-1-capital 0.12 -0.08 0.10 0.20 -0.37 -0.21 -0.18 -0.18 -0.07 -0.00 0.10 0.10 0.11
Systemic size -0.27 0.05 -0.13 -0.10 0.58 0.14 0.24 0.10 -0.11 -0.08 -0.22 -0.51 0.04
Liquidity 0.01 -0.05 0.04 0.24 0.37 0.16 -0.23 0.17 -0.10 -0.09 -0.17 -0.07 0.26
Interconnectedness -0.04 -0.19 0.17 0.51 -0.03 0.01 -0.05 -0.14 0.03 -0.02 0.09 0.09 0.07
Capital requirements 0.32 -0.14 0.07 0.17 -0.25 -0.03 -0.03 -0.10 -0.01 -0.06 0.20 0.15 0.19
Entry requirements 0.38 0.02 0.14 0.10 -0.21 -0.07 -0.15 -0.06 -0.16 -0.06 0.16 0.33 0.09
Diversification index 0.12 0.11 -0.08 -0.05 0.45 0.17 0.04 0.09 -0.01 -0.13 -0.09 -0.38 0.21
Official Supervisory
Power
0.11 -0.06 0.12 0.10 -0.52 -0.26 0.01 -0.07 -0.05 0.03 0.29 0.37 -0.11
Private monitoring in-
dex
0.23 -0.08 0.18 0.12 -0.57 -0.31 -0.02 -0.09 -0.17 0.06 0.32 0.57 -0.23
Governance 0.04 0.11 0.13 -0.15 -0.20 -0.13 0.06 0.05 -0.11 -0.09 0.08 0.12 -0.27
Governance (pca) 0.15 0.15 0.10 0.00 -0.11 -0.10 -0.06 -0.00 -0.11 -0.02 0.02 0.32 -0.08
GDP-growth -0.17 -0.01 -0.12 -0.08 0.46 0.39 -0.07 0.02 0.07 0.01 -0.25 -0.27 0.21
HHI 0.01 0.25 -0.01 -0.18 0.30 0.12 -0.03 0.12 -0.09 -0.08 -0.18 -0.09 -0.00
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Table 4.4: Correlations of independent variables (continued).
Tier-1-capital Systemic size Liquidity Inter connect-
edness
Capital re-
quirements
Entry require-
ments
Diversifica.
index
Official Su-
pervisory
Power
Private moni-
toring index
Governance Governance
(pca)
GDP growth
MES
∆CoVaR
Beta
Total assets
Market-to-book
Leverage
Non-interest income
Loans
Loan loss provisions
Debt maturity
Deposits
Return on assets
Tier-1-capital
Systemic size -0.32
Liquidity -0.01 0.12
Interconnectedness 0.05 -0.04 0.12
Capital requirements 0.21 -0.32 -0.05 0.09
Entry requirements 0.09 -0.22 -0.07 0.06 0.46
Diversification index -0.33 0.35 0.07 -0.04 0.03 0.23
Official Supervisory
Power
0.34 -0.32 -0.10 0.09 0.52 0.13 -0.54
Private monitoring in-
dex
0.32 -0.55 -0.13 0.08 0.33 0.44 -0.45 0.55
Governance 0.02 0.06 -0.04 -0.12 -0.22 0.17 -0.10 0.21 0.33
Governance (pca) 0.08 -0.10 -0.03 -0.01 -0.31 0.31 -0.19 -0.18 0.24 0.28
GDP-growth -0.30 0.24 0.13 -0.04 -0.29 -0.26 0.38 -0.77 -0.56 -0.55 -0.12
HHI -0.25 0.19 0.08 -0.16 -0.59 0.04 0.42 -0.60 -0.23 0.31 0.53 0.29
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the bank level.40 More formally, we will estimate regressions of the following form:
Buy-and-hold returni,t = β1 · Tier-1-capitali,t−1 + βBank controls · Xi,t−1
+ βRegulatory · Yi,t−1 + βCountry controls · Zi,t−1 + ui + vt + ǫi,t.
We run several regressions to identify the determinants of a bank’s stock performance.
In all our regressions, we use the banks’ yearly log buy-and-hold returns as our depen-
dent variable. First, we regress a banks’s stock performance on a set of bank-specific
variables. We control for any unobserved variables with time-fixed and bank-fixed
effects. In further regressions, we include additional control variables on the banks’
regulatory and macroeconomic environment to determine which country-specific fac-
tors drive the stock performance of banks. We lag all our explanatory variables by one
year to mitigate the problem that our dependent variables and some of our indepen-
dent variables could be determined simultaneously. The results of our baseline panel
regressions are shown in Table 4.5.
In our baseline regressions in Table 4.5, we use the banks’ yearly log buy-and-hold
return as the dependent variable. The results of our baseline panel regressions show
that a bank’s Tier 1 capital ratio is negatively related to the bank’s stock performance.
This result is statistically significant at the 1% level. At least for our full sample, how-
ever, this result is only marginally economically significant as a one standard deviation
increase in Tier 1 capital yields a decrease in a bank’s annual stock return of just 0.2%
(0.003 × 0.6787311). This finding contributes to the on-going discussion of the regula-
tion of banks’ equity capital. On the one hand, Tier 1 capital represents a bank’s capital
of the highest quality. Consequently, public opinion and regulators repeatedly call for
tougher capital regulations. In a recent paper, Bostandzic et al. (2014) find that higher
Tier 1 capital decreases both the exposure and contribution of individual banks to sys-
temic risk. On the other hand, bank managers argue that higher capital requirements
40As the residuals are not correlated across both time and banks, this procedure is valid. For further
comments see, e.g., Thompson (2011) or Beck and De Jonghe (2013).
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Table 4.5: Regressions of a bank’s stock performance.
The regressions estimate the relation between stock performance and bank characteristics as well as regulatory variables over the period 1999-2012. We use the banks’ log annual buy-and-hold return as our dependent
variable. The sample consists of 1,659 publicly traded international banks from 74 countries. Stock market data are retrieved from Thomson Reuters Financial Datastream while financial accounting data are taken
from the Worldscope database. Regulation variables come from Barth et al. (2013a) and country characteristics are retrieved from the World Bank’s World Development Indicator (WDI) Database. The regressions
include all banks from our sample and we apply panel regression with time-fixed and bank-fixed effects using clustered robust standard errors (at the bank level). P-values are given in parentheses, *, **, and ***
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Adj. R2 is adjusted R-squared. Definitions of variables as well as descriptions of the data sources are given in Appendix C.1.
Variable Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) Model (7) Model (8)
Bank-level characteristics
Lagged return -0.142 *** -0.153 *** -0.093 *** -0.125 *** -0.15 *** -0.136 *** -0.139 *** -0.099 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
MES -0.171 ** -0.157 ** -0.184 ** -0.144 ** -0.178 ** -0.159 ** -0.187 **
(0.018) (0.036) (0.011) (0.047) (0.014) (0.030) (0.015)
Beta -0.205 ** -0.193 ** -0.118 -0.223 ** -0.2 ** -0.195 ** -0.208 ** -0.101
(0.021) (0.029) (0.200) (0.013) (0.028) (0.029) (0.024) (0.273)
Total assets -0.205 *** -0.219 *** -0.199 *** -0.208 *** -0.2 *** -0.214 *** -0.202 *** -0.204 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Market-to-book -0.052 *** -0.049 *** -0.065 *** -0.05 *** -0.048 *** -0.05 *** -0.045 *** -0.062 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Leverage 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
(0.747) (0.813) (0.735) (0.676) (0.688) (0.498) (0.467) (0.574)
Non-interest income -0.021 -0.033 -0.008 -0.018 -0.026 -0.023 -0.022 -0.008
(0.225) (0.199) (0.655) (0.306) (0.136) (0.184) (0.208) (0.668)
Loans -0.266 *** -0.209 *** -0.197 ** -0.236 *** -0.241 *** -0.247 *** -0.236 *** -0.189 **
(0.000) (0.007) (0.011) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.016)
Loan loss provisions -2.137 ** -2.334 ** -1.783 * -1.764 * -2.577 *** -2.221 ** -2.317 ** -1.999 *
(0.020) (0.011) (0.099) (0.065) (0.007) (0.021) (0.017) (0.072)
Debt maturity -0.013 -0.029 -0.018 -0.016 -0.02 -0.018 -0.032
(0.563) (0.221) (0.429) (0.478) (0.373) (0.422) (0.178)
Deposits 0.212 *** 0.216 ** 0.199 ** 0.172 ** 0.21 ** 0.197 ** 0.229 ***
(0.009) (0.013) (0.017) (0.035) (0.011) (0.017) (0.009)
Return on assets 0.034 *** 0.034 *** 0.042 *** 0.036 *** 0.034 *** 0.035 *** 0.035 *** 0.041 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tier-1-capital -0.003 *** -0.003 *** -0.003 *** -0.003 *** -0.003 *** -0.003 *** -0.003 *** -0.003 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Liquidity -8.245 *** -7.544 *** -9.705 *** -9.676 *** -7.654 *** -8.076 *** -7.749 ** -9.077 **
(0.000) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.032) (0.013)
∆CoVaR 0.000
(0.621)
Regulatory environment
Offical Supervisory Power 0.014 ** 0.015 **
(0.025) (0.019)
Private monitoring index -0.029 *** -0.013 * -0.028 ***
(0.000) (0.051) (0.001)
Diversification index -0.116 *** -0.095 ***
(0.000) (0.000)
Entry requirements -0.057 *** -0.053 *** -0.042 **
(0.000) (0.000) (0.013)
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 10,032 9,112 8,687 9,670 9,835 9,762 9,580 8,567
R2 0.321 0.307 0.347 0.318 0.329 0.324 0.324 0.349
Adj. R2 0.319 0.305 0.345 0.316 0.327 0.322 0.322 0.347
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negatively affect bank performance. Blum (1999) shows that increasing capital re-
quirements could also lead to increased risk-taking. Our result supports the conjecture
that stock investors view higher capital ratios as being detrimental to a bank’s ability
to generate profits. However, this result is economically of marginal magnitude. We
attribute this finding to the fact that while investors might consider high capital ratios
undesirable in normal times, investors could, at the same time, favor stocks or highly
capitalized banks during a financial crisis. Berger and Bouwman (2013) find empirical
results in support of this line of argumentation as they show that capital helps banks
to increase the probability of survival and their market share during crises periods. On
average, however, we show for our full sample that high ratios of regulatory capital are
seen critically by stock investors.
Next, we find that a bank’s exposure to systemic risk is associated with a lower
stock performance (model (1)). The result is also economically significant as a one
standard deviation increase in our proxy for a bank’s systemic risk exposure (MES)
yields a decrease of the annual stock return of -3.7% (0.171 × 0.2172). This result
is line with our intuition as a bank with a higher systemic risk exposure is hit harder
in the event of a system-wide crash. In regression (2), we substitute the MES by
the bank’s estimate of ∆CoVaR as a measure of its contribution to systemic fragility.
In contrast to our previous finding, a bank’s contribution to systemic risk does not
have any statistically significant impact on the institution’s stock performance. Hence,
our finding underlines that these two measures, even though both are associated with
systemic risk, capture different aspects of systemic risk.
Additionally, we find strong evidence that supports the notion that size is nega-
tively correlated with bank performance. As banking firms increase in size, so does
their systemic importance and the implicit probability of a government bailout in
case of default. These findings are in line with the results of Gandhi and Lustig
(2015) who argue that size is a priced factor in the cross-section of bank stock re-
turns due to implicit bailout guarantees. Furthermore, our findings are in support of
Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Huizinga (2013) who argue that for large banks downsizing or
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splitting up might increase their value.
Additional results also show that high-valued stocks yield a lower buy-and-hold re-
turn than stocks with low valuation. This result is statistically significant at the 1%
level, economically significant, and large, as a one standard deviation increase yields
a decrease in performance of -56.3%. Further along, we control for differences in the
banks’ lagged performance and find evidence for reversal in the banks’ returns. To
be specific, we find that a bank’s performance is negatively influenced by its lagged
performance. Not surprisingly, banks that earn a high return on their assets also have
a better annual stock performance. This effect is of large economic importance. A one
standard deviation increase in return on assets implies an increase in the annual log
buy-and-hold return of 36%. We also control for differences in the banks’ stock liquid-
ity. Underlining the findings of Han and Lesmond (2011), we find that an individual
stock’s illiquidity is negatively associated with its performance. Turning to a bank’s
business model, we find that by taking deposits, banks increase their annual buy-and-
hold stock return in our sample period while giving loans decreases the annual stock
return. We trace this back to the fact that loans are associated with a small profit margin
and thus, banks with a large loan portfolio are realizing a decreased performance. Of
major importance is the quality of the loan portfolio measured by loan loss provisions.
As the quality of the loan portfolio decreases, so does the annual buy-and-hold return
of the banking firm. The economic importance of this influence is large. Furthermore,
banks with more deposits have a less fragile funding structure than, for example, banks
that invest in overnight money market funds. As a result, deposits are associated with
better stock performances. Surprisingly, neither a firm’s degree of leverage nor its
non-interest income has significant influence on the buy-and-hold returns in our large
comprehensive panel. Also the amount of short-term funding measured by debt matu-
rity has no significant influence on the performance.
In regressions (3) to (8), we add several variables that describe the banks’ regulatory
and supervisory environment to our models. In models (3) to (6), we start by adding
one regulatory variable at a time while in models (7) and (8), we include more than
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one regulatory variable at the same time. As mentioned earlier, some of our regula-
tory variables are highly correlated both with each other and with our macroeconomic
control variables. For example, the index of the Official Supervisory Power and the
Diversification Index are negatively correlated with a correlation of -54%. As a con-
sequence, we can only include one of these two variables in our regressions at a time.
Additionally, we observe a strong negative correlation between variables that proxy for
the supervisory environment of a country and country-specific controls such as GDP
growth, inflation, and the Herfindahl-Hirschman index. To minimize multicollinearity
problems, we do not use highly correlated variables simultaneously in a regression. In
additional unreported regressions, we include the country control variables instead of
our regulatory variables. The results on the idiosyncratic bank characteristics remain
qualitatively unchanged.41
Turning to the influence of the regulatory and supervisory environment on a bank’s
annual buy-and-hold return, we find that with more supervisory power, the stock per-
formance of banks increases. With increasing power of supervisors, banking problems
are recognized earlier and corrected more promptly. In contrast, higher incentives for
a better private monitoring are associated with a lower stock performance of banks.
We argue that increased capabilities for the private sector to monitor banks are linked
to additional efforts for the banking firms. Consequently, these additional cost lead to
a worse stock performance. Another possible explanation for this result is that with
more incentives for the private sector to monitor banks, banks are more cautious with
their investment strategies and consequently earn lower profits.
Next, higher values of the Diversification index that captures the guidelines for asset
diversification are also associated with a lower stock performance. Our results show
that more asset diversification leads to a poorer stock performance of banks in our full
sample. We argue that with stricter guidelines for asset diversification, banking firms
lack a core business. At the same time, banks have better diversified asset portfolios.
41We do not report the additional results as the focus of our paper is on the influence of the regulatory
and supervisory environment on banking performance.
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Consequently, our findings support both lines of argumentation as with stricter guide-
lines for diversification, the stock performance of banks decreases.
Finally, we find evidence that additional legal entry requirements to obtain a banking
license lead to a lower stock performance of banks in a given country. Ongena et al.
(2013) argue that lower barriers to entry are associated with lower bank lending stan-
dards abroad. Hence, investors could be more cautious which in turn leads to smaller
annual buy-and-hold returns.
In regressions (7) and (8), we include several variables that proxy for our sample
countries’ regulatory environments simultaneously and confirm our findings from the
previous regressions. In additional unreported results, we include a dummy variable
that captures the existence of a deposit insurance scheme in a given country. How-
ever, we find no convincing evidence of any influence of the variable on the annual
stock performance of banks. Also, we study the influence of capital requirements cap-
tured by the Capital Regulatory Index introduced by Barth et al. (2013a) on a bank’s
stock performance. However, we do not find any convincing evidence that the annual
buy-and-hold return is related to the stringency of capital requirements. Hence, we
conclude that investors rather base their investment decisions on idiosyncratic bank
characteristics than on country-level characteristics. Additionally, the Capital Regula-
tory Index captures capital stringency, but is not directly based on a required minimum
capital ratio. In contrast, the variable Tier 1 capital captures a bank’s actual amount of
regulatory capital within a single (realized) ratio.
To further analyze this result, we split our sample into halves based on the banks’
Tier 1 capital ratio in a given bank-year. The top half consists of all banks that feature
Tier 1 capital ratios above the mean while the bottom half consists of all banks whose
Tier 1 capital ratio is below the average. Our conjecture is that stock market investors
favor banks that are not undercapitalized but divest from banks that hold too much
capital relative to their competitors within a regulatory regime.
We then run separate panel regressions for each subsample using time-fixed and
bank-fixed effects as well as clustered robust standard errors (at the bank level) to test
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this conjecture. The results of our additional panel regressions are shown in Table 4.6.
Table 4.6: Tier 1 capital and banks’ stock performance.
The regressions estimate the relation between stock performance and bank characteristics as well
as regulatory variables over the period 1999-2012. We use the banks’ log annual buy-and-hold
return as our dependent variable. The sample consists of 1,659 publicly traded international banks
from 74 countries and is divided into two subsamples. The first subsample (Model (1)) consists
of banks whose Tier 1 capital ratio is above the mean while the second subsample (Model (2))
consists of banks whose Tier 1 capital ratio is below the mean. Model (3) includes all banks for
which a Capital Requirements Index realization is available. Stock market data are retrieved from
Thomson Reuters Financial Datastream while financial accounting data are taken from the Worldscope
database. Regulation variables come from Barth et al. (2013a) and country characteristics are retrieved
from the World Bank’s World Development Indicator (WDI) Database. The regressions include all
banks from our sample and we apply panel regression with time-fixed and bank-fixed effects using
clustered robust standard errors (at the bank level). P-values are given in parentheses, *, **, and
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Adj. R2 is adjusted
R-squared. Definitions of variables as well as descriptions of the data sources are given in Appendix C.1.
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
Sample Top half Bottom half CRI
Tier 1 capital Tier 1 capital Sample
Bank-level characteristics
Lagged return -0.116 *** -0.178 *** -0.183 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
MES -0.045 -0.289 *** -0.250 *
(0.697) (0.001) (0.070)
Beta -0.143 -0.309 * -0.455 **
(0.171) (0.071) (0.017)
Total assets -0.214 *** -0.224 *** -0.401 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Market-to-book -0.125 *** -0.033 *** -0.112 ***
(0.000) (0.005) (0.000)
Leverage 0.003 ** 0 0.004 ***
(0.023) (0.852) (0.000)
Non-interest income -0.022 -0.003 -0.048
(0.496) (0.860) (0.440)
Loans -0.269 ** -0.208 * -1.012 ***
(0.039) (0.053) (0.000)
Loan loss provisions -2.72 ** -1.544 -2.793 *
(0.031) (0.335) (0.077)
Deposits 0.137 0.266 * 1.025 ***
(0.280) (0.070) (0.000)
Return on assets 0.024 ** 0.048 *** 0.046 ***
(0.016) (0.001) (0.004)
Tier-1-capital -0.002 *** 0.003 0.778
(0.000) (0.997) (0.151)
Liquidity -8.082 *** -5.690 -15.036 *
(0.000) (0.302) (0.066)
Capital Requirement Deviation -0.038 **
(0.027)
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
N 4,923 5,109 3,320
R2 0.389 0.329 0.404
Adj. R2 0.385 0.325 0.399
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We observe that Tier 1 capital ratios are negatively associated with annual buy-and-
hold returns for banks that feature above-average regulatory capital ratios. At the same
time, this result disappears for banks that demonstrate below-average capital ratios.
Consequently, our results indicate that our finding of a negative relation between Tier
1 capital and banks’ stock performance is mainly driven by banks with high Tier 1
capital ratios. At the same time, we find no evidence that below-average capital ratios
increase bank performance. Another interesting result from the regressions based on
subsamples is that a bank’s stock performance is not related to its MES or Beta if
the bank is highly capitalized (Model (1)). In this scenario, the default probability
decreases and, consequently, different types of risk are no longer relevant for investors.
However, as capital ratios decrease, both, MES and Beta, are negatively associated
with banks’ stock performance (Model (2)).
Next, we try to shed more light on the question whether the capitalization of banks
relative to their competitors is priced by stock market investors. Irrespective of the
overall capital requirements that affect all banks in a given country, investors could
favor the stocks of those banks that hold more (or less) capital than the average com-
petitor. To this end, we introduce the new variable Capital Requirement Deviation
which we define in the following way. First, we calculate the mean of the variable Tier
1 capital for all banks with the same realization of the Capital Regulatory Index, or,
more exactly, for all banks that face a similar capital stringency. In a second step, we
calculate the differences between the individual banks’ Tier 1 capital and the respec-
tive mean values for each bank. Hence, our variable Capital Requirement Deviation
captures the extent to which a bank’s capital deviates from the average of peers in the
same CRI group, i.e., the average value of regulatory capital of banks within the same
group of capital stringency.42 We then repeat our baseline regression and additionally
include the new variable Capital Requirement Deviation (Model (3)). We find a statis-
tically significant (5% level) negative influence of the Capital Requirement Deviation
42Note that the Pearson correlation between the variables Tier 1 capital and the Capital Requirement
Deviation is 38%.
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on a bank’s stock performance. At the same time, the previously observed influence of
the variable Tier 1 capital disappears. The results on our other idiosyncratic bank char-
acteristics remain qualitatively unchanged. Our results are thus strongly supportive of
the notion that investors indeed value bank stocks based on their relative rather than
their absolute capitalization. Banks that had more Tier 1 capital relative to their peers
working under a similar capital stringency had significantly lower annual buy-and-hold
returns. This result supports the argumentation of Calem and Rob (1999). The authors
argue that the relationship between bank capital and risk is U-shaped.
4.3.2 Implicit bailout guarantees and bank stock performance
In additional analyses, we are interested in the relation between a bank’s stock perfor-
mance and possible implicit bailout guarantees. The results from our main regressions
in Table 4.5 highlighted the significant influence of a bank’s size on its stock perfor-
mance. More precisely, we find that with increasing size measured by the logarithm of
a bank’s total assets, the annual buy-and-hold return of banking firms decreases. Also,
we find evidence that an increased exposure to systemic risk measured by a bank’s
MES is associated with a declining stock performance. To further analyze the relation
between a bank’s stock performance and implicit bailout guarantees, we now turn to
several additional regressions in which we focus on indicators of systemic risk and
possible bailout guarantees. Again, to detect the determinants of a bank’s stock per-
formance, we estimate panel regressions with time-fixed and bank-fixed effects using
standard errors clustered at the bank level. The results of our additional panel regres-
sions are shown in Tables 4.7 and 4.8.
In our models (1) through (5) in Table 4.7, we run regressions that are very similar to
our baseline regressions. In contrast to the regressions in the previous section, however,
we also include our proxy for an individual bank’s interconnectedness with the finan-
cial sector in the regressions. Just like with bank size, we expect more interconnected
banks to be more systemically important (see also Chan-Lau, 2010) and thus provide
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Table 4.7: Regressions of a bank’s stock performance and interconnectedness.
The regressions estimate the relation between stock performance and a bank’s interconnectedness with other banks, bank
characteristics, and regulatory variables over the period 1999-2012. We use the banks’ log annual buy-and-hold return as our
dependent variable. The sample consists of 1,659 publicly traded international banks from 74 countries. Stock market data are
retrieved from Thomson Reuters Financial Datastream while financial accounting data are taken from the Worldscope database.
Regulation variables come from Barth et al. (2013a) and country characteristics are retrieved from the World Bank’s World
Development Indicator (WDI) Database. The regressions include all banks from our sample and we apply panel regression with
time-fixed and bank-fixed effects using clustered robust standard errors (at the bank level). P-values are given in parentheses,
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Adj. R2 is adjusted R-squared.
Definitions of variables as well as descriptions of the data sources are given in Appendix C.1.
Variable Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5)
Bank-level characteristics
Lagged return -0.201 *** -0.189 *** -0.214 *** -0.199 *** -0.21 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
MES -0.187 ** -0.2 *** -0.165 ** -0.189 ** -0.19 **
(0.015) (0.010) (0.034) (0.015) (0.017)
Total assets -0.218 *** -0.228 *** -0.219 *** -0.233 *** -0.224 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Market-to-book -0.049 *** -0.048 *** -0.046 *** -0.048 *** -0.042 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Leverage 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.995) (0.912) (0.982) (0.716) (0.738)
Non-interest income -0.009 -0.003 -0.013 -0.01 -0.004
(0.734) (0.907) (0.643) (0.712) (0.893)
Loans -0.368 *** -0.338 *** -0.349 *** -0.355 *** -0.348 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Loan loss provisions -2.93 ** -2.408 * -3.216 ** -2.904 ** -2.822 **
(0.018) (0.059) (0.013) (0.024) (0.030)
Debt maturity 0.01 0.006 0.008 0.005 0.008
(0.704) (0.820) (0.766) (0.837) (0.771)
Deposits 0.244 *** 0.242 *** 0.211 ** 0.247 *** 0.25 ***
(0.008) (0.010) (0.021) (0.008) (0.007)
Return on assets 0.037 *** 0.04 *** 0.039 *** 0.039 *** 0.041 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Tier-1-capital -0.004 *** -0.003 *** -0.003 *** -0.003 *** -0.003 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Liquidity -10.679 *** -11.287 *** -9.678 *** -10.568 *** -9.442 **
(0.002) (0.008) (0.005) (0.003) (0.029)
Interconnectedness -0.181 ** -0.17 ** -0.195 *** -0.17 ** -0.163 **
(0.014) (0.023) (0.008) (0.020) (0.028)
Regulatory environment
Private monitoring index -0.044 *** -0.031 ***
(0.000) (0.000)
Diversification index -0.098 *** -0.07 ***
(0.000) (0.003)
Entry requirements -0.066 *** -0.064 ***
(0.000) (0.000)
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 8,078 7,768 7,902 7,843 7,696
R2 0.34 0.337 0.347 0.342 0.344
Adj. R2 0.338 0.335 0.345 0.339 0.341
weaker stock performance. Our results provide strong evidence that more intercon-
nected banks realize a smaller annual buy-and-hold stock return than other banks. The
results are statistically (at the 5% level) and economically significant. Again, we find
support for the notion that investors view more interconnected banks to have an in-
creased probability of receiving a government bailout (see also Bertray et al., 2013).
Next, we analyze in more detail the question whether different indicators of sys-
temic risk also drive banks’ stock performance. One could argue that the sheer size
of a banking firm as it is captured by the logarithm of a bank’s total assets is not
the best indicator to measure whether the institution is too-big-to-fail. For example,
Bertray et al. (2013) propose to use the systemic size of an institution rather than its
total assets as a proxy for systemic relevance. The authors use the ratio of liabilities
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over GDP to identify systemically important banks. Table 4.8 shows the results of our
analyses in which we employ systemic size as an alternative proxy for the systemic
importance of a bank.
In models (1) through (8), we replace the variable Total assets by the variable Sys-
temic size. Interestingly, we cannot find any statistical evidence that the Systemic
size of a banking firm has influence on the stock performance of the institution. Our
other results remain qualitatively unchanged. This result underlines the findings by
Bertray et al. (2013) who argue that investors distinguish between banks’ absolute size
and systemic size. However, the variable systemic size also captures the costs of a
bailout for the government. Hence, the variable systemic size additionally measures
the degree to which a country is affected by a possible bailout of a banking firm in
case of financial distress. As a consequence, the systemic size of a bank captures two
contra-directional features. Accordingly, the variable does not significantly influence
the annual buy-and-hold return of a bank
In models (3) and (4), we additionally include a variable that measures the quality
of the corporate governance of a given country. The variables are calculated using the
Worldwide Governance Indicators provided by the World Bank. The variable Gover-
nance is an arithmetic mean of the six indicators on Corporate Governance provided
by the World bank. However, a better index of Corporate Governance might consist of
some underlying commonality found in the six indicators. Consequently, we perform a
principal component analysis to extract the common factor of the individual indicators
and include the variable Governance (pca) in an additional regression. Regardless of
the calculation method of the index we include to measure the quality of the corporate
governance in a country, we find evidence for the notion that better corporate gover-
nance yields better stock performance. Consequently, we find evidence that supports
the hypothesis that a better corporate governance environment allows banks to run their
business more soundly and solidly, which in turn results in higher annual buy-and-hold
returns.
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Table 4.8: Systemic size and bank’s stock performance.
The regressions estimate the relation between stock performance and bank characteristics as well as regulatory variables over the period 1999-2012. We use the banks’ log annual buy-and-hold return as our dependent variable. The sample consists of 1,659 publicly traded international
banks from 74 countries. Stock market data are retrieved from Thomson Reuters Financial Datastream while financial accounting data are taken from the Worldscope database. Regulation variables come from Barth et al. (2013a) and country characteristics are retrieved from the World
Bank’s World Development Indicator (WDI) Database. The regressions include all banks from our sample and we apply panel regression with time-fixed and bank-fixed effects using clustered robust standard errors (at the bank level). P-values are given in parentheses, *, **, and ***
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Adj. R2 is adjusted R-squared. Definitions of variables as well as descriptions of the data sources are given in Appendix C.1.
Variable Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) Model (7) Model (8)
Bank-level characteristics
Lagged return -0.129 *** -0.141 *** -0.131 *** -0.131 *** -0.082 *** -0.112 *** -0.138 *** -0.123 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
MES -0.233 *** -0.224 *** -0.229 *** -0.203 *** -0.25 *** -0.201 *** -0.241 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.000) (0.005) (0.001)
Beta -0.392 *** -0.398 *** -0.384 *** -0.388 *** -0.284 *** -0.411 *** -0.374 *** -0.39 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Systemic size -43.847 -36.983 -40.431 -50.773 -199.782 ** -119.369 -77.285 -101.203
(0.280) (0.346) (0.341) (0.201) (0.049) (0.161) (0.398) (0.225)
Market-to-book -0.049 *** -0.046 *** -0.047 *** -0.049 *** -0.063 *** -0.047 *** -0.045 *** -0.047 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Leverage 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
(0.694) (0.696) (0.725) (0.704) (0.700) (0.659) (0.635) (0.434)
Non-interest income -0.011 -0.013 -0.012 -0.011 -0.001 -0.01 -0.019 -0.013
(0.536) (0.591) (0.502) (0.521) (0.953) (0.573) (0.275) (0.453)
Loans -0.259 *** -0.233 *** -0.254 *** -0.24 *** -0.165 ** -0.238 *** -0.243 *** -0.251 ***
(0.000) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.035) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Loan loss provisions -2.162 ** -2.44 *** -2.223 *** -2.076 ** -1.883 * -1.915 ** -2.781 *** -2.369 ***
(0.011) (0.006) (0.009) (0.016) (0.067) (0.032) (0.002) (0.009)
Deposits 0.434 *** 0.423 *** 0.42 *** 0.426 *** 0.413 *** 0.409 *** 0.38 *** 0.433 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Return on assets 0.032 *** 0.033 *** 0.032 *** 0.032 *** 0.038 *** 0.033 *** 0.032 *** 0.033 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tier-1-capital -0.003 *** -0.003 *** -0.003 *** -0.003 *** -0.003 *** -0.003 *** -0.003 *** -0.003 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Liquidity -8.467 *** -9.205 *** -8.413 *** -8.539 *** -12.245 *** -12.008 *** -8.091 *** -8.389 ***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
∆CoVaR 0.000
(0.960)
Regulatory environment
Governance (pca) 0.033 **
(0.042)
Governance 0.102 *
(0.077)
Official Supervisory Power 0.014 **
(0.020)
Private monitoring Index -0.033 ***
(0.000)
Diversification Index -0.129 ***
(0.000)
Entry requirements -0.051 ***
(0.000)
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 10,149 9,108 10,149 10,149 8,793 9,782 9,951 9,875
R2 0.307 0.294 0.307 0.307 0.335 0.304 0.316 0.308
Adj. R2 0.305 0.292 0.305 0.305 0.333 0.302 0.314 0.306
4.3. THE INFLUENCE OF REGULATION ON STOCK PERFORMANCE 100
4.3.3 Banks’ stock performance during crises times
Our analyses so far have revealed strong correlations between bank capital, bank size,
and bank stock performance. As mentioned above, however, these effects could differ
significantly during times of financial crisis. As a result, we now turn to an in-depth
analysis of the factors that drive a bank’s performance during turbulent times. Com-
plementing the main regressions discussed in the previous subsections, we also inves-
tigate the robustness of our results during crisis- and non-crisis times, respectively. To
identify periods of financial crisis, we rely on the new database on systemic banking
crises provided by Laeven and Valencia (2012). We then perform several regressions
in which we employ the same set of variables as in Table 4.5 but additionally include a
dummy variable that takes on the value one if a country experienced a financial crisis
in a given year, and zero otherwise. Moreover, we include several interaction terms
with our crisis dummy to test the differential effect of several explanatory variables on
bank performance during and outside of crises. Again, we estimate panel regressions
of the annual buy-and-hold return with clustered robust standard errors (at the bank
level) as well as time-fixed and bank-fixed effects. The results are presented in Table
4.9.
Models (1) through (5) in Table 4.9 provide us with first evidence on the effect of
turbulent times on a bank’s performance. The results show that during crisis periods,
a higher Tier 1 capital ratio significantly increased a bank’s stock performance. The
result is economically significant and large. A one standard deviation increase in Tier
1 capital yields an increase in the dependent variable of 84%. Thus, while a higher
Tier 1 capital yields only a marginal decrease in stock performance during calm times,
during turbulent times, a higher Tier 1 capital ratio induces a significantly better stock
performance. This result supports the argumentation that Tier 1 capital shields banks
from adverse effects spilling over from the financial sector to individual institutions.
Also, this result is in line with the argumentation of Berger and Bouwman (2013) that
banks with more capital also have a higher probability of survival, a possibly higher
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Table 4.9: Bank-specific and regulatory interactions.
The regressions estimate the relation between stock performance and bank characteristics, a bank’s interconnectedness with
other banks, and regulatory variables over the period 1999-2012. Table 4.5 reports the results of our baseline regressions over
the period 1999-2012 using banks’ log annual buy-and-hold return as our dependent variable. In addition to our multivariate
analyses, we include several interaction terms. The sample consists of 1,659 publicly traded international banks from 74
countries. Stock market data are retrieved from Thomson Reuters Financial Datastream while financial accounting data are taken
from the Worldscope database. Regulation variables come from Barth et al. (2013a) and country characteristics are retrieved
from the World Bank’s World Development Indicator (WDI) Database. The regressions include all banks from our sample and
we apply panel regression with time-fixed and bank-fixed effects clustered robust standard errors (at the bank level). P-values
are given in parentheses, *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Adj. R2 is
adjusted R-squared. Definitions of variables as well as descriptions of the data sources are given in Appendix C.1.
Variable Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5)
Bank-level characteristics
Tier-1-capital -0.003 *** -0.003 *** -0.003 *** -0.003 *** -0.003 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Leverage 0.000 0.005 *** 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.542) (0.000) (0.749) (0.786) (0.963)
Debt maturity -0.014 -0.012 -0.015 -0.019 0.012
(0.539) (0.593) (0.504) (0.402) (0.620)
Loans -0.270 *** -0.274 *** -0.273 *** -0.149 * -0.318 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.060) (0.000)
Interconnectedness 0.028
(0.685)
Crisis -0.079 *** 0.113 *** 0.008 0.300 *** 0.006
(0.003) (0.000) (0.747) (0.000) (0.799)
Interactions
Tier-1-capital × Crisis 1.238 ***
(0.000)
Leverage × Crisis -0.006 ***
(0.000)
Debt maturity × Crisis 0.005
(0.904)
Loans × Crisis -0.421 ***
(0.000)
Interconnect. × Crisis -0.911 ***
(0.000)
Bank-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 10,032 10,032 10,032 10,032 8,078
R2 0.323 0.328 0.321 0.324 0.345
Adj. R2 0.321 0.326 0.319 0.322 0.343
market share, and thus a better stock performance.
Further along, we find that while Leverage does not have a significant influence on
a bank’s stock performance over the whole sample period, during crisis times, more
highly levered banks realize a significantly lower return than other banks. The eco-
nomic significance of this result is large (66.5% decrease in our dependent variable
for a one standard deviation increase in leverage). This finding is also underlined by
Fahlenbrach et al. (2012) who confirm that the leverage of a bank had a negative influ-
ence on the bank’s stock performance during the financial crisis. One possible expla-
nation for this finding could be that banks with higher leverage also had a more fragile
funding and were thus more vulnerable during the recent crisis. However, we find
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no statistical evidence that a bank’s debt maturity is significantly related to a bank’s
annual buy-and-hold return.
While we find some evidence for our full sample that banks with more loans in
their portfolio realize smaller annual buy-and-hold stock returns, this effect is even
more pronounced during crises times. We find strong empirical evidence (significant
at the 1% level) that banks with more loans have significantly lower stock returns
during a crisis. The result is also economically significant and in line with the results
of Ciha´k et al. (2012) who find that for the global financial crisis, countries had less
stringent regulations on the treatment of bad loans. Also, the finding underlines the
argumentation of Engle et al. (2014) who argue that leverage is more serious when the
economy is weak.
Finally, we analyze the relation between the interconnectedness of a bank with other
banking firms during times of a financial crisis. We show that during crisis times, a
bank’s stock performance decreases significantly as its interconnectedness increases.
Again, this result is significantly more pronounced during crisis times than for the com-
plete sample period. In line with our intuition, this evidence highlights the importance
of interconnectedness among financial institutions during crises. As interbank linkages
are to some degree unknown, for highly interconnected firms the risk of contagion in-
creases during crises periods. To be specific, only direct linkages to other banks are
known, while information about linkages of higher degrees are rare. As a result, with
increasing interconnectedness a bank’s stock performance decreases.
4.4 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate the effects of bank capital, bank regulation, and supervi-
sion on banks’ stock performance. We analyze a comprehensive panel of international
banks over the period of 1999-2012 with 11,803 bank-year observations from 1,659
banks in 74 countries. We employ panel regressions to study the determinants of each
bank’s annual buy-and-hold return using bank-specific as well as country-specific and
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regulatory explanatory variables.
The key result of our empirical study is that higher regulatory capital in the form of
Tier 1 capital is negatively related to the banks’ stock performance over our complete
sample period from 1999 to 2012. However, during turbulent times, higher regulatory
capital significantly increases a bank’s annual stock performance. In addition, we find
evidence that supports the notion that implicit government bailout guarantees decrease
bank stock performance. To be specific both, a bank’s size measured by its total as-
sets and a bank’s interconnectedness with other banking firms, are related to weaker
stock performance. Furthermore, we find evidence that better supervision and corpo-
rate governance are beneficial to bank stock performance. At the same time, schemes
supporting the private monitoring of banks are negatively related to annual buy-and-
hold returns.
The implications of our results are twofold. First, while higher bank capital indeed
decreases overall bank performance, this result is of marginal magnitude. However,
as higher Tier 1 capital ratios significantly increase performance during crisis times,
regulation appears to be on the right track, increasing regulatory capital requirements
around the world since the recent financial crisis. Finally, we confirm in our panel
setup that size and systemic relevance of banks negatively influence banks’ stock per-
formance. In line with earlier findings in the literature, bank stock returns are signifi-
cantly lower for larger and systemically more important banks that are more likely to
receive a government bailout.
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Chapter 5
Crisis Sentiment and Insurer
Performance
“The financial crisis generally had a limited effect on the insurance industry [...].
Aggregate stock prices of publicly traded life insurers [...] had declined by a total of
79 percent by February 2009.”
United States Government Accountability Office, 07/29/2013
5.1 Introduction
Looking back at the recent financial crisis, it appears that not only shareholders of
banks but also investors of insurer stocks were hit hard by the turmoil in international
stock markets. In fact, insurer stocks suffered even higher losses than stocks of banks.
The question remains what exactly caused stocks of insurers to experience such mas-
sive declines (see Figure D.1 in Appendix D for a comparison of the stock returns of
banks and insurers in the U.S. during the financial crisis). In this paper, we analyze
whether the abnormally high losses on insurer stocks during the financial crisis can
be explained by investor sentiment that intensified during the financial crisis. More
precisely, we argue that investors were measuring both banks and insurance compa-
nies by the same yardstick during the crisis and exited stock investments of financial
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institutions indiscriminately and regardless of the institutions’ actual exposure to the
crisis. If this were the case, investors would have been punishing insurers beyond the
degree to which they were actually exposed to the adverse effects of a crisis that origi-
nated from the banking sector. We find that market-level crisis sentiment was a highly
significant predictor of stock performance between 2004 and 2012. During the finan-
cial crisis, market-level crisis sentiment affected the performance of all insurers while
idiosyncratic crisis sentiment (negatively) influenced the stock performance of large
insurers. Our results imply that investors exited insurer stocks mainly due to irrational
crisis sentiment rather than a rational assessment of the insurers’ actual exposure to the
crisis.
Intuitively, we would expect insurers to suffer to a lesser extent than banks dur-
ing a financial crisis for several reasons: First, insurers are neither vulnerable to bank
runs by depositors (see Diamond and Dybvig, 1983) and creditors (see Duffie, 2010,
Gorton and Metrick, 2012) nor to liquidity shortages arising from the interbank market
as seen during the financial crisis. On the contrary, insurer stocks should experience
a flight to quality during an episode of turmoil in the financial sector as investors exit
their investments in volatile bank stocks. However, the recent financial crisis has seen
dramatic losses on the stocks of insurers worldwide. Insurer performance is clearly in-
fluenced by a multitude of determinants which have been thoroughly discussed in the
literature. He and Sommer (2011) investigate the impact of ownership structure, i.e.,
mutual versus stock ownership, on the relation between firm performance and CEO
turnover in the U.S. property-liability insurance industry. Similarly, Mayers and Smith
(2010) establish a connection between board structure and the extent to which exec-
utive compensation is linked to the performance of mutual insurers. They find that
dysfunctional managerial incentives can be controlled through governmental mecha-
nisms. Berry-Sto¨lzle et al. (2013) look at the effect of product diversification on per-
formance of insurers and find it to be heterogeneous across countries and dependent
on company size. Looking at the relationship of market structure and the performance
in property-liability insurers, Choi and Weiss (2005) come to the conclusion that a
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higher insurance market concentration leads to lower prices and higher profits and
that both cost and revenue efficiency have considerable influence on firm performance.
Most of the existing literature on insurer performance is restricted to the U.S. mar-
ket, with few exceptions such as Renbao and Wong (2004), who focus on the financial
health of Asian property-liability and life insurance companies. In a related study,
Lai and Limpaphayom (2003) examine the effects of organizational structure on per-
formance in the Japanese non-life insurance industry. The latter find that the keiretsu43
form of organization increases insurer performance. Complementing these findings,
an alternative explanation for the bad performance of insurers during the crisis could
be that investors were driven by extreme bearish sentiment together with high uncer-
tainty regarding a respective insurer’s involvement in the credit derivatives market.
This investor sentiment might also have been increased during the financial crisis by
the near-collapse of American International Group, which led to a reassessment of the
insurance sector’s potential to cause systemic risk.
In this paper, we argue that insurer performance during the financial crisis was sig-
nificantly driven by irrational components such as general negative investor sentiment.
To proxy for an individual insurer’s susceptibility to the adverse effects of the crisis
as perceived by market investors, we propose two new measures of “crisis sentiment”.
First, we extend the FEARS index of Da et al. (2015) and propose to use the first
principal component of several Google search volumes for crisis-related queries (e.g.,
“financial crisis”, “subprime crisis”) to measure the level of market-wide crisis senti-
ment. To measure the extent of idiosyncratic crisis sentiment, we improve the investor
attention proxy of Da et al. (2011) based on Google Trends data to obtain a measure for
the correlation of the search volume of individual insurers’ ticker symbols with search
terms such as “bank crisis”, “financial crisis” or “credit crisis”. Thus, we extend the
original idea of Da et al. (2011) by measuring not only the amount of attention paid
to the insurance market by investors, but the degree to which investors are negatively
43Keiretsu refers to the corporate structure of a company that is closely tied to a bank that provides debt
financing and owns a considerable part of the company’s equity, see Lai and Limpaphayom (2003).
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influenced by the financial crisis in their perception of the insurance market. We esti-
mate our proposed measure of crisis sentiment for a sample of international insurance
companies and carry out regressions of the stock performance of global insurers be-
fore, during and after the financial crisis on the two new measures of crisis sentiment
and various control variables. Most importantly, we control for the insurers’ individual
exposure to losses in the financial sector’s aggregate stock prices by using the Marginal
Expected Shortfall (MES) measure of Acharya et al. (2010).
Our results show that our measure of market-level (or general) crisis sentiment sig-
nificantly predicts an insurer’s quarterly buy-and-hold returns.44 Higher values of gen-
eral crisis sentiment induce a worse stock performance of insurers in the following
quarter. As we control for both the insurer’s exposure to systemic risk (proxied by
their Marginal Expected Shortfall) and the crisis-related downturn of the general econ-
omy (measured by the GDP growth and inflation rates), we find robust evidence that
the extreme losses on insurer stocks during the crisis were indeed due to (irrational)
bearish investor sentiment. In contrast, we find that idiosyncratic crisis sentiment is
only significant in the regressions of the stock performance of large insurers during the
crisis. Consequently, (retail) investors did indeed act on the sentiment of a general eco-
nomic downturn rather than a differential and rational assessment of the idiosyncratic
exposure of insurers to the crisis.
Our paper is related to few but influential previous studies on the usefulness of in-
ternet search data.45 Ginsberg et al. (2009) were among the first to use search engine
queries to detect health trends and predict influenza epidemics. In an economic con-
text, the usefulness of Google search volume data for portfolio diversification and in-
vestment strategies has recently been investigated by Kristoufek (2013) and Preis et al.
(2013). Methodically, our empirical approach differs from theirs in that we make use
44In contrast to related studies on investor sentiment (see, e.g., Tetlock, 2007, Da et al., 2011), we
concentrate in this study on quarterly buy-and-hold returns rather than daily stock returns. In this
way, our results are immediately comparable to related studies by Beltratti and Stulz (2012) and
Fahlenbrach et al. (2012) on the stock performance of banks during the financial crisis.
45As noted by Choi and Varian (2009), search data from Google may have the potential to describe
interest in a variety of economic variables.
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of the search volume index (SVI) provided by Google Trends while Ginsberg et al.
(2009) compute a time series of weekly counts for the most common search queries
themselves. The usefulness of quantifying internet search behaviour has also been
studied in the finance literature, most notably through the work of Da et al. (2011)
and Da et al. (2015). In the latter, the authors also study investor sentiment measured
through internet search behaviour but focus on the pricing of financial assets. Their
approach resembles ours with respect to the construction of a new index of investor
sentiment. Their so called FEARS index is based on the SVI of sentiment revealing
search terms such as “recession” or “bankruptcy”, which they find to increase in the
years around the financial crisis. However, Da et al. (2015) focus on the effect in-
vestor sentiment has on asset prices, volatility and fund flow from equity mutual funds
to bond funds. Our paper differs significantly from previous studies, however, as we
measure the correlation between two sets of search terms and provide the first use of
big data from Google in the empirical insurance literature. In addition, our work also
complements the findings on the relation between investor mood and asset prices (see,
e.g., Shu, 2010). But instead of using mood proxies, such as biorhythms or whether,
we employ a direct measure of the bearish sentiment of investors. Finally, our paper is
also related to the recent study by Wisniewski and Lambe (2013) which examines the
impact of negative media speculation on the performance of bank sector indices. In
contrast to their paper, we refine the notion of negative sentiment by analyzing crisis
sentiment and concentrate on the performance of individual insurers rather than the
whole financial sector.
The rest of our paper is structured as follows. In Section 5.2, we briefly describe the
construction of our data sample, followed by an outline of the measures we employ
to proxy for insurer performance. We then explain how we build our two measures of
crisis sentiment and describe the control variables that have been shown to influence
insurer performance. Section 5.3 presents the results of our analysis into the question
whether insurer performance during the crisis was driven by crisis sentiment. Section
5.4 concludes.
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5.2 Data and variables
5.2.1 Sample selection
We study the hypothesis that insurer stock performance during the financial crisis was
driven by crisis sentiment in a comprehensive cross-country analysis. Using a sample
of international insurers in our empirical study is instructive for several reasons. First,
we strongly expect crisis sentiment to vary significantly across countries due to cross-
country differences in internet availability and usage. As such, we expect the effect
of crisis sentiment on insurer stock performance to be attenuated in countries with
fewer internet users and vice versa. Second, we also expect crisis sentiment to have
a differential effect on the performance of insurers in the U.S. (being the country the
financial crisis originated from) and Non-U.S. countries.
We construct our data sample by first selecting all publicly listed international in-
surers from the dead and active firm lists in Thomson Reuters Financial Datastream.
For our investigation it is essential for an insurer to be large enough in terms of total
assets to receive sufficient attention by retail investors on the internet. We therefore
exclude all insurers with less than $ 1 billion of total assets. We then omit all firms for
which stock price data is unavailable in Datastream. Next, we eliminate all secondary
listings and nonprimary issues from our sample. Finally, we also exclude Berkshire
Hathaway, which is listed as an insurance company in Datastream due to its unusu-
ally high stock price. Balance-sheet and income statement data are retrieved from the
Thomson Worldscope database and all stock market and accounting data are collected
in U.S. dollars to minimize a possible bias in our results stemming from currency risk.
5.2.2 General crisis sentiment
In the early works on asset pricing and efficient markets, it is regularly assumed that
new information is immediately processed by investors and priced. In reality, how-
ever, the limited attention investors can allocate to an asset (see Kahnemann, 1973)
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raises severe doubts about the validity of the assumption of the instantaneous pricing
of information. There now exists an extensive literature on the effects of limited in-
formation and heterogeneous investor attention and asset pricing (see, e.g., Merton,
1987, Gervais et al., 2001, Sims, 2003, Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003, Grullon et al.,
2004, Seasholes and Wu, 2007, Barber and Odean, 2008, Hou et al., 2009). While
most of these studies relied on indirect measures of investor attention, recent work
has used data based on Google search volumes to directly measure investor attention
(see Da et al., 2011, 2015). Closely related to investor attention, asset prices could
also be driven by investor sentiment. If uninformed noise traders base their investment
decisions on sentiment rather than rational information, changes in investor sentiment
and pessimism will be reflected in asset prices (see De Long et al., 1990) if not in the
long run, then at least in the short run (see Kogan et al., 2006, 2011).46 As such, ex-
treme noise trading brought on by the financial crisis might have been responsible for
the extreme downward price movements in insurer stocks.
In this paper, we propose a direct measure of the pessimistic investor sentiment
caused by the financial crisis. We argue that the media coverage of the financial dis-
tress at banks during the crisis urged noise traders to exit investments in insurer stocks
even though these divestitures may not have been justified by an increased default prob-
ability of insurers. Moreover, if uninformed traders suspected insurers to be similarly
exposed as banks to runs in the money market (see Gorton, 2010) and counterparty
risk in credit derivatives markets, missing too-big-to-fail guarantees in insurance could
have additionally driven investors to sell the shares of insurers. To measure investor
sentiment towards the vulnerability of insurers to the banking crisis, we use the Google
Trends analytics tool. Google Trends allows the user to download (normalized) data
on the weekly search volume for a given word or list of words.47 First, we obtain the
Google Search Volume Index (GSVI) for multiple search terms related to the financial
46In fact, Tetlock (2007) shows that high media pessimism does not only explain contemporaneous
stock returns, but also predicts downward stock price movements which are followed by a reversion
to fundamentals.
47The graphical output of the Google Trends Analytics tool is illustrated in Figure D.2 in Appendix D.
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crisis. The GSVI measures the number of searches for a given term relative to the
total amount of searches on Google over a given time period as a proxy for investor
attention. As the naming of the financial crisis evolved through the years, just like
the crisis evolved from a relatively limited crisis in the subprime lending sector to a
global financial crisis, we collect data on several variations of the search term “finan-
cial crisis”. In particular, we use the words “financial crisis”, “credit crisis”, “subprime
crisis” and “bank crisis”.48 We do not use more general, negatively connotated terms,
like Da et al. (2015), since we are specifically interested in investors’ (irrational) per-
ception of the effect the crisis had on individual insurers’ stock returns. Following the
approach of Baker and Wurgler (2006), the observations of the GSVI for these search
terms are then used in a principal component analysis. More precisely, we first employ
the 52 weekly GSVI values of the four crisis-related search terms in the year 2004
and estimate the first principal component of the four time series. The resulting values
of the first principal component are then used to proxy for the Google search volume
of crisis-related search terms during the year 2004. To estimate the GSVI of crisis-
related terms in each remaining week in our sample, we use rolling windows that are
enlarged by one week after each estimation (i.e., the principal component analysis used
to compute the first principal component in week t is performed on data for weeks one
through week t). Obviously, the principal component analysis could have also been
performed on our complete data set. The estimation procedure described above, how-
ever, guarantees that the time series of the first principal component of crisis-related
search terms does not suffer from a look-ahead bias. Then, let Zt be the resulting value
of the first principal component of the GSVI of the four search terms at time t, scaled
to the range of 0 to 100.49 We then consider the estimate of Zt to be our primary proxy
for the general crisis sentiment of investors. The time evolution of the market-level
crisis sentiment Zt together with the GSVIs of the four original search terms is shown
48Note that we do not use search terms that differ only marginally from the terms we use like, e.g., “the
financial crisis” or “banking crisis”. As these alternative terms are highly correlated with the terms we
employ in our empirical study, we restrict Google searches to the small set of terms mentioned above.
49The scaling is done as in the Google Trends tool through dividing by the maximum value of the series
and then multiplying by 100.
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in Figure 5.1.
Figure 5.1: Google search volume indices for “financial crisis” and related search
terms.
The figure shows the plots of the five Google Search Volume Indices from 2004 to the end of 2012 for
the search terms “financial crisis”, “credit crisis”, “subprime crisis”, “bank crisis” and the first principal
component of the four indices. The principal component is iteratively calculated using an enlarging
window, starting with the values of the year 2004 and then scaled to the range of 0 to 100. All data are
taken from Google Trends.
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Two observations from Figure 5.1 are noteworthy: First, and not surprisingly, crisis
sentiment increased in summer 2007 and rose steeply around the collapse of Lehman
Brothers in 2008. Nevertheless, search volume indices also varied significantly before
and after the collapse of Lehman. Second, differences between the GSVI of the indi-
vidual search terms can be quite high as evidenced, e.g., by the high search volumes for
“subprime crisis” in late 2007 and early 2008 thus underlining the need to consolidate
the search volume data via our principal component analysis.
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5.2.3 Crisis Sentiment Index
Whereas our proxy for the general crisis sentiment as constructed above is supposed
to capture the overall angst of investors towards the financial crisis, we additionally
introduce a measure of the relation between individual insurers and the financial crisis
as perceived by investors.
We follow Da et al. (2011) and retrieve weekly data from Google Trends on the
GSVI for each insurer for the time period between 2004 and 2012 using the firm’s
ticker symbol as the search query (our retrieval of Google data parallels the approach
by Da et al., 2011).50 Although Google Trends allows to retrieve search results for
specific regions, we conduct world-wide searches as we want to capture international
investors’ attention to insurers. Moreover, as the GSVI does not provide the search
volume in total, but in relative terms, measuring investors’ attention countrywise would
make comparisons between individual countries difficult. Next, we estimate time-
varying correlations ρit between the general crisis sentiment Zt and the search volume
index GS VIit of insurer i. We follow Da et al. (2011) and compute GS VIit using insurer
i’s ticker symbol and, if only a numeric ticker symbol was available, the insurer’s
company name as given in Datastream as search terms in Google Trends. To avoid
a possible look-ahead bias in the estimation of the correlations, we estimate ρit using
rolling windows of length 52 weeks using data up to week t (the rolling windows
are skipped ahead one week for each estimation). Finally, we construct our Crisis
Sentiment Index (CSI) by combining the dynamic correlation between the first principal
component Zt and a firm’s GS VIit , multiplying the estimated correlation with the sum
(GS VIit + Zt) and then dividing the resulting term by 200:
CS Iit :=
(
GS VIit + Zt
200
)
· ρit. (5.1)
This specific construction of the CSI accounts for several issues. First, by employ-
50In case the ticker symbol was ambiguous, most notably Japan, official company names instead of
ticker symbols are used in Google Trends to retrieve the GSVI.
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ing the time-varying correlations of the first principal component and the normalized
search volume index of the firms we capture the time variation in the crisis-related at-
tention retail investors and noise traders (together with the general public) paid to the
insurance firms in our sample. This correlation, however, does not provide us with any
information on the actual level of the search volumes in a given week. As such, it could
be that both the insurer’s GSVI and the crisis-related search terms are highly correlated
simply because both their search volume indices were zero. We correct this issue in
equation (5.1) by multiplying the dynamic correlation with the sum of the indices and
the scaling factor of 1200 (each of the two GSVIs has a range of 0 to 100).
In Figure 5.2, we plot the estimated values of the Crisis Sentiment Index of three
global insurers (AIG, Prudential and Swiss RE) against the stock (mid) prices of the
three respective insurers during the period 01/01/2004 to 08/31/2013.
The plots in the upper panel of Figure 5.2 highlight both the time variation of id-
iosyncratic crisis sentiment during our full sample period and the particularly high
levels of crisis sentiment during the financial crisis. Moreover, consistent with the
fact that AIG received more media coverage during the crisis than any other insurance
company, the peak in the CSI is most pronounced for AIG while crisis sentiment was
considerably lower, e.g., for Swiss RE. A comparison of the plots of crisis sentiment
and the three insurers’ stock prices in the lower panel of Figure 5.2 already hints at a
high correlation between stock prices and contemporaneous idiosyncratic crisis senti-
ment. In our panel regression analysis, we will later explore the questions whether this
contemporaneous correlation also holds in our full sample and whether lagged values
of the general and idiosyncratic crisis sentiment proxies can also be used to predict an
insurer’s stock performance.51
51In Figure D.3 in Appendix D, we also plot the time evolution of CSI for the mean values and for the
10%- and 90%-quantiles of CSI.
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Figure 5.2: Crisis sentiment and insurer stock prices 2004-2013.
The figure shows plots of the (weekly) values of the Crisis Sentiment Index (first line) and daily stock prices (second line) for American International Group (first column),
Prudential (second column) and Swiss RE (third column). The data on the stock prices are taken from the Thomson Reuters Financial Datastream database and cover the
period from 01/01/2004 to 08/31/2013. The Crisis Sentiment Index is computed using data from Google Trends via CS Iit :=
(
GS VIit+Zt
200
)
· ρit. where Zt is the first principal
component of the Google Search Volume Indices (GSVI) for several crisis-related search query terms, GS VIit is the GSVI for insurer ith ticker symbol (or company name in
case of a numeric ticker symbol) and ρit is the (dynamic) correlation between Zt and GS VIit .
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5.2.4 Further control variables
In addition to our two proxies of crisis sentiment, we also employ several control vari-
ables that have been shown in the literature to affect insurer performance in our panel
regressions.52. Data on the insurer characteristics we use are obtained from the Thomp-
son Worldscope database. To begin with, we control for two standard accounting per-
formance measures and use an insurer’s Return on Equity (ROE) and Return on Assets
(ROA). ROE is calculated as earnings per share of the last 12 months divided by pro-
rated book value per share times 100. ROA is the pre-tax return of the insurer on its
total assets. As previous research has shown (see, e.g., Berry-Sto¨lzle et al., 2013), firm
performance is unquestionably related to firm size. We therefore include the natural
logarithm of an insurer’s total assets as well as net revenues, given by the log total
of an insurer’s operating revenue, to proxy for size and the market-to-book-ratio, de-
fined by market value of common equity divided by book value of common equity, to
proxy for each insurer’s firm value. As a further proxy for performance, we include
the loss ratio, built by adding claim and loss expenses to long term insurance reserves
and dividing by premiums earned. Moreover, we expect performance to be influenced
by leverage, which is obtained by subtracting the book value of equity from the book
value of assets, adding market value of equity and dividing the total by market value of
equity. Empirical evidence has shown both a negative (see, e.g., Acharya et al., 2010)
and a positive (see Vallascas and Hagendorff, 2011) correlation between performance
and leverage. We therefore have no expectations as to the sign of the coefficient of
leverage in our regressions. Furthermore, we include a proxy for an insurer’s invest-
ment success in our panel regressions. More precisely, we use the ratio of investment
income to net revenues, as well as the related proxy Investment Activity, which is de-
fined as the ratio of the insurer’s absolute investment income to the sum of absolute
investment income and absolute earned premiums. The latter proxies for the degree to
52The determinants of insurer performance have also been addressed by Lai and Limpaphayom (2003),
Choi and Weiss (2005), Lai et al. (2011), He and Sommer (2011), He et al. (2011), Fields et al. (2012)
and Berry-Sto¨lzle et al. (2013).
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which an insurer derives income from investing in assets instead of earning premiums
from underwriting. To assess an insurer’s activity outside the insurance business, we
also regress insurer performance on non-policyholder liabilities, obtained by dividing
the total on balance sheet liabilities by total insurance reserves. Since corporate gov-
ernance has been shown to affect firm performance during crises (see Johnson et al.,
2000), we include the variables Board Size and Board Independence in our regressions.
Board Size is measured by the natural logarithm of the number of directors whereas
Board Independence describes the percentage of independent outside directors on the
board of directors.
Although we argue that the bad stock performance of insurers was driven by irra-
tional crisis sentiment, it could also be the case that insurer stock performance was
driven by rational divestitures at systemically more exposed insurers. To control for
this effect, we include a measure of systemic risk in our analysis which has been ex-
tensively discussed in the previous literature. We compute an insurer’s Marginal Ex-
pected Shortfall to control for an insurer’s actual exposure to systemic risk. We follow
Acharya et al. (2010) and define the Marginal Expected Shortfall as the average return
on an individual insurer’s stock on the days the Datastream Bank Index experienced
its 5% worst outcomes during the time period of January 2004 to December 2012. To
control for country-specific, i.e., economic or political differences across countries in
our sample, we include several country controls, such as the annual real GDP growth
rate in per cent or Inflation, defined as the log of the annual change of the GDP defla-
tor.53 Finally, as we expect cross-country differences in internet availability and usage
to influence our Crisis Sentiment Index, we include the variable Internet use, which is
given as the percentage of people with access to the world wide web in a given coun-
try in our regression analysis. Data on internet availability is taken from the World
Development Indicator database of the World Bank.
53Inflation is known to influence insurer performance, see for instance Berry-Sto¨lzle et al. (2013).
5.2. DATA AND VARIABLES 118
5.2.5 Insurer performance and descriptive statistics
Descriptive statistics on our dependent variables, our measures of crisis sentiment and
various control variables are given in Table 5.1.
The descriptive statistics in Table 5.1 summarize the data of all 253 firms over the
complete sample period from Q2 2004 to Q4 2012. We intentionally choose quarterly
returns instead of data of higher frequency in order to keep our study comparable to
related studies by Beltratti and Stulz (2012) and Fahlenbrach et al. (2012). It is note-
worthy that the overall stock performance of insurers measured by the insurers’ quar-
terly buy-and-hold returns was insignificant over our full sample period. However,
stock performance was significantly negative during the financial crisis 54 with insurer
stocks plummeting by -5.19% on average. Similarly, our Crisis Sentiment Index has
a mean of zero in our full sample with the values of the CSI increasing significantly
during the financial crisis. The descriptive statistics for the proxy for the market-level
crisis sentiment are in line with the evidence presented in Figure 5.1 that our sample
period is characterized by a high variation in the level of general crisis sentiment with
peaks during 2008.
In addition, several findings from studying the descriptive statistics are noteworthy.
First, average internet use is high with approximately 69.54% of households having
access to the internet in our full sample. As the internet appears to be pervasively
available in our sample, we can safely assume that retail investors regularly use the
internet to gather information on stocks (regardless of the question whether they also
base their trading decisions on this information). Cross-country differences, however,
are significant with some countries having an internet availability of only 7%. Second,
the average exposure of insurers to systemic risk during our full sample period was at
an economically significant 2%. During the financial crisis, the average exposure of
insurers to externalities stemming from the banking sector was even higher with the
average MES being 2.33%. Several insurers were thus heavily exposed to systemic
54Following Fahlenbrach et al. (2012) we define the crisis period as Q3 2007 to Q4 2009.
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Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics.
The table presents descriptive statistics on quarterly buy-and-hold returns of the 253 sample insurers for the period from Q2 2004 to Q4 2012. Additionally, descriptive
statistics for the General crisis sentiment, Crisis Sentiment Index and the various control variables we use in our regression analyses are given on a quarterly basis. We report
the number of observations, minimum and maximum values, percentiles and moments. Except for the number of observations, skewness and (excess) kurtosis, all entries
are denominated in %. All variables and data sources are defined in Appendix D.1.
Percentiles Moments
Obs Min 1st 5th 20th 80th 95th 99th Max Mean St. Dev. Skewness Exc. Kurt.
Insurer performance and main explanatory variables
- Buy-and-hold returns 8714 -1.00 -0.47 -0.24 -0.08 0.10 0.26 0.55 29.00 0.02 0.39 49.40 3431.26
- CSI 8855 -0.30 -0.11 -0.04 0.00 0.01 0.07 0.16 0.43 0.01 0.04 1.47 14.91
- General crisis sentiment 35 0.32 0.32 0.39 1.77 13.44 24.75 48.39 48.39 8.96 9.36 2.25 6.57
Control variables
- Leverage 6247 1.17 1.50 1.93 3.12 15.02 37.03 133.23 44180.69 49.04 1137.83 37.55 1447.15
- Net revenues 6297 7.12 11.42 12.70 13.81 16.50 17.84 18.63 18.97 15.16 1.59 -0.26 0.79
- Total assets 6321 11.65 13.54 14.21 15.25 18.20 19.91 20.72 21.45 16.78 1.71 0.26 -0.25
- Debt maturity 5761 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.75 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.84 0.27 -2.05 3.24
- Loss ratio 5999 -1717.91 -0.06 40.81 63.17 114.85 267.37 864.40 8439.29 114.27 271.23 20.26 597.57
- Market-to-book ratio 6247 -0.76 0.20 0.50 0.81 2.03 3.30 5.51 45.12 1.54 1.50 16.13 439.99
- Non-policyholder liabilities 6027 0.56 1.01 1.07 1.14 1.79 5.06 36.52 704.97 5.04 40.78 14.04 205.65
- Return on assets 6318 -30.22 -5.80 -1.01 0.45 3.67 6.76 10.21 34.57 1.91 3.19 -0.39 25.74
- Investment activity 5998 -5.39 0.01 0.05 0.08 0.31 0.69 0.93 7.12 0.22 0.32 3.80 213.21
- Investment success 6035 -22.10 0.03 0.18 0.59 0.89 0.95 1.16 4.13 0.71 0.65 -28.63 995.07
- MES 8744 -1.14 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.06 0.10 0.40 0.02 0.03 -7.03 420.48
- Return on equity 5845 -77.86 -66.22 -6.84 5.66 16.29 25.82 34.29 36.69 10.16 12.84 -3.39 19.27
- Internet use 8835 7.30 8.43 35.00 64.76 81.03 86.77 91.30 95.00 69.54 15.54 -1.80 3.66
- Board size 2953 3.00 6.00 8.00 9.00 14.00 20.00 26.00 28.00 12.09 3.82 1.32 2.45
- Board independence 2694 0.55 2.84 9.23 38.53 86.98 91.33 94.45 94.67 62.58 26.61 -0.77 -0.60
- GDP growth 8624 -8.54 -5.49 -3.11 -0.36 3.27 5.45 8.22 14.78 1.68 2.66 -0.46 1.96
- Inflation 8624 -14.45 -2.16 -0.89 0.88 3.23 5.97 8.30 27.57 2.25 2.02 1.19 15.43
- Stock market turnover 8680 0.15 1.70 6.28 73.17 189.06 348.58 404.07 404.07 144.33 93.06 1.09 1.25
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risk. However, variation in the MES estimates across time and in the cross-section
is high thus underlining the notion that some insurers suffered heavily from the fi-
nancial crisis while others were not exposed to systemic risks. Furthermore, insurers
had positive mean profitability ratios and leverage ratios that lie mostly between 3.12
(20%-quantile) and 15.02 (80%-quantile). Mean leverage was 49.04, although this es-
timate is biased in part by few extreme outliers with a negative book value of equity.
We chose to keep these insurer-quarter observations in our sample as they belong to
insurers that most likely were in distress during the financial crisis and as dropping
these observations would lead to a survivorship bias.
We start our analysis of the hypothesized relation between crisis sentiment and in-
surer performance by conducting a univariate analysis of our full sample of insurer-
quarter observations. We first compute descriptive statistics for insurer-quarter obser-
vations in the bottom and top (general) crisis sentiment quartile based on our full sam-
ple (2004-2010). Not surprisingly, general crisis sentiment and the Crisis Sentiment
Index do not statistically significantly differ for insurer-quarters in the top and bottom
general crisis sentiment quartiles (despite the fact that both subsamples are constructed
in this way). Both measures of crisis sentiment are, however, higher in the top crisis
sentiment quartile. Quarterly buy-and-hold returns are slightly higher in the top crisis
sentiment quartile (0.7%) although returns in both the top and bottom quartile (0.68%)
are economically negligible. As results from this univariate analysis based on data
starting in 2004 offer a possibly biased picture due to the fact that crisis sentiment only
started to affect stock investors in 2006, we repeat this analysis for the subsample of
Q1 2006 to Q4 2010. The results of this analysis are reported in Table 5.2.
Surprisingly, buy-and-hold returns do not significantly differ between the insurers
in the top and bottom CSI quartiles. By construction, firm-specific and general crisis
sentiment are significantly higher in the top CSI quartile. However, results for some
of our independent variables indicate significant differences between insurers which
possessed a high CSI during the crisis and those that were in the bottom CSI quartile.
For instance, insurers with a high value of the Crisis Sentiment Index had a higher loss
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Table 5.2: Descriptive statistics for insurer-quarters in the first and fourth crisis sentiment quartiles (Q1 2006 - Q4 2010).
This table compares the characteristics of insurers below the bottom quartile of the Crisis Sentiment Index (CSI) relative to those above the top quartile of the CSI. Our
sample consists of 253 international insurers (listed in Appendix D.2) and covers the period from Q1 2006 to Q4 2010. We report the mean, 5%- and 95%-quantiles, and
the standard deviation of our dependent and independent variables. The equality of means of the different variables is tested using a standard t-test. All variables and data
sources are defined in Appendix D.1. ***,**,* denote estimates that are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Bottom crisis sentiment quartile Top crisis sentiment quartile t-test
Mean St. Dev. 5% quantile 95% quantile Mean St. Dev. 5% quantile 95% quantile
Dependent variable and main explanatory variables
- Buy-and-hold returns -0.0032 0.2055 -0.3047 0.2614 0.0058 0.3029 -0.3305 0.3427 0.6846
- CSI -0.0418 0.0375 -0.114 -0.002 0.0633 0.0649 0.003 0.2033 39.5295***
- General crisis sentiment 12.9959 11.3707 0.3155 24.7483 14.9866 13.2231 2.0653 48.3862 3.1199***
Control variables
- Leverage 14.57 30.23 1.80 57.28 17.067 54.02 1.94 51.64 1.02
- Net revenues 15.37 1.58 12.76 18.00 15.49 1.79 12.63 18.29 1.21
- Total assets 16.98 1.84 14.24 20.13 17.13 1.95 14.31 20.26 1.36
- Debt maturity 0.85 0.26 0.14 1 0.86 0.23 0.27 1 0.43
- Loss ratio 86.33 219.69 32.07 363.22 117.71 267.00 31.90 366.33 2.15**
- Market-to-book ratio 1.48 0.92 0.51 3.30 1.31 0.80 0.48 2.87 -3.17***
- Non-Policyholder liabilities 4.55 29.60 1.09 8.47 1.80 2.82 1.08 2.90 -2.00**
- Return on assets 2.31 3.35 -0.64 7.25 1.83 3.28 -0.82 6.72 -2.48**
- Investment activity 0.23 0.27 0.05 0.77 0.23 0.28 0.05 0.78 0.29
- Investment success 0.72 0.28 0.21 0.96 0.70 0.38 0.10 0.95 -1.44
- MES 0.02 0.03 -0.00 0.07 0.03 0.03 -0.00 0.09 2.86***
- Return on equity 9.47 12.53 -20.36 24.76 7.05 14.92 -19.24 20.45 -2.85***
- Internet use 70.05 13.82 40.79 85.03 68.88 13.92 37.99 82.3 -1.62
- Board size 11.78 3.83 6 20 12.23 3.54 8 20 1.65*
- Board independence 63.48 26.51 11.62 90.60 67.06 24.68 20.54 91.89 1.77*
- GDP growth 1.19 2.86 -4.81 5.40 0.62 2.92 -5.13 4.43 -3.77***
- Inflation 2.31 2.26 -0.93 5.38 2.33 1.88 -0.45 5.40 0.19
- Stock market turnover 187.49 111.54 33.37 404.07 185.99 114.17 30.58 404.07 -0.26
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ratio, were less profitable and had a higher exposure to systemic risk according to their
mean MES.
The results of the univariate analysis so far have presented only weak evidence in
support of the hypothesis that idiosyncratic crisis sentiment drove insurer performance
during the financial crisis. The extremely bad stock performance of insurers could,
however, be due to high levels of market-wide crisis sentiment that affected all finan-
cial institutions indiscriminately. Moreover, idiosyncratic and general crisis sentiment
could have a differential impact on small and large insurers as absolute media coverage
for these groups differ as well. We therefore explore the relation between crisis senti-
ment and insurer performance in a panel regression setting in the following section.
5.3 Does crisis sentiment drive insurer performance?
5.3.1 Baseline panel regressions
In this section, we explore the determinants of the stock performance of international
insurers during the last decade. To this end, we perform several panel regressions of the
insurers’ quarterly buy-and-hold returns on our two proxies of crisis sentiment together
with various control variables. To limit the possibility of reverse causality driving our
results, we lag all explanatory variables by one quarter.55 Our sample is composed of
8,855 insurer-quarter observations for the sample period Q1 2004 to Q4 2012. As we
strongly suspect the sensitivity of insurer performance to investor sentiment to vary
with firm size (and thus media coverage), and as this could possibly bias our findings,
we estimate separate regressions for quintiles of insurer-quarter sorted by the insurers’
total assets. Everything else equal, we would expect the influence of crisis sentiment on
insurer performance to be highest for large insurers as they are the ones with the most
55It is quite easy to imagine a possible source of reverse causality in the setting of our regression of
insurer performance on crisis sentiment. In a contemporaneous view, attention and sentiment of retail
investors could simply reflect a reaction of investors to the evolution of past stock prices. Although
we cannot completely rule out reverse causality, we believe that our regressions of performance on
lagged values of crisis sentiment mitigate this possibility to a large extent.
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extensive media coverage. To account for unobservable heterogeneity across insurers
and time, we estimate panel regressions with insurer- and time-fixed effects and robust
standard errors. Results from our baseline panel regressions are shown in Table 5.3.
Models (1) through (5) in Table 5.3 constitute our baseline panel regressions of in-
surer performance on our Crisis Sentiment Index based on insurer-quarter observations
sorted in quintiles of total assets. The results of these regressions show a clear picture.
Insurer performance is not affected by our measure of an insurer’s individual sensi-
tivity to crisis sentiment. Based on these findings, at least in our full sample there
appears to be no indication for a significant relation between individual crisis senti-
ment and insurer performance. Instead, several of our idiosyncratic control variables
like, e.g., the insurers’ market-to-book ratios are found to be driving buy-and-hold re-
turns (regardless of the firm size quintile the regression is based on). In models (6)
to (10), we repeat our baseline panel regressions but substitute the CSI by our mea-
sure of the market-wide crisis sentiment. The findings of these regressions offer a
completely different picture than our models that employ the CSI. Our measure of the
general crisis sentiment of investors is a highly statistically significant determinant of
the stock performance of insurers in our complete sample period. Moreover, we find
the market-level crisis sentiment to be highly significant for small, medium-sized and
large insurers with the effect being largest in magnitude for insurers in the top quintile
of total assets. Higher levels of market-wide crisis sentiment imply lower quarterly
buy-and-hold returns of insurers in the future. This effect is also economically sig-
nificant as a one standard deviation increase in our proxy of general crisis sentiment
decreases the average quarterly returns of, e.g., small insurers by -4.31% (-0.0045 ×
9.58). Similarly, a one standard deviation increase in the market-wide crisis sentiment
leads to a decrease in future returns on the stocks of large insurers of -5.12% (-0.0054
× 9.48).
Again, we find that insurer performance is also driven by the firms’ market-to-book
ratios and to some extent by their profitability as measured by the insurers’ return on as-
sets. In all regression specifications, leverage seems to be negatively related to insurer
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Table 5.3: Panel regressions of insurer performance 2004-2012.
This table shows results of panel regressions of quarterly buy-and-hold returns of international insurers on two proxies of general and firm-individual crisis sentiment and
various control variables. The panel regressions are performed on subsamples of insurer-quarter observations sorted into quintiles of the insurers’ total assets. All panel regres-
sions are estimated with insurer- and quarter-fixed effects. The sample includes 8,855 insurer-quarter observations of 253 international insurers over the time period Q1 2004
to Q4 2012. Robust standard errors are reported in parantheses and all explanatory variables are lagged by one quarter. For all regressions, we present results separated by
quintiles of the insurers’ total assets. Results for the country-specific variables GDP growth, Inflation and Stock market turnover are suppressed. Variable definitions and data
sources are provided in Table D.1 in the Appendix. ***,**,* denote coefficients that are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Adj. R2 is adjusted R-squared.
Dependent variable: Quarterly buy-and-hold returns
Total assets quintile: Small-Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Large-Q5 Small-Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Large-Q5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
CSI 0.0622 -0.0988 -0.3073 0.1063 -0.1635
(0.721) (0.385) (0.316) (0.381) (0.136)
General crisis sentiment -0.0045*** -0.0033*** -0.0040*** -0.0036*** -0.0054***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000)
MES 0.6991* 0.4269* 0.4282 1.3340* 0.9249 0.6999* 0.4368* 0.4051 1.3320 0.9252
(0.082) (0.099) (0.445) (0.077) (0.150) (0.081) (0.090) (0.475) (0.077) (0.153)
Total assets 0.0375** 0.0315 0.0545 0.0802** -0.0048 0.0381** 0.0305 0.0516 0.0830** -0.0055
(0.027) (0.521) (0.217) (0.026) (0.839) (0.024) (0.537) (0.245) (0.026) (0.817)
Market-to-book ratio 0.0053*** 0.0517*** 0.0422*** 0.0294*** 0.0150 0.0053*** 0.0520*** 0.0412*** 0.0292*** 0.0147
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.132) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.132)
Return on assets 0.0019** -0.0008 0.0109*** 0.0174*** 0.0070 0.0020** -0.0007 0.0115*** 0.0171*** 0.0067
(0.041) (0.833) (0.000) (0.000) (0.124) (0.039) (0.843) (0.000) (0.000) (0.139)
Leverage -0.0023* 0.0000 -0.0005*** -0.0001*** -0.0010*** -0.0024* 0.0000 -0.0005*** -0.0001*** -0.0010***
(0.099) (0.828) (0.001) (0.000) (0.008) (0.075) (0.830) (0.000) (0.000) 0.010
Investment activity 0.2066** -0.0063 -0.0282 -0.0080*** -0.0192* 0.2086** -0.0063 -0.0303 -0.0079*** -0.0207**
(0.030) (0.368) (0.181) (0.003) (0.056) (0.028) (0.368) (0.142) (0.004) (0.026)
Non-Policyholder Liabilities 0.0047 -0.0227*** -0.0001* -0.0001 0.0000 0.0050 -0.0226*** -0.0001* -0.0001 0.0000
(0.236) (0.002) (0.075) (0.116) (0.981) (0.127) (0.002) (0.089) (0.129) (0.975)
Loss ratio 0.0000 -0.0001* 0.0001 0.0000* 0.0001** 0.0000 -0.0001* 0.0001 0.0000* 0.0001***
(0.748) (0.089) (0.144) (0.089) (0.014) (0.710) (0.086) (0.131) (0.092) (0.010)
Debt maturity -0.0017 -0.0167 -0.0141 0.0210 -0.0624** -0.0025 -0.0150 -0.0121 0.0195 -0.0690**
(0.933) (0.184) (0.555) (0.526) (0.044) (0.899) (0.203) (0.642) (0.557) (0.033)
Internet use 0.0015 0.0013 -0.0013 -0.0036** -0.0036*** 0.0015 0.0012 -0.0013 -0.0037** -0.0035***
(0.298) (0.259) (0.319) (0.042) (0.004) (0.325) (0.287) (0.276) (0.040) (0.004)
Country controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Insurer-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 865 993 1085 1212 1198 865 993 1085 1212 1198
R2 0.251 0.352 0.373 0.455 0.561 0.251 0.351 0.370 0.455 0.560
Adj. R2 0.209 0.320 0.344 0.433 0.543 0.210 0.320 0.342 0.433 0.542
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performance for medium-sized and large insurers. Interestingly, an insurer’s exposure
to systemic risk as measured by its Marginal Expected Shortfall is not significantly
correlated with insurer performance. Although one might expect large insurers to be
especially susceptible to turmoil in the financial sector, the MES is not significant in
five out of our ten regressions in Table 5.3 and only significant at the 10% level in the
remaining models. Most strikingly, MES enters the latter regressions with a weakly
significant positive sign. Finally, the adjusted R2 in all regressions are all well above
20% with the regressions (5) and (10) of the performance of large insurers possess-
ing an adjusted R2 of 54.3% and 54.2%, respectively. Our baseline regressions thus
provide us with ample evidence in support of our hypothesis that market-wide crisis
sentiment is a significant driver of insurer stock performance.
In the following subsection, we test the robustness of our main results by performing
several further regression analyses.
5.3.2 Robustness checks
The results of our baseline panel regressions show that insurer performance between
2004 and 2012 was negatively related to the level of market-wide crisis sentiment of
investors. In the following, we present the results of various robustness checks of this
main finding.
First, one could argue that our measure of the general crisis sentiment simply reflects
the influence of the market portfolio or of changes in economic growth on an individual
firm’s stock performance. Both arguments can be confuted as we control for both the
insurers’ MES and the respective GDP growth rate. Controlling for both variables in
our regressions does not affect the high economic and statistical significance of the
general crisis sentiment.
Next, we estimate several additional panel regressions in which we employ addi-
tional or alternative control variables to check the robustness of our main finding. All
regressions are again estimated with insurer- and time-fixed effects employing the full
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set of control variables. The results of these robustness checks are presented in Table
5.4. For simplicity, the results on the control variables in these regressions are omitted
from the table.
Table 5.4: Robustness checks.
This table shows results of further panel regressions of quarterly buy-and-hold returns of international
insurers on two proxies of general and firm-individual crisis sentiment and various control variables.
The panel regressions are performed on subsamples of insurer-quarter observations sorted into quintiles
of the insurers’ total assets. All panel regressions are estimated with insurer- and quarter-fixed effects.
The sample includes 8,855 insurer-quarter observations of 253 international insurers over the time
period Q1 2004 to Q4 2012. Robust standard errors are reported in parantheses and all explanatory
variables (if not indicated otherwise) are lagged by one quarter. For all regressions, we present results
separated by quintiles of the insurers’ total assets. Variable definitions and data sources are provided
in Table D.1 in the Appendix. Panel A shows the results of a panel regression in which the general
crisis sentiment index is lagged by two quarters. Panel B presents a regression in which a subsample of
observations between 2006 to 2010 is used. Panels C and D present the results of regressions in which
the general crisis sentiment index is interacted with total assets and the availability of the internet,
respectively. Panels E, F and G use alternative measures of an insurer’s size, profitability and investment
activity. Panel H presents the results of three regressions in which the MES is estimated using different
sector indexes. All regressions include our full set of control variables. ***,**,* denote coefficients
that are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Adj. R2 is adjusted R-squared.
Dependent variable: Quarterly buy-and-hold returns
Total assets quintile: Small-Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Large-Q5
Panel A: double-lagged
General crisis sentimentt−2 -0.0034** -0.0034** -0.0122*** -0.0090*** -0.0144***
(0.030) (0.030) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Panel B: subsample 2006-2010
CSI -0.1057 -0.1267 -0.9064** 0.2303 -0.4102**
(0.565) (0.487) (0.010) (0.330) (0.040)
General crisis sentiment -0.0036* -0.0056*** -0.0106*** -0.0071*** -0.0067***
(0.087) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002)
Panel C: interaction total assets
General crisis sentiment 0.0163 0.0163 -0.0043 -0.0232 0.0220
(0.377) (0.377) (0.924) (0.398) (0.130)
Total assets 0.0362* 0.0362* 0.0694 0.0373 -0.0047
(0.063) (0.063) (0.140) (0.302) (0.836)
General crisis sentiment × Total assets -0.0014 -0.0014 -0.0001 0.0011 -0.0014*
(0.295) (0.295) (0.979) (0.497) (0.055)
Panel D: interaction internet use
General crisis sentiment -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0077** -0.0065*** -0.0023
(0.849) (0.849) (0.026) (0.002) (0.547)
Internet use 0.0012 0.0012 0.0013 -0.0015** -0.0023*
(0.287) (0.287) (0.147) (0.035) (0.056)
General crisis sentiment × Internet use 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001
(0.355) (0.355) (0.515) (0.279) (0.329)
Panel E: alternative size proxy
General crisis sentiment -0.0033*** -0.0033*** -0.0060*** -0.0047*** -0.0057***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Net revenues (Total assets) 0.0103 0.0103 0.0208 -0.0270 -0.0382*
(0.521) (0.521) (0.348) (0.214) (0.063)
Panel F: alternative profitability proxy
General crisis sentiment -0.0030 0.1526* -0.0059*** -0.0047*** -0.0062***
(0.114) (0.075) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ROE (ROA) 0.0018 0.0021 -0.0005 0.0089** 0.0116
(0.951) (1.000) (0.851) (0.032) (0.270)
Panel G: alternative investment activity proxy
General crisis sentiment -0.0030 0.1528* -0.0059*** -0.0047*** -0.0061***
(0.108) (0.075) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Investment success (Inv. Activity) -0.0418 0.0160 0.0064 0.0467 0.0220
(0.584) (0.560) (0.890) (0.525) (0.506)
Panel H: alternative MES estimation
General crisis sentiment (MES1) -0.0022 0.1595* -0.0042*** -0.0031*** -0.0059***
(0.251) (0.062) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000)
General crisis sentiment (MES2) -0.0022 0.1596* -0.0042*** -0.0031*** -0.0059***
(0.255) (0.062) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000)
General crisis sentiment (MES3) -0.0023 0.1593* -0.0042*** -0.0031*** -0.0059***
(0.235) (0.063) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000)
Other control variables: Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Insurer-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
We start by addressing concerns that despite lagging our main explanatory variable
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by one quarter, both the general crisis sentiment and the insurers’ quarterly buy-and-
hold returns could be simultaneously determined. To this end, we estimate panel re-
gressions in Panel A of Table 5.4 in which we employ the measure of market-wide
crisis sentiment lagged by two quarters. The results indicate that general crisis senti-
ment remains statistically significantly related to insurer performance even if lagged
by two quarters. Also, this result remains valid for all subsamples of different insurer
size.
Our main findings were based on an analysis of our full sample of insurer-quarter ob-
servations between 2004 and 2012. However, crisis sentiment was low to non-existent
before the onset of the financial crisis in early 2006. It could thus be argued that our
results are biased by including insurer-quarters in which both our measures of crisis
sentiment were practically zero. To control for this, we estimate a panel regression
in Panel B in which we only employ observations from the time period of 2006 to
2010. The results show that the effect of the general crisis sentiment on insurer per-
formance is even more pronounced during the financial crisis than in our full sample.
Even more importantly, we find that our proxy of insurer-individual crisis sentiment
is highly significant for mid-sized insurers and insurers in the top total assets quintile.
In other words, the stock performance of large insurers during the financial crisis was
significantly determined by both market-wide and individual crisis sentiment, possibly
because larger insurers receive more attention through searches on Google, especially
in times of financial turmoil. This effect is highly economically significant as a one
standard deviation increase in the CSI leads to a -2.74% decrease in insurer stock re-
turns (-0.4228 × 0.0649).
Furthermore, we investigate whether the negative correlation between market-wide
crisis sentiment and insurer performance is affected by insurer size and the availabil-
ity of the internet. For this purpose, we estimate panel regressions in Panels C and D
of Table 5.4 in which we interact the general crisis sentiment index with total assets
and our variable Internet use, respectively. Our results so far indicate that the effect of
crisis sentiment on performance is aggravated by the size of the insurer. This finding
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is weakly corroborated by the negative sign of the coefficient of the interaction term
in Panel C which is stat. significant at the 10% level. Also, it could be argued that a
better availability of the internet increases the effect of crisis sentiment. The results in
Panel D, however, show that the interaction term enters none of our regressions with
a significant sign. A possible explanation for this is that our sample is predominantly
composed of insurers from developed countries in which the internet was readily avail-
able even at the beginning of our sample period. Differences in the availability of the
internet across countries thus do not seem to influence our results.
We also estimate regressions in which we employ alternative measures of an in-
surer’s size (net revenues instead of total assets), profitability (ROE instead of ROA)
and investment activity (ratio of the insurer’s investment income to net revenues in-
stead of the ratio of the insurer’s absolute investment income to the sum of absolute
investment income and absolute earned premiums), respectively. The results presented
in Panels E to G clearly show that market-wide crisis sentiment remains a significant
driver of insurer performance. While the negative effect on performance is slightly
attenuated in the subsamples of smaller insurers, our main findings remain unchanged
for mid-sized and large insurers.
Next, it could be argued that our results are driven by the specific manner in which
we estimate the Marginal Expected Shortfall of insurers. If this were the case, our
proxies of crisis sentiment could simply capture the systemic risk exposure of insur-
ers that is not adequately captured by our MES estimates in the baseline regressions.
To control for this potential bias, we recalculate the MES using three alternative in-
dexes. To be precise, we employ the World DS Full Lin Insurer Index (labeled MES1
in Panel H), the MSCI World Banks Index (MES2) and the MSCI World Insurance
Index (MES3) taken from Datastream. The results show that our conclusions remain
unchanged. Additionally, we also estimate regressions in which we employ data on the
size and the independence of the insurers’ boards to control for possibility that the dif-
ferences in performance are due to differences in corporate governance. Again, we find
that our results remain unaffected by the addition of these variables in our regressions.
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Another concern with our results is that our proxies of crisis sentiment simply mea-
sure the overall volume of search queries on Google rather than the specific search
queries for crisis-related terms. If this were the case, any index constructed from ar-
bitrary Google search terms related to the economy should have a similarly significant
effect on insurer performance. To test this hypothesis, we construct several different
indices from Google search volumes for search terms that are related to the economy
but do not carry a negative connotation and that are not related to the financial cri-
sis.56 We then use these indices in unreported placebo panel regressions of insurer
stock performance. We find that none of these alternative Google search volume in-
dices is statistically significant in the placebo regressions. Related to this concern is
the argument that insurer stock prices could be influenced by general bad sentiment not
specifically tied to crisis-related topics. To refute this train of thought, we run several
regressions including the FEARS factor introduced in Da et al. (2015).57 We regress
the insurers’ stock performance on the FEARS index along with our control variables
(excluding the other two sentiment measures) in the quintiles of the insurers’ total as-
sets and find no statistical significance of the FEARS factor. Additionally, we rerun
these regressions and also include the CSI and then the general crisis sentiment index,
respectively. As before, the coefficients of the FEARS index remain insignificant from
zero while the general crisis sentiment index is highly significant with a negative effect
on the insurers’ stock performance. The CSI, again, is insignificant in the regressions.
In unreported regressions, we include the quarterly Chicago Board Options Ex-
change Market Volatility Index (VIX)58 and find the same results for the CSI and the
general crisis sentiment index as before.59
Finally, one could argue that not all search queries concerning the financial crisis
or related phrases were done in English. Citizens of every country are more likely
56For example, we use search times like “economy”, “employment”, “inflation”, “GDP”, etc.
57We construct the index using weekly data and aggregate the results to quarterly data by averaging the
weekly values.
58The data for VIX is obtained from http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/VIXCLS/downloaddata.
59In particular, we rerun the usual panel regressions with the VIX instead of the sentiment measures and
find it to be of little statistical significance.
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to enter search terms in their own mother tongue. We therefore construct a multi-
lingual version of our proxy for the general crisis sentiment by translating the four
crisis-related phrases used before into each insurers’ home country’s official language.
Unfortunately, Google Trends does not provide data for many of the translated words,
simply because the search volume of these words was too low. Consequently, we have
to restrict ourselves to seven main languages with available data for at least one of the
four search terms. 60 Afterwards, we proceed with the calculation of the multilingual
index in the same way as the general crisis sentiment. Despite the inclusion of several
other languages, we find that our main findings remain unchanged. A high correlation
of 96.1% between the general crisis sentiment and its multilingual version underlines
this result.
5.4 Conclusion
Shareholders of insurers lost significantly on their investments during the recent finan-
cial crisis. Although insurers did not suffer from the risk of a bank run or faced the
detrimental effects of interbank funding drying up, the stocks of insurers nevertheless
plummeted between 2006 and 2009 to an extent that was similar to the losses of banks.
In this paper, we argue that the bad stock performance of insurers during the crisis
was in part due to the crisis sentiment of investors, i.e., the perceived susceptibility of
insurers to the financial crisis. We propose two proxies of an insurer’s individual crisis
sentiment and the market-wide general crisis sentiment and estimate these measures
using Google Trends data.
These two measures of crisis sentiment are then used in panel regressions of inter-
national insurers’ quarterly buy-and-hold stock returns. In these regressions, we con-
trol for several other idiosyncratic and country-specific determinants of insurer perfor-
mance from the literature. Most importantly, we also control for the insurers’ exposure
to systemic risk as proxied by their Marginal Expected Shortfall. Our findings clearly
60We use the following languages to construct the multilingual version of the CSI and the general crisis
sentiment index: English, French, German, Italian, Norwegian, Portuguese and Spanish.
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show that market-wide crisis sentiment is a powerful predictor of an insurer’s stock
performance during the period 2004 to 2012 regardless of an insurer’s size. During the
financial crisis, the stock performance of large insurers is not only negatively related to
market-wide but also to idiosyncratic crisis sentiment. Stocks of insurers that retail in-
vestors perceived as particularly exposed to the banking crisis performed significantly
worse than stocks of insurers which investors perceived to be more independent of the
banking sector.
Our results imply that investors exited insurer stocks mainly due to irrational market-
wide crisis sentiment. Conversely, retail investors and noise traders did indeed act on
the sentiment of a general economic downturn rather than a differential assessment
of the idiosyncratic exposure of insurers to the crisis. The effect of crisis sentiment
on stock performance that we measure is large in magnitude and economically highly
significant. Our analysis can thus be seen as an investigation into the importance of
noise trading in stocks of financial institutions during the financial crisis.
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Chapter 6
Depositor Sentiment
“Even sunspots could cause runs if everyone believed that they did.”
Douglas W. Diamond, Economic Quarterly, Volume 93, Number 2, 2007, pp.189-200.
6.1 Introduction
The regulation of the banking sector and government interventions are often justified
with the need to prevent bank runs in which depositors withdraw their deposits from
a bank out of fear their deposits might be lost if the bank defaults. In case depositors
start to run indiscriminately to banks that might not at all face financial distress, the
ensuing contraints on banks’ liquidity could cause severe damage to the entire financial
system and the real economy.61 Since the time of the Great Depression in the United
States, governments have attempted to limit the risk of system-wide bank failures by
introducing deposit insurance schemes that aim at preventing self-fulfilling runs by de-
positors. There now exists a large literature on the optimal design, the positive effects,
but also the inherent agency problems of deposit insurance schemes.62 Complementing
61The consequences and real economy costs of financial crises are discussed, e.g., by Bernanke (1983),
Ongena et al. (2003), Calomiris and Mason (2003), Dell’Ariccia et al. (2008). Financial crises, how-
ever, can obviously be caused by other factors than depositor runs, too, as observed, e.g., by the “run
on repo” during the recent financial crisis (see, e.g., Gorton and Metrick, 2012).
62One of the first empirical studies on this subject is due to Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) who
find that the detrimental effects of deposit insurance on financial stability prevail. Subsequent analy-
ses have focused on the adoption and design of deposit insurance schemes (see Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt et al.,
2008) as well as the stabilizing effects of deposit insurance during times of financial crisis (see
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this line of research, several studies have analyzed the behavior of depositors during
financial crises and its effects on distressed and non-distressed banks. Evidence on
the determinants of bank runs and the behavior of depositors, however, is still sparse,
despite its obvious importance.
In this paper, we test whether household sentiment and attention for deposit insur-
ance in the U.S. affect changes in bank deposits. Using two direct measures of de-
positors’ aggregate level of sentiment and attention based on internet search volume
data from Google, we find that depositor sentiment is significantly negatively related to
changes in U.S. banks’ demand and time deposits during the period of 2004-2013. In
line with the hypothesis of depositors perceiving larger banks as safer due to too-big-
to-fail guarantees, we find depositor sentiment to have a differential effect on small-
and medium-sized banks and larger banks in our sample: while depositor sentiment
decreases deposits at banks that are not systemically important, the opposite is true for
larger banks. Conversely, the attention of households to deposit insurance as revealed
by the volume of queries related to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
is significantly related to increases in bank deposits. Given our main findings, we then
turn to the question whether depositor sentiment and attention can be used to explain
the probability of a bank run from or to a given bank. Our key result in this analysis
is that a higher level of information procurement by households on deposit insurance
mitigates the probability of a bank run.
In addition to active information retrieval through internet searches on deposit insur-
ance, depositors might also simply be exposed to news coverage of and by the FDIC.
Therefore, we also shed light on the interplay of the presence of the FDIC in the media
and the need of depositors to gather more information on the safety of their deposits.
Interestingly, our analyses indicate a negative correlation of the number of press re-
leases by the FDIC and the demand for more information by depositors as revealed on
Google. As such, it appears as if media attention to the FDIC does not spur but rather
substitutes depositors’ demand for more information on the U.S. deposit insurance sys-
Anginer et al., 2014b).
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tem. However, our analyses also reveal that depositors’ active search for information
on deposit insurance on the internet and passive exposure to news coverage on the topic
both have a significant positive effect on changes in banks’ demand and time deposits.
Depositors thus appear to divert their attention to information sources on the internet
via Google in case the presence of the FDIC in the media is low.
The results in our paper are closely related to the theoretical conclusions in
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) who show that a deposit insurance scheme is the opti-
mal strategy to hinder possible runs on banks in case depositors are perfectly informed
and rational. In reality, however, the existence of perfectly informed depositors may
not be given. Consequently, the subsequent theoretical literature includes numerous
extensions of the Diamond-Dybvig-model in which these assumptions have been loos-
ened (see, e.g., Chari and Jagannathan, 1988, Engineer, 1989, Goldstein and Pauzner,
2005, Azrieli and Peck, 2012). Our paper complements these papers empirically by
highlighting the detrimental effect of depositor sentiment on bank deposits even in the
presence of deposit insurance. To the best of our knowledge, both the direct measure-
ment of depositor sentiment as well as the analysis into its relation to changes in bank
deposits are new to the literature. The results we find are in line with recent findings in
the literature that, so far, has tried to explain depositor behavior at the micro-level. For
example, Brown et al. (2014) argue that the decision of depositors to withdraw money
from their bank is driven by personal reasons and attitudes, rather than by the formal
existence of deposit insurance schemes. Our results further support the notion that
sentiment rather than fundamentals cause bank runs.63
Our paper is also related to several studies on the effectiveness of deposit insurance
in preventing bank runs. First, Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt et al. (2008) find that the decision of
63The results of Osili and Paulson (2014) stress the finding that personal attitudes and experiences, rather
than deposit insurance, influence depositor behavior. They show that persons that have encountered
financial crises are less likely to use U.S. based banks to deposit their wealth. The hypothesis that
individuals’ perception and knowledge of a bank, and not fundamentals, determine changes in de-
posits is also supported by the work of Oliveira et al. (2014). They empirically assess the influence
of depositors’ perception of banks being “too-big-to-fail” on the changes in deposits during runs in
2008 in Brazil and conclude that extreme decreases cannot be explained by bank fundamentals (see
also Perı´a and Schmukler, 2001, for a similar finding).
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governments to introduce deposit insurance is often motivated by political rather than
by economical reasons. For example, a country might introduce a deposit insurance
scheme simply as an act of copying the structure of developed countries and not pri-
marily to reduce the danger of possible bank runs. Nevertheless, Anginer et al. (2014b)
argue that the use of explicit deposit insurance has a positive impact on the stability of
the financial sector and reduces the default risk of banks during times of crisis, despite
possible moral hazard. Similar to this study, Karas et al. (2013) investigate the im-
pact of deposit insurance schemes on market discipline and find that the sensitivity of
households towards the equity of banks during crises decreases significantly. Our study
helps in understanding the factors that influence the effectiveness of deposit insurance.
We find that an increased information retrieval on the deposit insurance scheme in
place, and thus better informed depositors, decreases the likelihood of a bank run.
Second, our paper complements the results of Iyer and Puri (2012) who make the case
that depositors retrieve information from their local social network to decide whether
to withdraw money from their bank account or not after the default of another inde-
pendent bank nearby.64 As our results suggest, depositor behavior is also significantly
affected by information retrieval from sources outside the depositors’ social network.
Finally, our paper also relates to the literature regarding the influence of investor sen-
timent on the economy. It has long been recognized that market-wide sentiment and
fear influence the attitudes and decisions of investors and thus, determine the prices
of assets such as stocks or bonds. As such, the question how investors’ attention, atti-
tudes, and sentiment can be quantified has been discussed extensively in the literature.
In our study, we follow in the footsteps of Da et al. (2011) and Da et al. (2015) and
use internet search volume data to directly measure depositor sentiment and deposi-
tor attention towards deposit insurance. While institutional investors and even noise
traders may also use other sources of information for their financial decision making,
we suspect internet search data to be particularly well suited for capturing the inter-
64In a follow-up study, Iyer et al. (2013) investigate which personal attributes of an individual contribute
to the decision to withdraw money as a response to announcements of economic distress of a bank.
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ests and attention of individual depositors. In doing so, our paper extends the quickly
growing literature on the applications of search volume data from Google Trends (see
also Ginsberg et al., 2009, Choi and Varian, 2009).
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. First, we give an introduction
to the topic of depositor sentiment and depositor attention as well as an overview of
the previous literature on deposit insurance and bank runs in Section 6.2. In Section
6.3, we describe the data and variables used in our study and the construction of our
main explanatory variables. Section 6.4 provides information on the empirical strategy
of our analyses. Empirical results are presented in Section 6.5. Results of robustness
checks are given in Section 6.6. Section 6.7 concludes.
6.2 Depositor sentiment and depositor attention
There now exists an extensive literature on the effects of limited information, investor
sentiment, and heterogeneous investor attention on asset prices (see, e.g., Merton,
1987, Gervais et al., 2001, Sims, 2003, Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003, Grullon et al.,
2004, Seasholes and Wu, 2007, Tetlock, 2007, Barber and Odean, 2008, Hou et al.,
2009). Similarly, limited information, bounded rationality, and irrationality could lead
bank depositors to run even though their deposits are covered by a deposit insurance
scheme. The empirical evidence by Perı´a and Schmukler (2001), Brown et al. (2014),
Oliveira et al. (2014), and Osili and Paulson (2014) supports this hypothesis as deposit
withdrawals appear to be driven by the personal attitudes and perceptions of depositors
rather than by bank fundamentals.
Most theoretical models describing the decision of bank depositors to run usually
make the assumption that agents can be divided into a group of patient depositors, and
one group of impatient agents.65 In the model of Diamond and Dybvig (1983), banks
face the problem that panic-based runs can occur as a result of both patient and im-
patient depositors demanding early withdrawal at the same time, thereby forcing the
65See, e.g., Azrieli and Peck (2012) for a model with a continuum of agents characterized by their degree
of impatience.
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bank into default.66 In fact, patient depositors could run due to bad expectations, i.e.,
the fear that others might run as well or the fear that the bank faces financial trouble.
In this paper, we refer to the level of bad expectations on the part of households as de-
positor sentiment. For example, when depositors have bad expectations on the banks’
financial soundness, the probability of a bank run might increase. This understanding
is in line with most of the theoretical literature which assumes bank runs to be the
result of pessimistic and noisy information of depositors about banks (see, e.g., Chen,
1999). However, it could even be the case that the sentiment of households caused by
the fear of a general economic downturn could be sufficient to drive depositors to run.
Consequently, the first hypothesis that we test predicts that higher levels of depositor
sentiment are negatively related to bank deposits.
In addition to the expectations of agents, a critical assumption for the effectiveness
of deposit insurance in these models is that depositors are informed about the existence
of deposit insurance. While many theoretical models show that noisy information or
misinterpretations about a bank’s assets on the part of depositors can cause panic-based
bank runs (see, e.g., Chari and Jagannathan, 1988, Chen, 1999), the question whether
information on the existence of deposit insurance is also noisy is left unanswered in
the literature. For a deposit insurance scheme to be effective in preventing bank runs,
however, depositors need to be informed about its existence and its design.67 The
idea of imperfect information on deposit insurance affecting depositor behavior lies at
the heart of the second hypothesis that we test in this paper. We measure the degree
of uninformedness of depositors in the U.S. via the level of attention households pay
to the FDIC and refer to the level of information retrieval on the FDIC as depositor
attention.
66Complementing this view, some studies in this literature explain bank runs as a result of bank behavior,
see Calomiris and Kahn (1991) and Diamond and Rajan (2001).
67Anecdotal evidence found by Goedde-Menke et al. (2014) for the German banking sector indeed sug-
gests that depositors’ knowledge of the deposit insurance schemes changed around the financial crisis.
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6.3 Data
6.3.1 Google Trends
In this study, we use internet search data obtained from the analytics tool Google
Trends, which gives us several advantages over other sentiment and attention measures.
For example, internet search data delivers insights into honest information retrieval and
interests of depositors since the search is anonymous.68 Also, in contrast to other mea-
sures of sentiment, Google Trends data provides insights into the active information
retrieval of depositors instead of passive information exposure through, e.g., news.6970
Measures derived from news or written publication in general may capture the senti-
ment of the market and thus influence the readers’ investment decisions. Since news
based measures of sentiment proxy passive attitudes of the market, we cannot extract
the actual attention readers pay to the publications and its content.
With internet search data, however, we are able to gain insights on how depositors
actively seek information on their topics of interest. Da et al. (2011) were among the
first to apply internet search data to the field of academic finance. In their pioneer-
ing work, the authors investigate the usefulness of Google Trends data capturing the
relative amount of searches for a specific stock ticker symbol to measure the atten-
tion of noise traders. They find that increased attention measured by internet search
data predicts higher stock prices and price reversals in the near future. However, they
specifically concentrate on attention of retail investors rather than on the household
level. In their follow-up study, Da et al. (2015) construct a market-wide sentiment
measure using internet search data on thirty economics-related search terms and show
68The information gained from the data is therefore not as biased as the one obtained from surveys,
as survey participants may not be motivated or altruistic enough to give comprehensive and honest
answers (see Singer, 2002). Additionally, the method of surveying delivers quite infrequent data.
69One approach to construct a sentiment measure based on news is given in the work of Tetlock (2007).
The author constructs a sentiment measure via the fraction of negative words in the “Abreast of the
Market column” in the Wall Street Journal.
70A more active way to obtain data on depositors’ sentiment would be to analyze entries on financial
message boards on the internet. One could possibly derive market sentiment from message boards by
applying linguistic techniques, though it would be a quite indirect way of approximating mood on the
internet (see Antweiler and Frank, 2004).
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that it can be used to explain mutual fund flows and asset price reversals. In our study,
we extend this idea to study the usefulness of search data on deposit insurance in the
U.S. to explain phenomena in the real economy and predict depositors’ behavior.
The search engine of Google is by far the most frequently used in the United States
and thus, its wealth of data is a superior source for data on the attention of ameri-
can households. Using the analytics tool Google Trends, we are able to download the
Google Search Volume Index (GSVI) for specific terms or a list of words at a daily,
weekly, or monthly frequency, depending on the requested time frame and search vol-
ume availability.71 The GSVI of a search term measures the number of searches that
occured in a specified time period, relative to the total amount of Google searches (and
is scaled to a maximum of 100). The default setting of the Google Trends tool gives
the user information on the relative attention towards a specific term worldwide and
in the time frame from 2004 to the current day. For our purposes, we will restrict all
queries on Google Trends to the time period of January 2004 to December 2013. If
not stated otherwise, all queries are also performed for the search volume in the United
States. Nevertheless, we will also obtain data on the search volume of terms restricted
to a smaller geographical area, namely the 50 U.S. states and the District of Columbia.
When entering a search phrase into Google Trends, we are also able to gain insights on
related phrases, which are also displayed on the webpage. This will be helpful when
we search and select appropriate phrases covering a specific theme. 72
6.3.2 Depositor sentiment
In our analyses, we make use of the Financial and Economic Attitudes Revealed by
Search (FEARS) index proposed by Da et al. (2015). This index combines the search
71If the user of Google Trends requests search volume data with a time frame of one quarter or less, one
is able to retrieve daily search volume (in case the term is searched for often enough). If the GSVI is
too low, only monthly or no data are provided.
72Another feature Google Trends provides is the comparison of up to five words simultaneously. When
entering two ore more phrases, Google Trends shows bars that compare the average search volume
in the specified time period, which is also reflected in the scale of the line graphs. A term that was
searched for more often than others will determine the scale and thus the values of Google Trends
data.
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volume of thirty economics-related phrases such as “gold prices” or “bankruptcy”.73
The FEARS index is calculated by taking the log changes of the words’ search vol-
umes, winsorizing at the 5% level, regressing the time series on time dummies, and
taking the residual to eliminate seasonality in the data. In contrast to Da et al. (2015),
we download weekly search volume data for the list of thirty words and adjust the
winsorized time series using month dummies. The thirty time series are then com-
bined by averaging. FEARS represents the negative sentiment of households in the
United States (higher values indicate a higher level of bad sentiment).
6.3.3 Depositor attention
We start by building a catalog of words associated with the topic of deposit insurance
in the United States. When depositors are interested in the safety of their deposits it
is, most of the time, clearly a sign of their attitude towards the current general eco-
nomic situation and in specific the condition of their banking system. In particular,
we intend to measure the attention of depositors towards the existing deposit insurance
scheme and how it affects their behavior. For this purpose, we start the construction
of our attention index by comparing the search volumes of the two phrases “FDIC”74
and “deposit insurance”. If U.S. depositors want to retrieve information on the deposit
insurance system of their country, they might simply type in the latter of the two search
terms. However, they might also have heard of the institution providing deposit insur-
ance before looking for further information. The output in Google Trends is shown in
Figure 6.1.
Obviously, the GSVI for “FDIC” dominates the GSVI of “deposit insurance” and
peaks twice during the financial crisis, where the FDIC might have been relevant to
depositors when deciding on their course of action. To obtain other relevant related
search phrases, we type the two terms mentioned above into the Google Trends tool and
73The initial word list is derived using appropriate dictionaries. Phrases tagged as “economic” words
with either “positive” or “negative” sentiment are retrieved and then ranked according to the strongest
relations with market returns, which turn out to be negative relations.
74Note that Google Trends does not distinguish between upper or lower case letters.
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Figure 6.1: Comparing the search terms “FDIC” and “deposit insurance” with Google
Trends.
The figure represents the graphical output for a parallel Google Trends search on “FDIC” and “deposit
insurance”. Weekly search volumes scaled by the average search volume for “FDIC” (which has a
higher average search volume than “deposit insurance”) are plotted for the time period 2004 to 2013.
 
receive related search terms, e.g., variations of the terms or similar words. Afterwards,
we compare each of the suggested terms with the GSVI of “FDIC” by using the specific
search phrases and “FDIC” parallely. By doing so, we are able to identify if a given
search phrase has sufficient seach volume to be included in our analysis.75 However,
none of the related expressions is searched for nearly as often as the phrase “FDIC”
itself. We thus conclude that in the quest for measuring depositors attention towards
the deposit insurance scheme in the U.S., it is sufficient to restrict our list of words to
75The related search terms used are: federal deposit insurance, deposit insurance corporation, car
insurance deposit, bank deposit insurance, insurance no deposit, deposit insurance act, fdic insurance,
deposit insurance scheme, fdic bank, fdic insurance, the fdic, fdic banks, fdic insured, fdic limits, fdic
limit, fdic insurance limits, what is fdic and fdic coverage.
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this single search term.76
While the decision on the appropriate search term “FDIC” is based on the search
volume for all states in the country, we expect both, the actual level of search volume
and the time evolution of the GSVI to differ from state to state. Intuitively, the time
evolution of interest in deposit insurance schemes in states with more internet usage
(e.g., New York, Texas, or California) might differ from the time evolution of interest
in deposit insurance in states with, e.g., a lower population density. We type “FDIC”
into the Google Trends tool while restricting the search to specific states and download
the weekly time series from 2004 to the end of 2013 for the 50 U.S. States and the
District of Columbia. In case the search volume for “FDIC” is high enough, we are
able to obtain weekly data on the SVI from 2004 to 2013. For some states, however, we
are only able to retrieve monthly data (or no data in the case of the state of Wyoming),
simply because the interest of the population measured with search data over this time
frame is close to zero. We define states as “high volume” states if we are able to
retrieve weekly search data on “FDIC” and “low volume” states otherwise. Figure 6.2
illustrates the geographical distribution of high and low search volume states in our
sample.
From the map, we can see that most of the high volume states are located in the east
of the United States. The other high-volume states are Arizona, California, Colorado,
Texas, and Washington. With respect to the previous discussion of appropriate search
terms, our main variable of interest is the FDIC jt -index, which is constructed by taking
the weekly search volume of “FDIC” in state j winsorized at the 5% level, filtering out
seasonality by regressing month-dummies on the index and using the residuals. Each
time series is scaled by its standard deviation to minimize possible heteroskedasticity
problems (see Da et al., 2011). Quarterly values are then obtained by taking the sum of
weekly values for each quarter. Figure 6.3 shows the time evolution of the FDIC-index
76Another approach would be to aggregate the GSVI of several search terms into one time series, e.g.
by averaging the values or performing a principal component analysis (see, e.g., Baker and Wurgler,
2006). Since the search volume for “FDIC” is way above the values of the other terms, we decide
against a combination of GSVIs.
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Figure 6.2: Distribution of states with high and low search volume.
The figure shows a heat map of the United States (excluding the low volume states Alaska and Hawai).
A black area indicates a high search volume for the phrase “FDIC” on Google Trends (weekly search
volume available) and a white area represents low or zero search volume.
High volume state map
for five selected states.
In all states, attention to deposit insurance spikes in mid 2008 before the financial
crisis and reaches a minimum level of attention at the beginning of 2009. Interestingly,
depositor attention on “FDIC” in California, New York, and Texas is lowest around the
beginning of 2006, while the values of the FDIC-index stay relatively constant from
2004 to 2008. After a few quarterly ups and downs in attention after the financial crisis,
the search volume on “FDIC” in these states does not vary as significantly as before.
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Figure 6.3: Time evolution of FDIC-index.
The figure shows the time evolution of the FDIC index for the states Arizona (black), California (green),
New York (yellow), Pennsylvania (red), and Texas (blue). The FDIC-index is constructed as the search
volume for “FDIC” from Google Trends in a given state for the time period 2004 to the end of 2013,
winsorized at the 5% level, adjusted for seasonality, and scaled by its standard deviation. Higher values
indicate a higher search volume on “FDIC”.
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6.3.4 Other data
In our analyses, we investigate the relation between U.S. depositor sentiment, depositor
attention, and bank deposits. Therefore, we analyze bank deposits from U.S. banks
that are insured by the FDIC. We obtain all FDIC call reports for the time period Q1
2004 to Q4 2013.77 First, we include in our sample all banks that are located in one
of the 50 U.S. states or the District of Columbia that have at least one listed quarter
observation on demand and time deposits. Since we can only measure the effects of
depositor attention on deposit insurance for high volume states, we omit all banks in
77The call reports are provided by the FDIC and can be downloaded at
www2.fdic.gov/sdi/download_large_list_outside.asp.
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the sample that are located in one of the low volume states and restrict ourselves to the
high volume states. While this might seem a huge sacrifice of data on the first look, we
still account for over 75.8% of all demand deposits and 72.2% of all time deposits (in
Q1 2004). Our final sample includes 7,290 banks that report at least once in the given
time frame.
6.4 Empirical strategy
Our goal is to empirically assess the interplay of depositors’ knowledge of and at-
tention towards deposit insurance and their resulting behavior. In theory, a perfectly
informed, rational depositor is expected to acknowledge the existence and effectiveness
of deposit insurance schemes and thus, the safety of his assets. Consequently, disas-
trous events such as bank runs and possible contagion effects should be very unlikely
to occur if the assumptions for the depositors’ level of information hold true.
In our analyses, we investigate the impact of depositor sentiment and attention on
changes in bank deposits. As our dependent variables, we employ percental changes
in demand and time deposits from 2004 to 2013. Demand deposits are widely con-
sidered as money and can be withdrawn at any given time by the banks’ customers.
They therefore bear the risk of creating spontaneous liquidity shortages at banks if de-
positors parallelly begin to withdraw their money. Changes in time deposits, on the
other hand, reveal rather slow trends and long term depositor behavior. From 2004 to
2013 the amount of deposits of FDIC insured banks increased almost linearly, although
the number of banks in the sample decreases. To adjust for inflation or the growth of
money supply, which biases trends in deposits that are resulting from depositor behav-
ior, we adjust the total values of demand and time deposits and the banks’ total assets
with the M2-index released by the Federal Reserve Board as a proxy for money supply
78
.
78The index includes notes and coins in circulation (outside Federal Reserve Banks and the vaults of de-
pository institutions), traveler checks of non-bank issuers, demand deposits, other checkable deposits
(OCDs), which consist primarily of negotiable order of withdrawal (NOW) accounts at depository in-
stitutions and credit union share draft accounts, savings deposits, time deposits less than 100,000, and
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Our two dependent variables are the change in demand deposits (∆Demand) and the
change in time deposits (∆Time) in%. We winsorize the two variables at the 1% level
to minimize the risk of outliers driving our results. As our main variable of interest in
our regression analyses, we employ the FDIC-index introduced in Section 6.3.3. For
our first analysis, we stimate the following model
∆Depositsi,t = β1 × FDICi,t−1 + β2 × ∆Depositsi,t−1
+Θ × CONTROLSi,t−1 + νt + αi + εi,t,
where ∆Depositsi,t is the change in demand or time deposits in one quarter and
FDICi,t−1 is the lagged main independent variable of interest indicating the relative
attention of depositors in the state of bank i towards deposit insurance. The control
variables used are Return on assets (ROA) as a proxy for firm profitability, non-interest
income relative to total interest income, a bank’s equity ratio, the net interest margin,
and also operating efficiency to control for preferences of depositors regarding bank
fundamentals (see Oliveira et al., 2014). Additionally, we employ the size of a bank
(natural logarithm of a bank’s total assets at the end of a quarter) to check for differ-
ences in depositor behavior between smaller or larger banks, which could arise, e.g.,
because of possible too-big-to-fail guarantees. In our first set of regressions, we em-
ploy our full sample but also split our sample of banks into three samples, namely
small, medium and large banks (measured by the 33.3%- and 66.7%-quantiles of the
banks’ size). Finally, we also include the FEARS-index introduced in Da et al. (2015)
which consists of internet search volume data on thirty economics-related words. A
higher value of FEARS indicates negative household sentiment on the current econ-
omy, which could not only affect stock returns, but also changes in deposits.
In general, our model could suffer from endogeneity problems since changes in
deposits could induce higher levels of attention on deposit insurance and, of course,
vice versa. We intend to solve this issue by employing the first lag of all indepen-
money-market deposit accounts for individuals. The index is constructed using Laspeyres’ method
and Q1 2004 as our basis.
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dent variables. Since the call reports are published with a large time lag, the infor-
mation on a bank’s deposits should not affect depositors’ behavior in that short time
frame. In addition, depositors would need to inform themselves about the FDIC and
their publicly available data and thus, should know about the deposit insurance in the
first place. However, we estimate the dynamic panel model above with the (one-step)
GMM-sys method (see Blundell and Bond, 1998) using the double lagged variables
∆Depositsi,t−2, FDICi,t−2, and NetInterestMargini,t−2 as instruments. Furthermore, we
include bank-level fixed effects and quarter time-dummies to account for unobserved
heterogeneity.
Beside the differentiation in bank size by depositors, we suspect the effects of sev-
eral variables to differ during the crisis. For example, crisis sentiment of depositors
could have induced decision-making that is not based on fundamental values and thus,
could have caused significant drops in deposits. On the other hand, we know that no
systematic runs on deposits occured during the recent crisis, which might indicate that
depositors perceive bank deposits as a safer alternative in contrast to other investment
classes. Also, depositors might seek additional information on the safety nets for their
assets or deposits, but also the possible positive effects of financial knowledge could
be counterbalanced by negative sentiment.
Since the interaction of crises times and depositor behavior is far from obvious, we
further investigate the behavior of depositors with interaction terms of our main inde-
pendent variables and a crisis dummy variable. We follow Oliveira et al. (2014) and
declare the time frame of the financial crisis to be Q4 2008 and Q1 2009. Thus, we
define our variable Crisis to be equal to one, if the bank observations is in Q4 2008 or
Q1 2009 and zero otherwise. In our analyses, we particularly focus on the interaction
of the variable Crisis with FDIC and FEARS. Finally, we employ the interaction of
deposit insurance attention measured by FDIC and the household sentiment variable
FEARS. Increased negative sentiment could lead to withdrawals of depositors’ assets
but also to intensified research on the safety options provided, which makes this inter-
action specifically interesting.
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So far the empirical strategy intends to reveal the impact of deposit insurance aware-
ness on the average trends of changes in deposits and thus, the behavior of U.S. de-
positors. As a next step, we want to shed light on the usefulness of internet search
data to predict depositors’ behavior. In particular, one might be interested in finding a
reliable indicator of extreme withdrawals or, possibly, bank runs. Although the inter-
net search data obtained from Google Trends is updated at a very high frequency (less
than a week), its predicive power should be considered with caution. First of all, it is
not clear which search terms could indicate the worries of depositors about possible
bank runs or the distress of their (possibly local) bank. Second, worries about bank
runs on specific banks are not only difficult to measure but bank runs also take place in
a relatively short time frame and are therefore not captured at the quarterly frequency
we have in our sample data. While we will not be able to forecast individual bank
runs with internet search data on individual institutions, we will instead concentrate on
the overall level of deposit insurance knowledge and attention, and the likelihood of
extreme withdrawals of and gains in deposits.
We define large withdrawals as a percental decrease in demand deposits by the 20%-
quantile of our whole sample observations. Similarly, we view a positive change in
demand deposits over the 80%-quantile as a large gain in deposits. In theory, a higher
level of awareness about deposit insurance should decrease the likelihood of large de-
posit withdrawals and could possibly increase the probability of significant positive
changes in bank deposit levels and thus support the results in Diamond and Dybvig
(1983) and subsequent work. We address this question by performing logistic panel
regressions with bank- and time-fixed effects. In our setup, the dependent variables
are Runi,t, which is a dummy variable that takes on the value one if bank i experiences
a drop in demand deposits by -9.8% (20%-quantile) in quarter t, and zero otherwise,
and Gaini,t, which is one if the increase in demand deposits is above +12.5% (80%-
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quantile) and zero otherwise.79 The estimated models are the following
Runi,t or Gaini,t = β1 × FDICi,t−1 + β2 × FEARSt−1
+Θ × CONTROLSi,t−1 + νt + αi + εi,t,
where the controls are the first lag of control variables that are used in our previous
analyses.
6.5 Empirical results
6.5.1 Changes in U.S. bank deposits
To get a first impression of the distribution of changes in deposits across the United
States and to detect possible trends in deposits across U.S. states, we plot heat maps of
changes in deposits. Figure 6.4 and 6.5 present heat maps indicating average changes
in demand and time deposits in a given state for a pre-crisis, mid-crisis, and post-crisis
quarter.
The average changes in demand deposits are mostly positive across the whole coun-
try in all three quarters. In Q4 2006, we see high increases in demand deposits in the
center of the country (e.g. the mountain states). During the financial crisis, we still
notice positive changes in demand deposits but to a smaller extent. After two years, in
Q4 2010, the picture of changes in deposits still holds true.
For the 20%-quantile heat maps of changes in demand deposits, we see that the
values seem to be rather negative across the whole country with the biggest drop of de-
posits in Q4 2006 happening in Arizona. Also, we can see that the number of extreme
withdrawals increases during the crisis, before the landscape of extremely negative
changes in deposits reverts to its normal state in 2010. Before, we saw that the av-
erage and 20%-quantile changes in time deposits were less extreme than in the case
of demand deposits. In the mid-crisis quarter we notice less positive increases than in
79Our approach follows Iyer and Peydro (2011) who use similar quantiles to define large withdrawals.
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Figure 6.4: Heat maps of changes in demand deposits.
The figure shows heat maps for percental changes in demand deposits for the fourth quarter in 2006, 2008, and 2010, respectively. The first row shows the maps for average
values per state and the second row contains the 20%-quantiles of changes in demand deposits in each state. Percental changes of -20% and below are shown in black and
increases of over +20% are shown in white. Values in between are presented with respective shades of grey. Data on demand deposit changes are winsorized at the 1% level.
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Figure 6.5: Heat maps of changes in time deposits.
The figure shows heat maps for percental changes in time deposits for the fourth quarter in 2006, 2008, and 2010, respectively. The first row shows the maps for average
values per state and the second row contains the 20%-quantiles of changes in time deposits in each state. Percental changes of -20% and below are shown in black and
increases of over +20% are shown in white. Values in between are presented with respective shades of grey. Data on time deposit changes are winsorized at the 1% level.
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demand deposits but still extremely positive percental changes in time deposits in the
western states of the U.S.
Changes in deposits may vary not only on the individual or state levels, but also over
time. Figure 6.6 shows the time evolution of changes in demand and time deposits
across our full sample for the time period Q2 2004 to Q4 2013. In addition to the time
evolution of the mean values, the range of the values is expressed via the 20%- and
80%-quantiles. In the case of demand deposits, we see that extremely positive values
peak twice (in Q4 2009 and Q4 2012) at around +20%. Extreme withdrawals (20%-
quantile) in demand deposits, on the other hand, are lowest several times between 2006
to 2010 with about -15% decreases. However, average values of changes in deposits
are positive for the whole sample period with several quarterly increases in demand
deposits of +10% and with a maximum of approximately +20% in Q4 2012.
Turning to the changes in time deposits, we see a less volatile time evolution. Gen-
erally, changes in time deposits move within maximum increases of under 10% and
minimum decreases over -10%. Interestingly, after the crisis, there is a strong negative
trend in changes in time deposits where even the 80%-quantiles in changes seem to be
negative. However, some extremely high values seem to bias the mean values in Q2
2004 and upcoming quarters until 2007. To address this issue, we rerun our main anal-
yses on winsorized changes in time deposits but winsorize at the 5% and 10% level,
respectively, in our robustness checks.
6.5.2 Depositor sentiment, depositor attention, and changes in de-
posits
Our main analyses are geared towards the effects of attention to deposit insurance and
depositor sentiment on the movements in demand and time deposits. We investigate
FDIC insured banks from 2004 to 2013 that are located in states with sufficient in-
ternet search volume on “FDIC”. Since we suspect depositor sentiment and depositor
attention to have a differential effect on banks of different sizes, we run our regression
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Figure 6.6: Time evolution of changes in deposits.
The figure shows barplots of quarterly changes in demand and time deposits (in percent) for the time
period Q2 2004 to Q4 2013 for FDIC insured banks in high volume states. The top grey bars indicate
the 80%-quantiles of changes in deposits each quarter and the bottom bars indicate the 20%-quantiles of
changes in deposits. The black lines present the mean percental changes in deposits each quarter. Data
on deposit changes are winsorized at the 1% level.
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analyses for the whole sample and also separately for small, medium and large banks
(by taking the 33.3%- and 66.7%-quantiles of size as cut-off values).
Table 6.1 presents summary statistics for the observations used in our panel regre-
sions of changes in demand and time deposits.
Most strikingly, we see that average changes in demand and time deposits are pos-
itive across all samples. On average, demand deposits increased by 5.3% per quarter
for all banks in the sample and time deposits increased by 1%. Surprisingly, demand
deposits increase by almost 2% more for small banks than for medium or large sized
banks. This also holds true for changes in time deposits. We observe that, on average,
small banks also tend to be more efficient, have higher net interest margins and equity
ratios but are also significantly less profitable. Therefore, we expect to find different
factors to explain the movements in deposits for small banks in comparison to their
larger counterparts.
We now turn to the description of our multivariate analyses on the impact of depos-
itor sentiment and depositor attention on the trends in deposit changes. The results of
our (one-step) GMM-sys regressions of ∆Demand and ∆Time on the FDIC-index, the
FEARS-index, and our control variables are presented in Table 6.2.
We find two main results. First, we observe a positive relation of higher attention of
depositors towards “FDIC” and changes in demand and time deposits. This is consis-
tent with the theoretical basis in Diamond and Dybvig (1983) since increased attention
to deposit insurance reveals depositors’ knowledge of deposit insurance and thus im-
plicates the effectiveness of such schemes. Empirically, this is also supported in the
work of Brown et al. (2014), who report a significant influence of financial literacy on
depositors’ behavior. Second, we find that increased bad sentiment among depositors
leads to systematic negative trends in changes in both demand and time deposits.
For the regressions with changes in demand deposits, we find a positive influence
of depositors’ attention to deposit insurance on the movements in demand deposits.
The variable FDIC is statistically significant at the 1% level. On the other hand, we
find the effects of household sentiment to significantly decrease the level of demand
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Table 6.1: Summary Statistics.
The table shows mean values and standard deviations (in brackets) for the percental changes in demand and time deposits in a quarter and
control variables that are used in the respective regression analyses. We report summary statistics for the regression analyses with the whole
sample (all) and the split samples consisting of small, medium, and large banks (distinguished by the one third percentiles of total assets).
Variable definitions and data sources are provided in Appendix E.1.
Demand deposits Time deposits
Sample: All Small Medium Large All Small Medium Large
∆Deposits 0.053 0.065 0.045 0.048 0.010 0.023 0.003 0.002
(0.45) (0.45) (0.41) (0.47) (0.16) (0.22) (0.12) (0.12)
FDIC 0.631 0.816 0.785 0.268 0.604 0.758 0.776 0.250
(12.17) (12.14) (12.10) (12.24) (12.17) (12.15) (12.10) (12.24)
Net interest margin 3.871 3.962 3.911 3.740 3.871 3.950 3.914 3.749
(1.04) (1.00) (0.96) (1.12) (1.08) (1.03) (1.02) (1.15)
FEARS 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.004
(0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22)
Size 5.145 4.570 5.079 5.778 5.140 4.564 5.079 5.780
(0.58) (0.23) (0.12) (0.49) (0.59) (0.23) (0.12) (0.49)
ROA 0.589 0.396 0.668 0.701 0.596 0.447 0.636 0.714
(2.68) (2.65) (3.12) (1.61) (2.09) (2.88) (1.58) (1.45)
Non-interest income 0.620 0.956 0.420 0.433 2.130 4.680 1.310 0.433
(24.66) (35.04) (21.29) (10.68) (170.77) (263.53) (141.68) (11.22)
Operating efficiency 76.921 88.210 75.327 68.230 76.807 87.882 75.278 68.056
(251.38) (164.62) (100.67) (43.27) (250.86) (167.39) (100.28) (43.31)
Equity 0.113 0.129 0.106 0.103 0.114 0.132 0.107 0.103
(0.06) (0.08) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.09) (0.05) (0.04)
Observations 181,141 58,093 59,025 59,637 183,409 59,537 59,530 59,924
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Table 6.2: GMM-sys regressions of changes in deposits.
The table shows the results of the (one-step) GMM-sys estimation of ∆Demand and ∆Time on FDIC and control variables. The dependent
variables are the quarterly percental changes in demand deposits and time deposits. The main variable of interest is FDIC which is the Google
Search Volume Index of the phrase “FDIC” from Google Trends, adjusted for seasonality, winsorized at the 5% level, and scaled by its standard
deviation. Other regressors are defined in Appendix E.1. All independent variables are lagged by one quarter and the lagged dependent variable
is included in the regressions. We employ double-lagged values of the dependent variables, FDIC, and Net interest margin as instruments.
P-values are given in parentheses and *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Dependent variable: ∆Demand ∆Time
Sample: All Small Medium Large All Small Medium Large
FDIC 0.0009*** 0.0003 0.0006 0.0014** 0.0004*** 0.0005** 0.0002* 0.0004***
(0.007) (0.636) (0.297) (0.036) (0.000) (0.016) (0.064) (0.005)
FEARS -1.9332*** -7.4680*** -13.7430*** 6.3370*** -3.5460*** -8.4343*** -14.1875*** 4.3576***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Size -0.1923*** -0.7278*** -1.2295*** -0.5747*** -0.3551*** -0.8817*** -1.2494*** -0.3824***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ROA -0.0126*** 0.0023 -0.0138*** -0.0215*** -0.0074*** -0.0052*** 0.0010 -0.0005
(0.000) (0.364) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.155) (0.508)
Net interest margin -0.0300*** -0.0460*** -0.0237*** 0.0083 0.0105*** 0.0222*** -0.0005 0.0075***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.137) (0.000) (0.000) (0.810) (0.000)
Non-interest income 0.0003 -0.0002 0.0008 0.0020*** 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001
(0.165) (0.531) (0.229) (0.001) (0.868) (0.834) (0.785) (0.538)
Operating efficiency 0.0000*** 0.0000 0.0002*** 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000** 0.0000 0.0000
(0.000) (0.488) (0.000) (0.369) (0.547) (0.013) (0.395) (0.524)
Equity ratio 2.7338*** 2.2196*** 2.7438*** 2.7521*** 1.5459*** 1.6299*** 0.3034*** 0.5475***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆Depositst−1 -0.1233*** -0.1154*** -0.1262*** -0.1397*** 0.0115*** 0.0323*** 0.0058** 0.0015*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.011) (0.092)
Bank-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 181,141 58,093 59,025 59,637 183,409 59,537 59,530 59,924
Wald 9,436.82 4,141.79 2,837.53 3,060.35 35,701.78 19,358.02 6,693.83 5,625.09
Wald (p-value) < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001
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deposits. However, the economic significance of these two contradicting forces differs
drastically. An increase of one standard deviation in FDIC results in an average in-
crease of demand deposits by 1.1% (0.0009 × 12.17) whereas the negative effects of
depositor sentiment induce changes in demand deposits of -42.5% (−1.9322 × 0.22).
For small- and medium-sized banks, we do not find a significant influence of depositor
attention on demand deposits. Large banks, however, gain +1.7% (0.0014 × 12.24) in
demand deposits from a one standard deviation increase in FDIC. Comparing the re-
sults of small- and medium-sized banks with the results for large banks, we notice that
the influence of depositor sentiment is the exact opposite. While we find that FEARS
has a strong negative influence on changes in deposits of smaller banks, the deposits of
large banks are more likely to significantly rise with higher depositor sentiment. This
picture is also revealed for the changes in time deposits. In this case, we also find weak
significance of increased attention to the FDIC on time deposits. The results for these
two variables show that the impact of depositor sentiment can influence the decisions
of depositors concerning their assets. Since negative sentiment seems to increase the
level of deposits for large banks, one could be tempted to use possible too-big-to-fail or
bailout guarantees to explain this trend, which is consistent with previous results from,
e.g., Oliveira et al. (2014). Therefore, we also include bank fundamentals to control
for depositors’ preferences for specific banks.
A higher equity ratio is associated with decreases in deposits, and a one standard de-
viation higher equity ratio has an economically large impact of +16.4% (2.7338×0.06)
across our full sample, which is even higher for small banks’ demand deposits
(+17.8% = 2.2196 × 0.08 in comparison to +11.0% = 2.7521 × 0.04 for large banks).
The efficiency of a bank seems to be a significant factor for increasing deposits at
medium-sized banks, but less important for the largest banks. In contrast to the dif-
ferences in the effects of depositor sentiment on small and medium-sized versus larger
banks’ deposits, we consistently find our variable size to influence depositors’ prefer-
ences. Our results suggest that depositors choose small rather than large banks to de-
posit their money in the form of demand and time deposits. The factor size determines
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economically significantly large decreases in demand deposits of -16.7% (small), -
14.8% (medium), and -28.2% (large), and similar values for time deposits.
Overall, our results suggest that both depositor sentiment and attention influence
depositor behavior. To further investigate the relation of our main variables of interest
with changes in deposits, we employ various interaction terms. Table 6.3 shows the
respective results of additional (one-step) GMM-sys estimations of changes in deposits
on control variables and interaction terms using the full sample.
The first two colums include a crisis dummy in addition to other control variables
to check for possible differences that occured during the turmoil of the recent financial
crisis. First, we interact FDIC with the crisis dummy to differentiate between the
effects of FDIC during and outside the crisis. For the regression of ∆Demand, we find
strong evidence for a positive relation of depositor attention and changes in demand
deposits outside of the crisis period. The coefficient of the crisis dummy is positive and
statistically significant at the 1% level, which is consistent with Oliveira et al. (2014)
who document that depositors in Brazil used systemically important banks to allocate
their money in the form of deposits. However, we find no evidence of a significant
influence of the interaction term. Thus, we cannot conclude that increased attention
to deposit insurance was the driver of the positive change in demand deposits during
the two crisis quarters. In the regression of ∆Time, the crisis dummy is omitted due to
collinearity.
Another regression employing the interaction of the crisis dummy and FEARS sug-
gests that the effect of FEARS is independent of crisis times. A higher level of negative
depositor sentiment leads to a significant decrease in both demand and time deposits.
Again, we see that bank customers use deposit accounts for their wealth during crisis
times, which is suggested by the significant positive relation between the crisis dummy
and ∆Deposits.
Finally, we observe a strong interaction of depositor attention and depositor senti-
ment. The negative sign of the interaction term’s coefficient indicates the following
relation: Increased negative sentiment is associated with less attention to deposit in-
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Table 6.3: GMM-sys regressions on changes in deposits with interaction terms.
The table shows the results of the (one-step) GMM-sys estimation of ∆Demand and ∆Time on FDIC, control variables and interaction terms.
The dependent variables are the quarterly percental changes in demand deposits and time deposits. The main variable of interest is FDIC which
is the Google Search Volume Index of the phrase “FDIC” from Google Trends, adjusted for seasonality, winsorized at the 5% level, and scaled
by its standard deviation. Other regressors are defined in Appendix E.1. All independent variables are lagged by one quarter and the lagged
dependent variable is included in the regressions. We employ double-lagged values of the dependent variables, FDIC, and Net interest margin
as instruments. P-values are given in parentheses and *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Dependent variable: ∆Demand ∆Time
Interaction: Crisis x FDIC Crisis x FEARS FDIC x FEARS Crisis x FDIC Crisis x FEARS FDIC x FEARS
FDIC 0.0009*** 0.0009*** 0.0009*** 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0004***
(0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
FEARS -1.9312*** -1.9332*** -2.3162*** -3.5450*** -3.5460*** -4.3390***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Size -0.1922*** -0.1923*** -0.1923*** -0.3550*** -0.3551*** -0.3551***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Crisis 0.9999*** 1.1149*** omitted 2.1397***
(0.000) (0.000) - (0.000)
Crisis x FDIC -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.925) (0.729)
Crisis x FEARS omitted omitted
- -
FDIC x FEARS -0.0301*** -0.0623***
(0.000) (0.000)
Control variables: Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 181,141 181,141 181,141 183,409 183,409 183,409
Wald 9,438.76 9,436.82 9,436.82 35,708.90 35,701.78 35,701.78
Wald (p-value) < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001
6.5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 160
surance, which suggests that the irrational component of depositors’ behavior over-
whelmes the search for information on safety options for their assets. In reverse, a
higher value of FDIC over time seems to mitigate depositor sentiment and thus, at
least partly, lowers the likelihood of runs on deposits. The statistical significance of
the main effects of FDIC and FEARS remains unchanged.
6.5.3 Does deposit insurance attention prevent bank runs?
So far we have examined the importance of depositor sentiment and depositor attention
for average trends in demand and time deposits, but little is known about the factors
explaining extreme events such as bank runs. In the context of our study, the fol-
lowing question arises: does negative sentiment or attention of depositors increase or
decrease their propensity to withdraw large parts of their deposits? While this question
has been addressed on the micro-level for single banks (see, e.g., Iyer and Puri, 2012,
Brown et al., 2014), we investigate this issue on a macro-level. To do so, we estimate
logit panel regression with fixed effects on the bank-level and time dummies of which
the results are presented in Table 6.4. The first three regressions in Table 6.4 make use
of the dummy variable Run, which takes on the value of one if ∆Demand is below -
9.8% (20%-quantile), and zero otherwise. From the literature, we know that individual
perception and knowledge of depositors can play a major role in the financial decision
making process and can cause depositors to run, despite of promising bank fundamen-
tals (see, e.g. Osili and Paulson, 2014). We therefore would expect that knowledge
about the FDIC lowers the propensity of depositors to withdraw large parts of their
assets.
In the baseline regression, we see that the variable FDIC is statistically significant
at the 10% level (p-value of 0.05). It appears that at times of higher depositor atten-
tion to deposit insurance, the likelihood of large withdrawals is lower. This effect of
depositor attention on extreme withdrawals holds also true when including the crisis
dummy and its interaction with FDIC. None of the latter two variables seem to influ-
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Table 6.4: Panel logistic regression of large withdrawals and gains in demand deposits.
The table shows the results of panel logistic regressions on large withdrawals and gains of deposits. The dependent variables are the dummy
variables Run, which takes on the value one if a bank experiences changes in demand deposits below the 20%-quantile of ∆Demand deposits
and zero otherwise, and Gain, which is equal to one if the changes in deposits are above the 80%-quantile and zero otherwise. The main variable
of interest is FDIC which is the Google Search Volume Index of the phrase “FDIC” from Google Trends, adjusted for seasonality, winsorized at
the 5% level, and scaled by its standard deviation. Other regressors are defined in Appendix E.1. All independent variables are lagged by one
quarter. P-values are given in parentheses and *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Dependent variable: Run Gain
FDIC -0.0026* -0.0030** -0.0026* 0.0026* 0.0023 0.0026*
(0.050) (0.029) (0.050) (0.063) (0.110) (0.061)
FEARS 0.2065 0.1840 0.1689 1.6063*** 1.5860*** 0.3557
(0.590) (0.631) (0.714) (0.000) (0.000) (0.427)
Size 0.6932*** 0.6925*** 0.6928*** -0.7965*** -0.7971*** -0.8054***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Crisis -0.1344 -1.0786***
(0.552) (0.000)
Crisis x FDIC 0.0089 0.0088
(0.175) (0.231)
Size x FDIC 0.0001 0.0040***
(0.883) (0.000)
Control variables: Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 186,026 186,026 186,026 184,041 184,041 184,041
Likelihood ratio 3,320.32 3,322.15 3,320.32 4,507.12 4,508.56 4,528.02
Likelihood ratio (p-value) < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001
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ence the probability of large withdrawals in demand deposits. The interaction term of
the variable size and FDIC is included in the third column, but the results suggest that
this interaction neither mitigates nor intensifies the likelihood of bank runs.
We notice two more important relations: Our results suggest that the size of a bank
is a significant driver of the probability of large withdrawals. Large banks are more
likely to suffer from large withdrawals in demand deposits than smaller ones. This
could be due to the fact that large banks are also more likely to be present in the media
and thus also to bad rumors and sentiment. Interestingly, depositor sentiment fails
to explain large withdrawals, although we are able to explain average trends with the
FEARS variable in our previous analyses.
Next, we turn to the three regressions concerning the opposite situation of a bank
run, namely large gains in demand deposits. The dummy variable Gain is defined to
take on the value of one if demand deposits increase by +12.5% (80%-quantile) in one
quarter, and zero otherwise. For the size of a bank, we see a very similar relation with
Gain to the one with with large withdrawals. The larger a bank is, the less likely it is to
experience extreme percental increases in demand deposits. The variable FDIC itself
is only slightly statistically significant but, nevertheless, increases the chances of large
gains in deposits.
For large gains, we also see that during the crisis, depositors were less likely to
induce large gains in deposits, although we did see a positive trend on average during
the crisis. Also, even though depositor sentiment explains negative trends in deposits,
the likelihood of large gains in deposits increases with bad sentiment. An explanation
is that depositors favor bank deposits over other investment opportunities to allocate
their wealth.
6.5.4 Why do depositors search for FDIC?
Our results this far show that depositors’ attention and sentiment influence their de-
cision whether to use bank deposits or not. In parts, depositors’ attention to deposit
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insurance helps to explain the positive trends in deposits over time. Internet search
data is a way of measuring the active knowledge information retrieval of depositors in
several states. However, we cannot conclude that the actual level of knowledge about
deposit insurance is higher or lower, when the variable FDIC is low. It could also be
that the interest in “FDIC” in Google is low since most of the depositors use alterna-
tive information sources to learn more about deposit insurance. On the other hand,
the search volume of “FDIC” could be high, simply because media coverage spreads
the word about the respective institution. To address this question, we perform further
analyses involving a proxy for the news coverage by the FDIC. To do this, we regress
the state-specific volumes of “FDIC” on contemporary control variables. We estimate
models of the following form
FDIC j,t = β1 × Presst + β2 × GIFt + β3 × GDP j,t + νt + α j + ε j,t,
where FDIC j,t is the FDIC-index of state j, Presst is the number of press releases by
the FDIC in quarter t, GIFt is an index on the general interest in finance topics on the
internet, GDP j,t is the GDP growth of state j in quarter t and α j and νt express state-
level- and time-fixed effects. The results of our OLS-regressions are reported in Table
6.5.
Our first regression includes only the number of press releases by the FDIC as well
as state- and time-fixed effects. We observe a negative relation of the number of press
releases and contemporary search volume on FDIC, which could be interpreted as
if more news coverage by the FDIC indicates that there is less need for additional
information retrieval by depositors on the internet. However, we do not know whether
depositors actually process the news by the FDIC since it is a passive measure of
attention. Next, we include the GDP growth of a state as a control variable, which does
not change the results. Another aspect we need to control for is whether the level of
depositor attention is simply determined by trends in general interest in finance topics.
Thus, we include in our regressions a General Interest in Finance (GIF) index, which
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Table 6.5: Why do depositors search for deposit insurance?
The table shows the results of OLS panel regressions of the variable FDIC j,t on the
number of press releases by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation per quarter,
GDP growth per state, general interest in finance, and the interaction term of press
releases and General interest in finance. All regressions are performed with state- and
time-fixed effects in the period of 2004 to 2013. P-values are given in parentheses
and *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively. Adj. R2 is adjusted R2.
Dependent variable: FDIC
Press -0.1130** -0.1152*** -0.0733* -0.0755*
(0.010) (0.009) (0.068) (0.064)
GDP growth 0.1206*** 0.1167*** 0.1202***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.005)
GIF -0.2708*** -0.1044
(0.001) (0.557)
Press x GIF -0.0033
(0.455)
State-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 858 748 748 748
Adj. R2 0.4153 0.4293 0.480 0.482
is provided by Google Trends when entering no search term but restricting the search
category to “finance”. The index describes the relative changes in search volumes on
search terms tagged in the finance category, where higher values indicate increasing
interest. Running a regression using this variable, we do not find different results for
the previous factors. Furthermore, GIF shows a negative relation with attention to
FDIC. Finally, we use the interaction term of the variables Press and GIF to check
whether press releases influence depositor attention, independent of the general level
of interest in finance. This analysis is not successful as the coefficient of the interaction
term is not statistically significant.
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6.6 Robustness and further analyses
To verify the robustness of our results, we perform several tests and further analyses.80
As a first robustness check, we include in our baseline GMM-sys regressions the GDP
growth of a state in which a bank is located. Depositor behavior could simply by
determined by the economic environment the depositors are in, but our regressions
reveal that the GDP growth neither is a reliable factor to explain changes in deposits,
nor does it change the impact of depositor attention and depositor sentiment.
Next, we control for the general interest in finance by employing the GIF index
introduced before. In doing so, we control for the possibility that depositors simply
search for “FDIC” or other economics related subjects because the general level of
interest in financial topics has an upward trend. Including GIF in additional GMM-sys
regressions with ∆Demand and ∆Time, however, does not change our main findings.
In section 6.5.4, we show that the presence of the FDIC in press releases was related to
the need of depositors to gain more information on deposit insurance and related topics.
Therefore, we substitute our variable FDIC by the number of press releases per quarter
while having in mind that due to the limited geographical variation of this variable,
we are not able to capture differences on the state- or bank-level. However, including
this variable shows that a higher presence in the media through press releases leads to
upwards trends in both demand and time deposits. The negative impact of depositor
sentiment is still valid. Also, we control for the ratio of retail deposits and total deposits
of a bank to control for the fraction of household depositors’ assets among a bank’s
total deposits, but find no changes in our inferences.
Further, we consider the possibility that the interest in the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation increases due to changes in the CD rates offered by banks. We therefore
investigate the impact of the 3-month CD rate (published by the Federal Reserve Bank
of St. Louis) on changes in deposits. Changing CD rates might in fact be highly
80The tables containing the results of our further analyses and robustness checks as well as additional
information on our data set can be found in Appendix E.
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correlated with depositors’ attention to deposits and deposit insurance, which, how-
ever, does not change the effect of depositors’ financial knowledge on their behavior.
To measure the isolated influence of the level of CD rates on depositor behavior, we
regress the quarterly average of the CD rates on the contemporary FDIC index and
include the residual as an additional variable in our regressions. We find that our infer-
ences do not change and that the sole impact of the CD rates’ level is not significant in
determining changes in deposits.
In the midst of the financial crisis, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act was
introduced as a way of bailing out troubled (financial) institutions with the aim of sta-
bilizing the financial system in the United States.81 At its core, the act contained the
so-called Trouble Asset Relief Program (“TARP” in short) which allowed the U.S. De-
partment of Treasury to buy up assets and equity of troubled financial institutions to
strengthen financial stability. Several studies find that investors perceive banks that are
associated with “too-big-to-fail” or bailout guarantees differently than non-systemic
banks (see, e.g., Oliveira et al., 2014, Gandhi and Lustig, 2015). To control for dif-
ferences in changes in the deposits at banks that did or did not receive government
support through TARP, we include in our regressions a dummy variable TARP that is
one if a bank or its holding received government support and zero before Q3 2008
or if the bank did not receive TARP support. We estimate GMM-sys regressions for
changes in demand and time deposits that include the dummy variable and also its in-
teraction with FDIC. For demand deposits, we find that the coefficients of TARP and
the interaction term are statistically insignificant. On the other hand, TARP seems to
have a positive effect on changes in time deposits. The coefficient of the interaction
of FDIC and TARP is negative and statistically significant. We therefore conclude that
the introduction of TARP has in fact decreased the interest in the FDIC.82 Our main
81In addition, the deposit insurance coverage limit was increased from $100,000 to $250,000 per de-
positor and bank to strengthen the confidence of depositors and mitigate the possibility of depositors
frantically withdrawing their assets from banks. Lambert et al. (2014) empirically address the effect of
this increase of the coverage limit and show that banks affected by this change in regulation engaged
in riskier investments (e.g., risky commercial real estate loans) due to moral hazard.
82Comparing the search volumes for “TARP” and “FDIC” with Google Trends, however, reveals that
“FDIC” was still the more prominent search term of the two.
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inferences regarding depositor attention and depositor sentiment are the same.
In a further analysis, we split our sample of banks according to their average ratio of
non-performing loans to total assets and also according to the average ratio of insured
deposits to total deposits. We estimate (one-step) GMM-sys and logistic panel regres-
sions for banks in the bottom and top quartiles of these two additional variables. The
results show that the FDIC variable fails to explain the extreme withdrawals or gains
in demand deposits in those specific categories of banks. For the changes in demand
deposits, we find a statistically significant positive relation with depositor attention for
banks in the bottom quartile of the insured deposits ratio. This also holds true for the
changes in time deposits. While we find a consistently negative influence of depositor
sentiment on the changes in demand deposits for all categories, we find that depositors
appear to differentiate between banks with high and low non-performing loans ratios
when looking at the changes in time deposits. We see that depositor sentiment is pos-
itively related to changes in time deposits for banks with a low non-performing loans
to total assets ratio. For banks with a higher ratio, we find a negative relation between
the FEARS-index and changes in time deposits. Thus, our results support the notion of
depositors withdrawing their money from troubled banks with bad loans and running
to banks perceived as financially healthier when depositor sentiment increases. For
banks in the bottom and top quartile of insured deposits ratio, we do not find such a
differential effect, although one could expect it, since banks with less insured deposits
do not have the full effect of deposit insurance coverage and could thus, more likely
experience extreme withdrawals of deposits.
Although we split our sample according to the banks’ total assets to further account
for size effects and also include size as an independent variable in our regressions,
our approach could still be criticized for not capturing the contemporary changes in a
bank’s size (e.g., a bank could exhibit a relative decrease in its demand deposit ratio
that is simply caused by an increase in bank size and not by withdrawals by customers).
To further investigate this aspect, we perform additional regressions with the dependent
variable ∆Ratio which is the relative quarterly change in a bank’s demand deposit
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ratio. As independent variables, we include the contemporary changes in a bank’s size
(∆Size), the lagged values of FDIC, FEARS, and Net Interest Margin. We estimate
static and dynamic panels with simple OLS and also with (one-step) GMM-sys (and
use double-lagged values of FDIC, Net interest margin, and the dependent variable as
instruments). Our results reveal that the influence of depositor attention and sentiment
we find in our main analysis is also valid for changes in demand deposit ratios.83
Also, we re-estimate our baseline models with different specifications. Instead of
employing the GMM-sys estimators, we perform pooled OLS regressions with time-
fixed effects and also estimate models with state-fixed effects, as well as robust stan-
dard errors adjusting for clustering on the bank level. Our main inferences remain the
same. Also, instead of winsorizing our changes in deposits at the 1% level, we re-
peat our GMM-sys regressions with winsorized changes at the more conservative 5%
and 10% level, respectively, but find no different results. As another set of robustness
tests, we re-run our GMM-sys baseline regressions using double lagged values of all
independent variables created with balance-sheet data to further mitigate concerns of
endogeneity in our analysis. Also, we use the mean of the weekly values of the FDIC-
index as a way of aggregating the search volume data to a quarter and employ this
average in our main analyses. In both of the tests, our main results remain the same as
before.
One possible concern could be the selection bias through the restriction of our data
sample to high volume states, although our sample covers over 70% of all deposits in
the United States. Therefore, we employ a Heckman two-stage selection procedure to
detect effects of a selection bias. For the selection model, we use the lagged control
variables size, return on assets, non-interest income, equity ratio, and operating effi-
ciency as well as the average GDP growth per state, the states’ population density, one
lag of changes in deposits, and time dummies. However, we find no significant effect
of the non-random sample selection on our main results in any of the regressions.
83Using simple OLS yields a significant negative influence of ∆Size on changes in demand deposit
ratios, but employing GMM-sys shows that the changes in the deposit ratios are not due to changes in
a bank’s size.
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Turning to our logistic panel regressions, we repeat the baseline regressions with a
different definition for the Run and Gain dummy variables. We try to explain even
more extreme withdrawals and gains by employing dummy variables that take on the
value one if the changes in demand deposits are below (above) the 5%-, 10%-, or
15%-quantile (85%-, 90%-, or 95%-quantile) of the full sample, and zero otherwise.
For extremely large withdrawal, we see that FDIC is no good predictor but depositor
sentiment increases the likelihood of such extreme events at a statistically significant
level. For the other regressions, we find depositor attention and depositor sentiment
to increase the probability of large gains in demand deposits, although average trends
in deposits are negatively affected by bad sentiment. As a further analysis, we esti-
mate the baseline logistic panel regression using a different aggregation of the weekly
values of the FDIC-index. First, we take the average instead of the sum to obtain quar-
terly values. The second approach we take is to use the maximum value in a quarter
to proxy peaks in attention to the FDIC. Finally, we use the maximum of the weekly
differences of the FDIC-index in a quarter to measure rapid changes in depositor atten-
tion. When investigating large withdrawals, however, the variables consistently fail to
explain these extreme events. For large gains in demand deposits, we find that the max-
imum value and the maximum in differences have more predictive power than simply
the mean and the sum of the FDIC-index values.
6.7 Conclusion
This paper constitutes the first analysis of the effects of depositor sentiment and depos-
itor attention on changes in bank deposits in the U.S. during the period of 2004-2013.
Using two direct measures of depositors’ aggregate level of sentiment and attention
based on internet search volume data from Google, we find that depositor sentiment is
significantly negatively related to changes in U.S. banks’ demand and time deposits.
Conversely, a higher level of depositor attention to deposit insurance correlates posi-
tively with changes in bank deposits.
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Our results suggest that personal attitudes and sentiment rather than bank funda-
mentals play a vital role in explaining the behavior of depositors. We also find further
empirical evidence that depositor behavior is affected by the perception of a too-big-
to-fail policy. More precisely, depositor sentiment has a differential effect on small
and large banks: while depositor sentiment decreases deposits for small- and medium-
sized banks, both demand and time deposits increase for larger banks when depositor
sentiment is high.
Our findings have important implications for policy-makers and regulators: First,
our findings document that deposit insurance helps in mitigating the risk of panic-
based bank runs - but only if the existence of an explicit deposit insurance scheme
is known among depositors. Our key result here is that a higher level of information
procurement by households on deposit insurance mitigates the probability of a bank
run. Interestingly, we find the media presence of the FDIC to substitute depositors’
demand for more information on the U.S. deposit insurance system, with depositor
attention being diverted to information sources on the internet via Google in case the
presence of the FDIC in the media is low. The most important finding for policy-
makers in this respect, however, is that the attention of households to deposit insurance
in general exerts a mitigating effect on deposit outflows.
Finally, an important question that has not been addressed in this study (nor in the
previous literature) is whether depositor attention and sentiment also possess such a
significant impact on depositor behavior in case deposits are not covered by an ex-
plicit deposit insurance scheme. In particular, it would be interesting to analyze the
differential effect of depositors’ sentiment and attention on deposit outflows across
different countries with differently designed deposit insurance schemes and different
institutional environments. We intend to address this question in future research.
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A.1 Sample insurance companies
Table A.1: Sample insurance companies.
The appendix lists all international insurance companies that are used in the empirical study. The
sample is constructed by first selecting all international insurers from the country and dead-firm lists
of Thomson Reuters Financial Datastream. The list is then corrected for all companies for which
stock price and balance sheet data are not available from Thomson Reuters Financial Datastream and
Worldscope. The names of the companies are retrieved from the Worldscope database (item WC06001).
ALEA GROUP HOLDINGS AXA ASIA PACIFIC ERGO PREVIDENZA
CHAUCER HOLDINGS PLC AXA LEBENSVERSICH ERGO-VERSICHERUNG
21ST CENTURY INS AXA KONZERN AG ERIE FAMILY LIFE INS
ACE LIMITED AXA PORTUGAL SEGUROS ERIE INDEMNITY
AEGON N.V. AXA VERSICHERUNG AG ETHNIKI GREEK INS
AFFIN-ACF HOLDINGS AXIS CAPITAL HLDG EULER HERMES
AFLAC INCORPORATED BALOISE HOLDING AG EVEREST RE GROUP
AFRICAN LIFE BENFIELD GROUP LTD FAIRFAX FIN’L HLDGS
AGEAS SA BRIT INSURANCE HOLD FBD HOLDINGS PLC
ASSURANCES GENERALES CAPITAL ALLIANCE FBL FINANCIAL GROUP
AIOI INSURANCE CASH.LIFE AG FINANCIAL INDUSTRIES
ALFA CORPORATION CATHAY FINANCIAL FINAXA SA
ALLEANZA ASSICUR. CATLIN GROUP LTD FIRST FIRE & MARINE
ALLEGHANY CORP CATTOLICA ASS FONDIARIA - SAI SPA
ALLIANZ SE CESKA POJISTOVNA A.S FOYER S.A.
ALLIANZ LEBENSVERS. CHALLENGER FIN’L SVC FPIC INSURANCE GROUP
ALLSTATE CORPORATION CHESNARA PLC FRIENDS PROVIDENT
ALM BRAND AS CHINA LIFE INSURANCE FUBON FINANCIAL
ALTERRA CAPITAL CHINA TAIPING INSU FUJI FIRE& MARINE INS
AMBAC FINANCIAL CHUBB CORP (THE) GENERALI (SCHWEIZ)
AMERICAN NATIONAL CINCINNATI FINL CORP GENERALI DEUTSCH
AMERICAN PHYSICIANS CLAL INSURANCE ENT GENERALI HOLDING VIE
AMERICAN EQUITY INV CNA FINANCIAL CORP GENWORTH FIN’L, INC.
AMERICAN FIN’L GROUP CNA SURETY CORP GLOBAL INDEMNITY
AMERICAN INT’L GROUP CNO FINANCIAL GRUPO NACIONAL
AMERUS GROUP CO CNP ASSURANCES GRUPO PROFUTURO
AMLIN PLC CODAN A/S GREAT EASTERN HLDGS
AMP LIMITED GROUPE COFACE GREAT WEST LIFECO
ANN & LIFE RE HLDGS COMMERCE GROUP, INC. GRUPO CATALANA
AON PLC MILANO ASSICURAZIONI GREAT AMERICAN FIN’L
ARAB INSURANCE GROUP COX INSURANCE HANNOVER RUECK SE
ARCH CAPITAL GROUP DAI-ICHI LIFE INSU HANOVER INSURANCE
ARGONAUT GROUP, INC. DAIDO LIFE INSURANCE HAREL INSUR INVEST
ARTHUR J GALLAGHER DBV WINTERTHUR HARLEYSVILLE GROUP
ASIA FINANCIAL HLDGS DELPHI FINANCIAL GRP HARTFORD FINL SRVC
ASPEN INSURANCE HOLD DELTA LLOYD LEBENS HCC INS HOLDINGS
ASSICUR GENERALI SPA DONGBU INSURANCE CO. HELVETIA HOLDING
ASSURANT INC DEUTSCHE AERZTEVERS HILB, ROGAL & HOBBS
ASSURED GUARANTY LTD E-L FINANCIAL CORP. HILLTOP HOL
AVIVA PLC EMPLOYERS HOLDINGS HISCOX PLC
AXA SA ENDURANCE SPECIALTY HORACE MANN EDUCATRS
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Table A.1: Sample insurance companies (continued).
HYUNDAI M & F INS. OLD REPUBLIC INTL SWISS RE
INDUSTRIAL ALLIANCE PARTNERRE LTD. TAIWAN LIFE INSURANC
INFINITY PROP & CAS PENN TREATY AMERICAN TAIYO LIFE INSURANCE
ING GROEP N.V. PERMANENT TSB GROUP TOKIO MARINE
INSURANCE AUSTRALIA PHILADELPHIA CORP TONG YANG LIFE INS
INTACT FINANCIAL PHOENIX COMPANIES TOPDANMARK A/S
IPC HOLDINGS, LTD. PHOENIX HOLDINGS TORCHMARK CORP
JARDINE LLOYD PICC PROPERTY TORO ASSICURAZIONI
JEFFERSON-PILOT CORP PING AN INSURANCE TOWER LTD
JOHN HANCOCK FIN SVC PLAT UNDERWRITERS TRANSATLANTIC HLDGS
KANSAS CITY LIFE INS PMA CAPITAL CORP TRAVELERS COS
KEMPER POHJOLA-YHTYMA OYJ TRAVELERS PROPERTY
KINGSWAY FINANCIAL POWER CORP OF CANADA TRYG A/S
KOELNISCHE RUECKVER. POWER FINANCIAL CORP UICI
KOREAN REINSURANCE PREMAFIN FINANZIARIA UNIPOL GRUPPO FIN
LANDAMERICA FINL GRP PRESIDENTIAL LIFE UNIQA INSUR
LEGAL & GEN’L GRP PRINCIPAL FINL GROUP UNITED FIRE
LIBERTY GROUP LTD PROASSURANCE CORP PROVIDENT COMPANIES
LIBERTY HOLDINGS PROGRESSIVE CORP WAADT VERSICHERUNGEN
LIG INSURANCE CO LTD PROMINA GROUP VESTA INSURANCE GRP
LINCOLN NAT’L CORP PROTECTIVE LIFE CORP VIENNA INSURANCE
LOEWS CORPORATION PRUCO LIFE INSURANCE VITTORIA ASSICURAZIO
MAA GROUP PRUDENTIAL PLC W R BERKLEY CORP.
MANULIFE FINANCIAL PRUDENTIAL FINANCIAL WELLINGTON
MAPFRE SA QBE INSURANCE GROUP WESCO FINANCIAL CORP
MARKEL CORP RIUNIONE ADRIATICA WHITE MOUNTAIN INSUR
MARSH & MCLENNAN CO. REINSURANCE GROUP WILLIS GROUP
MBIA INC RENAISSANCERE HLDGS WUERTTEMBERGISCHE LE
MEDIOLANUM RHEINLAND HOLDING XL GROUP PLC
MENORAH MIVTACHIM RLI CORP ZENITH NATIONAL
MERCURY GENERAL CORP RSA INSURANCE GROUP ZURICH INSURANCE
METLIFE INC SAFECO CORPORATION
MIDLAND COMPANY SAFETY INSURANCE GP
MIGDAL INSURAN & FIN SAMPO OYJ
MIIX GROUP, INC SAMSUNG FIRE & MARINE
MNI HOLDINGS BHD SOUTH AFRICAN NAT’L
MONTPELIER RE HLDGS SCHWEIZERISCHE NAT
MONY GROUP INC. SCOR SE
MS& AD INSURANCE SCOTTISH RE GROUP
MUENCHENER SELECTIVE INSURANCE
NATIONAL WESTERN SHIN KONG FINANCIAL
NATIONWIDE FIN’L SKANDIA FORSAKRINGS
NAVIGATORS GROUP INC SOMPO JAPAN INSURANC
NIPPONKOA INS SAINT JAMES’S PLACE
NISSAY DOWA GEN STANCORP FINANCIAL
NISSHIN FIRE/MAR INS STATE AUTO FINANCIAL
NUERNBERGER BET.-AG STOREBRAND ASA
ODYSSEY RE SUL AMERICA SEGUROS
OHIO CASUALTY CORP SUN LIFE FINANCIAL
OLD MUTUAL PLC SWISS LIFE HOLDING
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A.2 Variable definitions and data sources
Table A.2: Variable definitions and data sources.
The appendix presents definitions as well as data sources for all dependent and independent variables that are used in the
empirical study. The insurer characteristics were retrieved from the Thomson Reuters Financial Datastream and Thomson
Worldscope databases.
Variable name Definition Data source
Dependent variables
∆CoVaR Unconditional ∆CoVaR as defined by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2014),
measured as the difference of the Value-at-risk (VaR) of a financial sec-
tor index conditional on the distress of a particular insurer and the VaR
of the sector index conditional on the median state of the insurer.
Datastream, own
calc.
MES Quarterly Marginal Expected Shortfall as defined by Acharya et al.
(2010) as the average return on an individual insurer’s stock on the days
the World Datastream Bank index experienced its 5% worst outcomes.
Datastream, own
calc.
SRISK Average quarterly estimate of the Systemic Risk Index as proposed by
Acharya et al. (2012) and Brownlees and Engle (2012). The SRISK es-
timate for insurer i at time t is given by S RIS Ki,t = k
(
Debti,t
)
− (1 −
k) (1 − LRMES i,t) Equityi,t where k is a regulatory capital ratio (set to
8%), Debti,t is the insurer’s book value of debt, LRMES i,t is the long
run Marginal Expected Shortfall defined as 1−exp(−18·MES ), MES is
the estimated Marginal Expected Shortfall and Equityi,t is the insurer’s
market value of equity.
Datastream,
Worldscope
(WC03351,
WC08001), own.
calc.
Insurer characteristics
Beta Beta of the capital asset pricing model measuring the market sensitivity
of a firm and a local market index of the insurer’s country.
Worldscope
(WC09802).
Debt maturity Total long-term debt (due in more than one year) divided by total debt. Worldscope
(WC03251,
WC03255).
Foreign sales International sales divided by net revenues (times 100) Worldscope
(WC08731).
Investment success Ratio of insurer’s investment income to net revenues. Worldscope
(WC01001,
WC01006), own
calc.
Interconnectedness PCAS measure as defined in Billio et al. (2012). PCAS is constructed
using a decomposition of the variance-covariance matrix of the insurers’
daily, standardized stock returns.
Datastream, own
calc.
Leverage Book value of assets minus book value of equity plus market value of
equity, divided by market value of equity.
Worldscope
(WC02999,
WC03501,
WC08001), own
calc.
Loss ratio Ratio of claim and loss expenses plus long term insurance reserves to
earned premiums.
Worldscope
(WC15549).
A.2. VARIABLE DEFINITIONS AND DATA SOURCES 175
Table A.2: Variable definitions and data sources (continued).
The appendix presents definitions as well as data sources for all dependent and independent variables
that are used in the empirical study. The insurer characteristics were retrieved from the Thomson
Reuters Financial Datastream and Thomson Worldscope databases.
Variable name Definition Data source
Insurer characteristics
Market-to-book Market value of common equity divided by book value of common eq-
uity.
Worldscope
(WC07210,
WC03501).
Net revenues Log value of total operating revenue of the insurer. Worldscope
(WC01001).
Non-Policyholder Liabili-
ties
Total on balance sheet liabilities divided by total insurance reserves. Worldscope
(WC03351,
WC03030).
Operating expenses Ratio of operating expenses to total assets. Worldscope
(WC01249,
WC02999).
Other income Other pre-tax income and expenses besides operating income. Worldscope
(WC01262).
Performance Quarterly buy-and-hold return on an insurer’s stock. Datastream, own
calc.
Return on Assets Return of the insurer on it’s total assets after taxes (in %). Worldscope
(WC08326).
Return on Equity An insurer’s earnings per share during the last 12 months over the pro-
rated book value per share times 100 (in %).
Worldscope
(WC08372).
Total assets Natural logarithm of a insurer’s total assets. Worldscope
(WC02999).
Country characteristics
GDP growth Annual real GDP growth rate (in %). WDI database
(World Bank).
Inflation Log of the annual change of the GDP deflator. WDI database
(World Bank)
Stock market turnover Total value of shares traded in a given country divided by the average
market capitalization.
WDI database
(World Bank).
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Table B.1: Variable definitions and data sources.
The appendix presents data sources, definitions and expected signs in our regression analyses for all dependent and independent variables that are used in the empirical study.
The expected sign of each independent variable on the systemic risk of a bank or insurer is shown in the last column with a “+” indicating an expected increasing (and a “-”
a decreasing) impact on systemic risk. The bank and insurer controls were taken from the Thomson Reuters Financial Datastream and Thomson Worldscope databases.
Variable name Definition Data source Hypotheses Expected sign
Panel A: Systemic risk measures
∆CoVaR Unconditional ∆CoVaR as defined by
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2014), measured as
the difference of the Value-at-risk (VaR) of a financial
sector index conditional on the distress of a particular
insurer and the VaR of the sector index conditional
on the median state of the firm.
Datastream, own calc.
MES Marginal Expected Shortfall as defined by
Acharya et al. (2010) as the negative average re-
turn on an individual firm’s stock on the days
the MSCI World index experienced its 5% worst
outcomes.
Datastream, own calc.
Panel B: Main independent variables
Interconnectedness PCAS measure as defined in Billio et al. (2012).
PCAS is constructed using a decomposition of the
variance-covariance matrix of the firms’ daily, stan-
dardized stock returns.
Datastream, own calc. More exposure to other banks and insurers. +
Market-to-book Market value of common equity divided by book
value of common equity.
Worldscope (WC07210,
WC03501)
Greater charter value incentivizes bank managers to
keep their bank’s capital ratio and to limit their
risk-taking (see Keeley, 1990 and Fahlenbrach et al.
(2012)).
-
Total assets Natural logarithm of a firm’s total assets. Worldscope (WC02999) Too-big-to-fail vs. more diversification. +/-
Leverage Book value of assets minus book value of equity plus
market value of equity, divided by market value of
equity.
Worldscope (WC02999,
WC03501, WC08001),
own calc.
Disciplining effect of leverage vs. greater vulnera-
bility during financial crises (see Adrian and Shin,
2010).
+/-
Performance Annual buy-and-hold stock returns computed from
the first and last trading day in the year 2006.
Datastream, own calc. Firms that performed well in the past will continue to
perform well over time VS. institutions that took on
too many risks in the past could also stick to their cul-
ture of risk-taking (see Fahlenbrach et al., 2012) and
increase their exposure and contribution to systemic
risk.
+/-
Return on assets Return of the firm on it’s total assets after taxes (in
%).
Worldscope (WC08326). Higher profits can shield banks from the adverse ef-
fects of a financial crisis
-
Debt maturity Total long-term debt (due in more than one year) di-
vided by total debt.
Worldscope (WC03251,
WC03255).
A less fragile funding structure of a bank makes it less
vulnerable to sudden shortages in liquidity during a
crisis (see Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009).
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Table B.1: Variable definitions and data sources (continued).
Variable name Definition Data source Hypotheses Expected sign
Panel C: Bank characteristics
Deposits Total deposits divided by total liabilities. Worldscope (WC03019,
WC03351).
Banks with more deposit financing are more stable in
times of crises.
-
Loan loss provisions Natural logarithm of expenses set aside as an al-
lowance for uncollectable or troubled loans.
Worldscope (WC01271). A larger buffer against troubled loans should serve as
a stabilizing factor reducing a bank’s total risk.
-
Loans Ratio of total loans to total assets. Worldscope (WC02271,
WC02999).
A higher loans-to-assets ratio of a bank could indicate
a business model that focuses on lending rather than
more risky activities.
-
Tier-1-capital Ratio of a bank’s Tier-1-Capital to total assets. Worldscope (WC18228,
WC02999).
Higher regulatory bank capital acts as a buffer against
losses and should stabilize both an individual bank
and the financial sector.
-
Non-interest income Non-interest income divided by total interest income. Worldscope (WC01021,
WC01016).
Higher values of non-interest income relative to to-
tal interest income could be indicative of a busi-
ness model that concentrates more on non-deposit
taking activities (like, e.g., investment banking) and
thus more risk-taking (see, e.g., Brunnermeier et al.,
2012).
+
Panel D: Insurer characteristics
Investment success Ratio of insurer’s investment income to net revenues. Worldscope (WC01001,
WC01006), own calc.
Insurers become more intertwined with financial mar-
kets through asset management.
+
Loss ratio Ratio of claim and loss expenses plus long term insur-
ance reserves to earned premiums.
Worldscope (WC15549). High loss ratio indicates bad quality of the insurance
portfolio and increases default risk.
+
Non-Policyholder Liabilities Total on balance sheet liabilities divided by total in-
surance reserves.
Worldscope (WC03351,
WC03030).
Non-core insurance activities increase the risk to suf-
fer from other sources in the financial market (see
IAIS, 2013).
+
Operating expenses Ratio of operating expenses to total assets. Worldscope (WC01249,
WC02999).
Poor management reflects the total risk of the insur-
ance company.
+
Other income Other pre-tax income and expenses besides operating
income.
Worldscope (WC01262). Non-core insurance activities increase the risk to suf-
fer from other sources in the financial market (see
IAIS, 2013).
+
Fixed income Natural logarithm of fixed income. Worldscope (WC01262). Engagement in other asset classes than fixed income
could suffer more profoundly from plummeting asset
prices.
-
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C.1 Variable definitions and data sources
Table C.1: Variable definitions and data sources.
The appendix presents definitions as well as data sources for all dependent and independent variables that are used in the empir-
ical study. The bank characteristics were retrieved from the Thomson Reuters Financial Datastream and Thomson Worldscope
databases. The country control variables are taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicator (WDI) database. Data
on the banks’ regulatory environment are taken from Barth et al. (2006) and Barth et al. (2013a).
Variable name Definition Data source
Dependent variables
Buy-and-hold return Log annual buy-and-hold stock returns computed from the first and last
trading day in a year.
Datastream, own. calc.
Bank characteristics
Beta Beta of a stock calculated as the ratio of the covariance of the stock’s
return and the MSCI World Index return and the variance of the stock’s
returns in one year.
Datastream, own calc.
MES Annual Marginal Expected Shortfall as defined by Acharya et al. (2010)
as the average return on an individual bank’s stock on the days the World
Datastream Bank index experienced its 5% worst outcomes.
Datastream, own calc.
∆CoVaR Unconditional ∆CoVaR as defined by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2014),
measured as the difference of the Value-at-risk (VaR) of a financial sec-
tor index conditional on the distress of a particular insurer and the VaR
of the sector index conditional on the median state of the insurer.
Datastream, own calc.
Total assets Natural logarithm of a bank’s total assets at fiscal year end. Worldscope (WC02999).
Market-to-book Market value of common equity divided by book value of common eq-
uity.
Worldscope (WC07210
and WC03501).
Leverage Book value of assets minus book value of equity plus market value of
equity, divided by market value of equity (see Acharya et al., 2010).
Worldscope (WC02999,
WC03501, WC08001),
own calc.
Non-interest income Non-interest income divided by total interest income. Worldscope (WC01021
and WC01016).
Loans Ratio of total loans to total assets. Worldscope (WC02271
and WC02999).
Loan loss provisions Natural logarithm of expenses set aside as an allowance for uncol-
lectable or troubled loans divided by total loans.
Worldscope (WC01271
and WC02271).
Debt maturity Total long-term debt (due in more than one year) divided by total debt. Worldscope (WC03251
and WC03255).
Deposits Total deposits divided by total liabilities. Worldscope (WC03019
and WC03351).
Return on assets Pre-tax return of the insurer on its total assets. Worldscope (WC08326).
Tier-1-capital Ratio of Tier 1 Capital to total risk-weighted assets. Worldscope (WC18157).
Systemic size Ratio of a bank’s total liabilities to national GDP. Worldscope (WC03351),
WDI database.
Liquidity Mean value of the Amihud measure of an individual stock’s illiquidity
adjusted following the procedure proposed by Karolyi et al. (2012). The
adjusted Amihud measure is defined as − ln
(
1 + |Ri,t |Pi,tVOi,t
)
where Ri,t is
the return, Pi,t is the price, and VOi,t is the trading volume of stock i on
day t.
Datastream, own calc.
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Table C.1: Variable definitions and data sources (continued).
Variable name Definition Data source
Interconnectedness Number of in- and outgoing granger causalities as introduced in
Billio et al. (2012).
own calc.
Capital Requirement De-
viation
Captures to which degree a banking firm’s capital deviates from group
average.
own calc.
Regulatory environment
Capital Regulatory Index Index of the stringency of capital regulations in the banking system,
capturing whether the capital requirement reflects certain risk elements
and deducts certain market value losses from capital before minimum
capital adequacy is determined. Index ranges from 0 to 10. Higher
values denote greater stringency.
Barth et al. (2006, 2013a).
Official Supervisory
Power
Index of the extent to which supervisory authorities have the author-
ity to discipline banks by taking specific actions to prevent and correct
problems. Index ranges from 0 to 14. Higher scores denote greater
power.
Barth et al. (2006, 2013a).
Diversification index Index of the guidelines for asset diversification. Index ranges from 0 to
2. Higher scores denote more diversification.
Barth et al. (2006, 2013a).
Entry requirements Index of the legal requirements that need to be fulfilled before issuance
of the banking license. Index ranges from 0 to 8. Higher scores denote
greater stringency.
Barth et al. (2006, 2013a).
Private monitoring index Index of the incentives and capabilities provided by regulatory and su-
pervisory authorities to encourage the private monitoring of banks. In-
dex ranges from 0 to 12. Higher scores indicate greater regulatory em-
powerment of the monitoring of banks by private investors.
Barth et al. (2006, 2013a).
Corporate governance Consolidated index of the six Worldwide Governance Indicators by av-
eraging.
World Bank, own calc.
Corporate governance
(pca)
Consolidated index of the six Worldwide Governance Indicators by us-
ing principal component analysis.
World Bank, own calc.
Country characteristics
GDP growth Annual real GDP growth rate (in %). WDI database.
Inflation Log of the annual change of the GDP deflator. WDI database
HHI Herfindahl-Hirschman Index computed as the sum of the squared mar-
ket shares of a country’s domestic and foreign banks.
WDI database.
Crisis dummy Dummy variable that equals one if a financial crisis is identified by
Laeven and Valencia (2012) in a country for a given year, and zero oth-
erwise.
Laeven and Valencia
(2012).
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D.1 Additional figures
Figure D.1: International bank and insurer stock prices 2006-2013.
The figure shows plots of the Datastream World Life Insurance, World Non-Life Insurance and World
Bank indexes as well as the MSCI World Index. The data are taken from the Thomson Reuters
Financial Datastream database and cover the period from 01/02/2006 to 10/11/2013. The business
cycle contraction during and after the financial crisis as defined by the National Bureau of Economic
Research (NBER) is highlighted by the area shaded in grey. All data series of stock prices are
normalized to 100 at the start of 2006.
















































































































	







	







	







	







































































































































  !
"#
$% 
D
.1
.
A
D
D
ITIO
N
A
L
FIG
U
R
ES
184
Figure D.2: Illustration of Google Trends search.
The figure illustrates the graphical output of the weekly aggregated search volume index (SVI) from Google Trends (http://www.google.com/trends/). The figure shows the
plotted SVI for the the search query “financial crisis” and the SVI is scaled by the maximum over the time period 2004 to 2013.
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Figure D.3: Time evolution of the Crisis Sentiment Index.
The figure shows a plot of the time evolution of the Crisis Sentiment Index (CSI) during our full sample
period 01/01/2004 to 12/31/2012 across our full sample of 253 international insurers. The Crisis Sen-
timent Index is computed using data from Google Trends via CS Iit :=
(
GS VIit+Zt
200
)
· ρit. where Zt is the
first principal component of the Google Search Volume Indices (GSVI) for several crisis-related search
query terms, GS VIit is the GSVI for insurer ith ticker symbol (or company name in case of a numeric
ticker symbol) and ρit is the (dynamic) correlation between Zt and GS VIit . The cross-sectional mean
values of the CSI are shown as a black line while the range between the 10%- and 90%-quantiles of CSI
values in the cross-section are highlighted by the shaded area in grey.
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D.2 Variable definitions and data sources
Table D.1: Variable definitions and data sources.
The appendix presents definitions as well as data sources for all dependent and independent variables that are used in the empirical
study.
Variable name Definition Data source
Dependent variable and main explanatory variables of interest
Buy-and-hold returns Quarterly buy-and-hold return on an insurer’s stock. Datastream, own
calc.
General crisis sentiment First principal component of the four GSVIs of the search terms “fi-
nancial crisis”, “credit crisis”, “subprime crisis” and “bank crisis”, cal-
culated using a rolling window enlarged by one week after each esti-
mation, starting with a window of 52 weeks for the first year. For each
quarter, the Crisis-GSVI is the average of the weekly first principal com-
ponents in that quarter.
Google Trends,
own calc.
CSI Value of the Crisis Sentiment Index lagged by one quarter. The Cri-
sis Sentiment Index is computed using data from Google Trends via
CS Iit :=
(
GS VIit+Zt
200
)
· ρit. where Zt is the first principal component of the
Google Search Volume Indices (GSVI) for several crisis-related search
query terms, GS VIit is the GSVI for insurer ith ticker symbol (or com-
pany name in case of a numeric ticker symbol) and ρit is the (dynamic)
correlation between Zt and GS VIit .
Datastream,
Google Trends,
own calc.
Control variables
Return on assets An insurer’s return on assets defined as pre-tax return of the insurer on
its total assets.
Worldscope
(WC08326).
Return on equity An insurer’s earnings per share during the last 12 months. Worldscope
(WC08372).
MES Marginal Expected Shortfall as defined in Acharya et al. (2010) as the
average return on an individual insurer’s stock on the days the World
Datastream Bank index experienced its 5% worst outcomes.
Datastream, own.
calc.
Total assets Natural logarithm of an insurer’s total assets. Worldscope
(WC02999).
Market-to-book ratio Market value of common equity divided by book value of common eq-
uity.
Worldscope
(WC07210,
WC03501).
Leverage Book value of assets minus book value of equity plus market value of
equity, divided by market value of equity.
Worldscope
(WC02999,
WC03501,
WC08001).
Investment activity Ratio of the insurer’s absolute investment income to the sum of absolute
investment income and absolute earned premiums.
Worldscope
(WC01002,
WC01006),own
calc.
Investment success Ratio of the insurer’s investment income to net revenues. Worldscope
(WC01001,
WC01006), own
calc.
D.2. VARIABLE DEFINITIONS AND DATA SOURCES 187
Table D.1: Variable definitions and data sources (continued).
Variable name Definition Data source
Control variables
Net revenues Log value of total operating revenue of the insurer. Worldscope
(WC01001).
Non-Policyholder Liabili-
ties
Total on balance sheet liabilities divided by total insurance reserves. Worldscope
(WC03351,
WC03030).
Loss ratio Claim and loss expense plus long term insurance reserves divided by
premiums earned.
Worldscope
(WC15549).
Debt Maturity Total long-term debt divided by total debt. Worldscope
(WC03251), own
calc.
Board size Natural logarithm of the number of directors on an insurer’s board. ESG ASSET 4
(CGBSDP060).
Board independence Percentage of independent outside directors on the board of directors. ESG ASSET 4
(CGBSO07S).
GDP growth Annual real GDP growth rate (in %). WDI database
(World Bank).
Inflation Log of the annual change of the GDP deflator. WDI database
(World Bank)
Stock market turnover Ratio of annual trading volume to shares outstanding. WDI database
(World Bank).
Internet use Number of people with access to the internet in the insurer’s home coun-
try per 100.
WDI database
(World Bank).
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D.3 Sample insurance companies
Table D.2: Sample insurance companies.
The appendix lists all international insurance companies that are used in the empirical study. The sample is constructed by first
selecting all international insurers from the country and dead-firm lists of Thomson Reuters Worldscope. The list is then corrected
for all companies for which stock price and balance sheet data are not available from Thomson Reuters Financial Datastream and
Worldscope. The names of the companies are retrieved from the Worldscope database (item WC06001).
ALEA GROUP HOLDINGS AXA ASIA PACIFIC ERGO PREVIDENZA
CHAUCER HOLDINGS PLC AXA LEBENSVERSICH ERGO-VERSICHERUNG
21ST CENTURY INS AXA KONZERN AG ERIE FAMILY LIFE INS
ACE LIMITED AXA PORTUGAL SEGUROS ERIE INDEMNITY
AEGON N.V. AXA VERSICHERUNG AG ETHNIKI GREEK INS
AFFIN-ACF HOLDINGS AXIS CAPITAL HLDG EULER HERMES
AFLAC INCORPORATED BALOISE HOLDING AG EVEREST RE GROUP
AFRICAN LIFE BENFIELD GROUP LTD FAIRFAX FIN’L HLDGS
AGEAS SA BRIT INSURANCE HOLD FBD HOLDINGS PLC
ASSURANCES GENERALES CAPITAL ALLIANCE FBL FINANCIAL GROUP
AIOI INSURANCE CASH.LIFE AG FINANCIAL INDUSTRIES
ALFA CORPORATION CATHAY FINANCIAL FINAXA SA
ALLEANZA ASSICUR. CATLIN GROUP LTD FIRST FIRE & MARINE
ALLEGHANY CORP CATTOLICA ASS FONDIARIA - SAI SPA
ALLIANZ SE CESKA POJISTOVNA A.S FOYER S.A.
ALLIANZ LEBENSVERS. CHALLENGER FIN’L SVC FPIC INSURANCE GROUP
ALLSTATE CORPORATION CHESNARA PLC FRIENDS PROVIDENT
ALM BRAND AS CHINA LIFE INSURANCE FUBON FINANCIAL
ALTERRA CAPITAL CHINA TAIPING INSU FUJI FIRE& MARINE INS
AMBAC FINANCIAL CHUBB CORP (THE) GENERALI (SCHWEIZ)
AMERICAN NATIONAL CINCINNATI FINL CORP GENERALI DEUTSCH
AMERICAN PHYSICIANS CLAL INSURANCE ENT GENERALI HOLDING VIE
AMERICAN EQUITY INV CNA FINANCIAL CORP GENWORTH FIN’L, INC.
AMERICAN FIN’L GROUP CNA SURETY CORP GLOBAL INDEMNITY
AMERICAN INT’L GROUP CNO FINANCIAL GRUPO NACIONAL
AMERUS GROUP CO CNP ASSURANCES GRUPO PROFUTURO
AMLIN PLC CODAN A/S GREAT EASTERN HLDGS
AMP LIMITED GROUPE COFACE GREAT WEST LIFECO
ANN & LIFE RE HLDGS COMMERCE GROUP, INC. GRUPO CATALANA
AON PLC MILANO ASSICURAZIONI GREAT AMERICAN FIN’L
ARAB INSURANCE GROUP COX INSURANCE HANNOVER RUECK SE
ARCH CAPITAL GROUP DAI-ICHI LIFE INSU HANOVER INSURANCE
ARGONAUT GROUP, INC. DAIDO LIFE INSURANCE HAREL INSUR INVEST
ARTHUR J GALLAGHER DBV WINTERTHUR HARLEYSVILLE GROUP
ASIA FINANCIAL HLDGS DELPHI FINANCIAL GRP HARTFORD FINL SRVC
ASPEN INSURANCE HOLD DELTA LLOYD LEBENS HCC INS HOLDINGS
ASSICUR GENERALI SPA DONGBU INSURANCE CO. HELVETIA HOLDING
ASSURANT INC DEUTSCHE AERZTEVERS HILB, ROGAL & HOBBS
ASSURED GUARANTY LTD E-L FINANCIAL CORP. HILLTOP HOL
AVIVA PLC EMPLOYERS HOLDINGS HISCOX PLC
AXA SA ENDURANCE SPECIALTY HORACE MANN EDUCATRS
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Table D.2: Sample insurance companies (continued).
HYUNDAI M & F INS. OLD REPUBLIC INTL SWISS RE
INDUSTRIAL ALLIANCE PARTNERRE LTD. TAIWAN LIFE INSURANC
INFINITY PROP & CAS PENN TREATY AMERICAN TAIYO LIFE INSURANCE
ING GROEP N.V. PERMANENT TSB GROUP TOKIO MARINE
INSURANCE AUSTRALIA PHILADELPHIA CORP TONG YANG LIFE INS
INTACT FINANCIAL PHOENIX COMPANIES TOPDANMARK A/S
IPC HOLDINGS, LTD. PHOENIX HOLDINGS TORCHMARK CORP
JARDINE LLOYD PICC PROPERTY TORO ASSICURAZIONI
JEFFERSON-PILOT CORP PING AN INSURANCE TOWER LTD
JOHN HANCOCK FIN SVC PLAT UNDERWRITERS TRANSATLANTIC HLDGS
KANSAS CITY LIFE INS PMA CAPITAL CORP TRAVELERS COS
KEMPER POHJOLA-YHTYMA OYJ TRAVELERS PROPERTY
KINGSWAY FINANCIAL POWER CORP OF CANADA TRYG A/S
KOELNISCHE RUECKVER. POWER FINANCIAL CORP UICI
KOREAN REINSURANCE PREMAFIN FINANZIARIA UNIPOL GRUPPO FIN
LANDAMERICA FINL GRP PRESIDENTIAL LIFE UNIQA INSUR
LEGAL & GEN’L GRP PRINCIPAL FINL GROUP UNITED FIRE
LIBERTY GROUP LTD PROASSURANCE CORP PROVIDENT COMPANIES
LIBERTY HOLDINGS PROGRESSIVE CORP WAADT VERSICHERUNGEN
LIG INSURANCE CO LTD PROMINA GROUP VESTA INSURANCE GRP
LINCOLN NAT’L CORP PROTECTIVE LIFE CORP VIENNA INSURANCE
LOEWS CORPORATION PRUCO LIFE INSURANCE VITTORIA ASSICURAZIO
MAA GROUP PRUDENTIAL PLC W R BERKLEY CORP.
MANULIFE FINANCIAL PRUDENTIAL FINANCIAL WELLINGTON
MAPFRE SA QBE INSURANCE GROUP WESCO FINANCIAL CORP
MARKEL CORP RIUNIONE ADRIATICA WHITE MOUNTAIN INSUR
MARSH & MCLENNAN CO. REINSURANCE GROUP WILLIS GROUP
MBIA INC RENAISSANCERE HLDGS WUERTTEMBERGISCHE LE
MEDIOLANUM RHEINLAND HOLDING XL GROUP PLC
MENORAH MIVTACHIM RLI CORP ZENITH NATIONAL
MERCURY GENERAL CORP RSA INSURANCE GROUP ZURICH INSURANCE
METLIFE INC SAFECO CORPORATION
MIDLAND COMPANY SAFETY INSURANCE GP
MIGDAL INSURAN & FIN SAMPO OYJ
MIIX GROUP, INC SAMSUNG FIRE & MARINE
MNI HOLDINGS BHD SOUTH AFRICAN NAT’L
MONTPELIER RE HLDGS SCHWEIZERISCHE NAT
MONY GROUP INC. SCOR SE
MS& AD INSURANCE SCOTTISH RE GROUP
MUENCHENER SELECTIVE INSURANCE
NATIONAL WESTERN SHIN KONG FINANCIAL
NATIONWIDE FIN’L SKANDIA FORSAKRINGS
NAVIGATORS GROUP INC SOMPO JAPAN INSURANC
NIPPONKOA INS SAINT JAMES’S PLACE
NISSAY DOWA GEN STANCORP FINANCIAL
NISSHIN FIRE/MAR INS STATE AUTO FINANCIAL
NUERNBERGER BET.-AG STOREBRAND ASA
ODYSSEY RE SUL AMERICA SEGUROS
OHIO CASUALTY CORP SUN LIFE FINANCIAL
OLD MUTUAL PLC SWISS LIFE HOLDING
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E.1 Variable definitions and data sources
Table E.1: Variable definitions and data sources.
The table presents variable definitions and data sources for all dependent variables,
bank characteristics, and macroeconomic control variables.
Variable name Variable definition Data source
Dependent variable
∆Demand Change in a bank’s demand deposits per quarter (in percent). FDIC call re-
ports.
∆Time Change in a bank’s time deposits per quarter (in percent). FDIC call re-
ports.
∆Ratio Change in a bank’s ratio of demand deposits to total deposits per quarter
(in percent).
FDIC call re-
ports.
Main variables of interest:
FDIC Sum of the winsorized weekly search volume of the term “FDIC” per
state (in quarter), adjusted for seasonality and scaled by its standard
deviation.
Google Trends.
FEARS Quarterly average of the weekly FEARS-index introduced in Da et al.
(2015).
Google Trends.
Bank characteristics:
Size Natural logarithm of a bank’s total assets at the end of a quarter. FDIC call re-
ports.
Return on assets Net income after taxes and extraordinary items (annualized) as a percent
of average total assets.
FDIC call re-
ports.
Non-interest income Non-interest income divided by total interest income. FDIC call re-
ports.
Net interest margin Total interest income less total interest expense (annualized) as a per-
cent of average earning assets.
FDIC call re-
ports.
Operating Efficiency Non-interest expense, less the amortization expense of intangible assets,
as a percent of the sum of net interest income and non-interest income.
FDIC call re-
ports.
Equity ratio Ratio of a bank’s total equity and total assets. FDIC call re-
ports.
Crisis Dummy variables that takes on the value one if the bank observation is
in Q4 2008 or Q1 2009 (see Oliveira et al., 2014).
Own calc.
Retail deposit ratio Ratio of a bank’s retail deposits and total deposits. FDIC call re-
ports.
Non-performing loans Sum of total assets past due 30-90 days and still accruing interest, total
assets past due 90 or more days and still accruing interest, and total
assets which are no longer accruing interest divided by total assets.
FDIC call re-
ports.
Insured deposits Ratio of a bank’s insured deposits and total deposits. FDIC call re-
ports.
Macroeconomic controls:
GDP growth GDP growth by state per year. U.S. Bureau of
Economic Analy-
sis.
General interest in finance
(GIF)
Quarterly average of the winsorized weekly changes in interest for fi-
nancial topics via Google searches per state, adjusted for seasonality
and scaled by its standard deviation.
Google Trends.
CD rate Average 3-month CD rate per quarter. Federal Reserve
Bank of St.
Louis.
Press releases Number of press releases by the FDIC per quarter. FDIC.
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E.2 Institutional details on the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) was founded in 1933 as a conse-
quence of a series of bank failures during the 1920s. It is designed as a regulation
and monitoring vehicle for banks and thrifts in the United States and is supposed to
strengthen the stability of the financial system by currently insuring over 9 trillion dol-
lars of deposits. The current coverage limit is 250,000 $ per depositor per bank for each
account category (checking and saving accounts, CDs and money market accounts). As
of 2013, over 6,500 institutions are insured via the FDIC. These banks include state-
chartered banks that are not participating in the Federal Reserve System.84 Insured
banks need to fulfill liquidity and reserve requirements and are obliged to send quar-
terly call reports to the FDIC which include data on the banks’ balance sheets.85 Call
reports are published on the FDIC’s wesbite a few months after the reports were sent
in. We obtain the aggregated call reports from the website of the FDIC for the time
period from 2004 to 2013. 86 In our main analyses, we include only banks from states
with sufficient search volume for “FDIC”, which account for approximately 75.8 % of
all demand deposits and 72.2 % of all time deposits (in Q1 2004). All banks with a
minimum of one quarter of data on deposits are included in the sample.
84The deposit insurance system applies to individual banks in a state, and not necesseraliy on the holding
level. Thus, the data set includes several banks with the same company name but in a different state.
85Call reports have to be sent in at latest 30 days after the end of the corresponding quarter.
86Note that we use the reports for all banks of the fifty states and District of Columbia but exclude banks
from Guam, American Samoa, Puerto Rico and Virgin Islands.
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E.3 Further description of the sample
Our sample includes 7,290 of 11,126 FDIC insured banks that reported at least once
from Q1 2004 to Q4 2013. Figure E.1 shows a heat map of the average number of FDIC
insured banks for United States that reported during the given time period (excluding
Alaska and Hawai). Clearly, the states of Illinois and Texas have the highest number of
Figure E.1: Number of banks per state.
The figure shows a heat map of the number of FDIC insured banks in the United States (excluding
the low volume states Alaska and Hawai). A darker shade of grey indicates a higher number of FDIC
insured banks in a state.
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FDIC insured banks in our sample with over 800 and 700 banks reporting per quarter,
respectively. These two states are followed by Minnesota (over 500) and California
(over 450).87 In terms of size, however, we do not have the same distribution. Figure
E.2 shows two heat maps of the United States that indicate the level of demand deposits
and the percentage of all demand deposits in the United States.
87Note that all of the four states are “high-volume states” and are included in our main analyses.
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Figure E.2: Distribution of demand deposits across the United States
The figure shows heat maps of demand deposits across the United States (excluding the low volume
states Alaska and Hawai). A darker area in the upper plot represents a higher value of the sum of all
demand deposits (in million $ US) in a state (average from 2004 to 2013), whereas a darker area in the
lower plot represents a higher percentage of all demand deposits in the United States. From the two
pictures, we can see that California holds by far the largest percentage of all demand deposits (around
20%). The state with the second largest percentage is Minnesota.
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E.4 Further analyses
In Section 6.6, we described the results of additional GMM-sys regressions of changes
in deposits on FDIC, FEARS, and various control variables. Table E.2 shows the results
of these additional analyses.
We control for a general interest in finance (GIF), residuals of a regression of FDIC
on the 3-month CD rate, a state’s GDP growth, and the ratio of a bank’s retail deposits
and total deposits. Also, we exchange the variable FDIC with the number of press
releases by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and include it in our regressions.
During the recent financial crisis, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act was
introduced and contained several programs (e.g., the Troubled Asset Relief Program
“TARP”) to strengthen the stability of the financial system in the United States. When
receiving government support, bank managers could be tempted to change their risk-
taking behavior and thus, possibly creating moral hazard. On the other hand, depositor
behavior could be influenced by possible “too-big-to-fail” perceptions or bailout guar-
antees. As a further analysis, we investigate the impact of the introduction of TARP
on a bank’s changes in deposits. Table E.3 shows the results of (one-step) GMM-sys
regressions that include the dummy variable TARP that is one if a bank or its holding
received government support and zero before Q3 2008 or if the bank did not receive
TARP support. Our additional results suggest that TARP did not affect the changes in
demand deposits but had a statistically significant impact on changes in time deposits.
Also, the interaction term of depositor attention and TARP shows that the introduction
of TARP decreased the interest in the FDIC.
Naturally, we would expect that troubled banks (e.g., banks that hold a higher per-
centage of non-performing loans) are more vulnerable to deposit withdrawals than their
financially healthier counterparts. For the purpose of analyzing the impact of depositor
attention and depositor sentiment on specific subsets of banks, we split our sample of
banks into bottom and top quartiles of the average ratio of non-performing loans and
total assets. Additionally, we investigate differences in changes in deposits for a group
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Table E.2: Additional GMM-sys regressions of changes in deposits.
The table shows the results of the (one-step) GMM-sys estimation of ∆Demand and ∆Time on FDIC and control variables. The dependent
variables are the percental changes in demand deposits and time deposits. The main variable of interest is FDIC which is the Google Search
Volume Index of the phrase “FDIC” from Google Trends, adjusted for seasonality, winsorized at the 5% level, and scaled by its standard
deviation. Additionally, we include the variables General interest in finance (GIF), which is an index obtained from Google Trends indicating
the changes in search interest for finance topics for each state, the residuals of the linear regression of the 3-month cd rate on the FDIC-index,
the GDP growth per state, and the ratio of a bank’s retail deposits to total deposits. Other regressors are defined in Table E.1. All independent
variables are lagged by one quarter and the lagged dependent variable is included in the regressions. We employ double-lagged values of the
dependent variables, FDIC and Net interest margin as instruments. P-values are given in parentheses and *, **, and *** indicate statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Dependent variable: ∆Demand ∆Time
FDIC 0.0012*** 0.0009** 0.0010*** 0.0010*** 0.0004*** 0.0003*** 0.0002** 0.0003***
(0.001) (0.013) (0.006) (0.005) (0.000) (0.001) (0.041) (0.002)
FEARS -1.9364*** -1.9598*** -2.2807*** -2.4203*** -3.1660*** -3.5428*** -3.5288*** -4.1531*** -4.1494*** -2.2557***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GIF -0.0016*** -0.0004***
(0.000) (0.000)
CD rate residual -0.0003 -0.0001
(0.246) (0.285)
Press 0.0255*** 0.0465***
(0.000) (0.000)
GDP growth -0.0003 0.0002
(0.400) (0.121)
Retail deposit ratio -0.4460*** 0.4735***
(0.000) (0.000)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 181,141 176,808 181,141 159,816 181,119 183,409 178,978 183,409 161,724 183,409
Wald 9,450.26 9,085.00 8,513.22 8,035.81 9,662.37 35,714.36 35,550.39 36,683.07 31,334.29 39,849.36
Wald (p-value) < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001
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Table E.3: GMM-sys regressions of changes in deposits (TARP).
The table shows the results of the (one-step) GMM-sys estimation of ∆Demand and ∆Time on FDIC and control variables. The dependent
variables are the quarterly percental changes in demand deposits and time deposits winsorized at the 1% level. The main variable of interest
is FDIC which is the Google Search Volume Index of the phrase “FDIC” from Google Trends, adjusted for seasonality, winsorized at the 5%
level, and scaled by its standard deviation. A dummy variable TARP is included which is one if the bank observation is in Q3 2008 or later
and the bank or its holding has received government support through the TARP program. Other regressors are defined in Appendix E.1. All
independent variables are lagged by one quarter and the lagged dependent variable is included in the regressions. We employ double-lagged
values of the dependent variables, FDIC, and Net interest margin as instruments. P-values are given in parentheses and *, **, and *** indicate
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Dependent variable: ∆Demand ∆Time
FDIC 0.0009*** 0.0009*** 0.0004*** 0.0005***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000)
FEARS -1.9196*** -1.9179*** -3.5658*** -3.5883***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
TARP -0.0218 -0.0246 0.0326*** 0.0751***
(0.437) (0.495) (0.000) (0.000)
FDIC × TARP 0.0001 -0.0023***
(0.957) (0.000)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 181,141 181,141 183,409 183,409
Wald 9,437.07 9,437.08 35,721.72 35,762.33
Wald (p-value) < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001
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of banks with a lower and a higher ratio of insured deposits to total deposits. Intuitively,
we would expect that a bank that has less insured deposits is also more susceptible to
deposit withdrawals, since not all of its deposits are covered by the FDIC. Table E.4
and E.5 show the results of the baseline GMM-sys and logistic panel regressions for
these subsamples.
As our main results, we find that depositor attention to the FDIC has a statistically
significant positive impact on changes in deposits for banks that have lower ratios of
insured deposits to total deposits. For changes in time deposits, we also observe a
positive effect for banks in the top quartile of non-performing loans ratio which is
particlarly interesting, since, although this subsample of banks holds more bad loans
in their portfolio, attention to the FDIC partly prevents depositors from withdrawing
their assets. The variable FEARS is almost always significant with a negative sign of
the coefficient except for changes in time deposits of banks with little non-performing
loans. We conclude that depositor sentiment has different effects on changes in time
deposits for banks with less troubled assets (positive) and those with more (negative).
This result suggests that depositors appear to rationally distinguish between financially
heatlthier banks and banks with a higher proportion of bad loans.
In our main analyses, we focus on the winsorized changes in (absolute) demand and
time deposits as our dependent variables. This approach could be criticized for not
adequately capturing the relevant changes in deposits, since a relative change in ab-
solute deposits has different magnitudes when comparing smaller with larger banks.
As an alternative to relative changes in (absolute) demand deposits, we employ the
changes in a bank’s demand deposit ratios as our dependent variable for additional
panel regressions. Our main variables of interest are, again, depositors’ sentiment and
depositors’ attention to the FDIC. However, demand deposit ratios could also change
simply because a bank’s size is increasing or decreasing while the amount of demand
deposits remains the same. Therefore, we include in these regressions the contempo-
rary changes in a bank’s size as another independent variable. The results for static
and dynamic panel OLS and GMM-sys regressions of changes in demand deposit ra-
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Table E.4: GMM-sys regressions of changes in deposits for banks in quartiles of non-performing loans ratio and insured deposits ratio.
The table shows the results of the (one-step) GMM-sys estimation of ∆Demand and ∆Time on FDIC and control variables. The full sample
is split into the bottom and top quartile of the variables Non-performing loans, which is the sum of total assets past due 30-90 days and still
accruing interest, total assets past due 90 or more days and still accruing interest, and total assets which are no longer accruing interest divided
by total assets, and the ratio of insured deposits to total deposits (the bank sample is split according to their average value of these variables over
the sample period). The dependent variables are the quarterly percental changes in demand deposits and time deposits winsorized at the 1%
level. The main variable of interest is FDIC which is the Google Search Volume Index of the phrase “FDIC” from Google Trends, adjusted for
seasonality, winsorized at the 5% level, and scaled by its standard deviation. Other regressors are defined in Appendix E.1. All independent
variables are lagged by one quarter and the lagged dependent variable is included in the regressions. We employ double-lagged values of the
dependent variables, FDIC, and Net interest margin as instruments. P-values are given in parentheses and *, **, and *** indicate statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Dependent variable: ∆Demand ∆Time
Non-performing loans Insured Non-performing loans Insured
< 25% > 75% < 25% > 75% < 25% > 75% < 25% > 75%
FDIC 0.0013 -0.0002 0.0033*** 0.0005 0.0004 0.0005** 0.0011*** 0.0001
(0.122) (0.748) (0.000) (0.449) (0.199) (0.026) (0.006) (0.290)
FEARS -1.5857*** -0.6443 -2.2356*** -0.9762** 1.8580*** -5.6289*** -4.0613*** -2.6126***
(0.000) (0.175) (0.000) (0.014) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 33,266 49,704 37,789 47,250 33,717 50,486 37,868 49,147
Wald 2,664.24 2,198.28 3,107.08 1,865.36 5,469.87 11,794.93 7,220.76 7,509.19
Wald (p-value) < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001
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Table E.5: Panel logistic regression of large withdrawals and gains in demand deposits for banks in quartiles of non-performing loans ratio and
insured deposits ratio.
The table shows the results of panel logistic regressions on large withdrawals and gains of deposits. The full sample is split into the bottom and
top quartile of the variables Non-performing loans, which is the sum of total assets past due 30-90 days and still accruing interest, total assets
past due 90 or more days and still accruing interest, and total assets which are no longer accruing interest divided by total assets, and the ratio
of insured deposits to total deposits (the bank sample is split according to their average value of these variables over the sample period). The
dependent variables are the dummy variables Run, which takes on the value one if a bank experiences changes in demand deposits below the
20%-quantile of ∆Demand deposits and zero otherwise, and Gain, which is equal to one if the changes in deposits are above the 80%-quantile
and zero otherwise. The main variable of interest is FDIC which is the Google Search Volume Index of the phrase “FDIC” from Google Trends,
adjusted for seasonality, winsorized at the 5% level, and scaled by its standard deviation. Other regressors are defined in Appendix E.1. All
independent variables are lagged by one quarter. P-values are given in parentheses and *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Dependent variable: Run Gain
Non-performing loans Insured Non-performing loans Insured
< 25% > 75% < 25% > 75% < 25% > 75% < 25% > 75%
FDIC -0.0029 -0.0009 0.0005 -0.0038 0.0034 -0.0011 -0.0004 0.0044
(0.391) (0.724) (0.858) (0.162) (0.293) (0.679) (0.876) (0.131)
FEARS 1.6854** -1.8171** 0.5299 0.8159 1.5693** 3.6641*** 3.5315*** 0.4692
(0.047) (0.013) (0.531) (0.262) (0.045) (0.000) (0.000) (0.498)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 33,731 51,978 39,278 48,795 33,901 50,887 39,297 47,921
Likelihood ratio 534.33 909.4 661.62 918.13 1,022.47 1,048.33 1,164.81 1,279.95
Likelihood ratio (p-value) < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001
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tios on FDIC, FEARS, Net interest margin, and changes in a bank’s size are presented
in Table E.6. As in the baseline GMM-sys regressions of changes in demand and time
deposits, we find that depositor attention to the FDIC is positively related to changes
in demand deposit ratios and that depositor sentiment has a strong negative influence.
Interestingly, in our GMM-sys regressions, we find no evidence that these changes in
demand deposit ratios are due to simple changes in a bank’s size.
E.5 Robustness checks
In our main analyses, we winsorized all changes in deposits at the 1% level to remove
extreme outliers in our sample. However, for the changes in time deposits, we see
that there are still extreme changes from 2004 to 2006 that bias the mean changes
in deposits. Therefore, we also run analyses that use changes winsorized at the 5%
and 10% level, which is a more conservative approach. The time evolutions for the
mean changes in demand and time deposits as well as 20%- and 80%-quantiles in each
quarter with winsorization at the 10% level are shown in Figure E.3. The time evolution
of mean changes in demand deposits show an almost identical pattern as in our main
analyses, but only at a lower level. In some quarters, we even have negative mean
changes in deposits. For the evolution of ∆Time, we notice that the extreme outliers
do not bias the mean changes in time deposits with an extreme magnitude anymore.
Also, we see the same time trends as before.
Additionally, we rerun our baseline GMM-sys regressions from Table 6.2 of our
main analyses with the dependent variables ∆Demand and ∆Time winsorized at the
5% and 10% level. The regression results for the 5% winsorized dependent variables
are given in Table E.7.
Overall, the results remain qualitatively unchanged. However, this time we find a
slight significance for depositor attention on changes in demand deposits for medium-
sized banks and for changes in time deposits for small-sized banks. The other impor-
tant inferences are still valid.
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Table E.6: GMM-sys regressions of changes in demand deposit ratios.
The table shows the results of OLS and (one-step) GMM-sys panel regressions of the changes in demand deposit ratios (∆Ratio) on FDIC,
FEARS, changes in bank size, and control variables. The dependent variable is the quarterly percental changes in demand deposit ratios
winsorized at the 1% level. The main variable of interest is FDIC which is the Google Search Volume Index of the phrase “FDIC” from Google
Trends, adjusted for seasonality, winsorized at the 5% level, and scaled by its standard deviation. Other regressors are defined in Appendix
E.1. All independent variables except for ∆Size are lagged by one quarter and the lagged dependent variable is included in the regressions. We
employ double-lagged values of the dependent variables, FDIC, and Net interest margin as well as the lagged values of ∆Size as instruments.
P-values are given in parentheses and *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Dependent variable: ∆Ratio
Estimation: OLS GMM
∆Ratiot−1 -0.1897*** -0.1898*** -0.1897*** -0.1352*** -0.1352*** -0.1352***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
FDICt−1 0.0005*** 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0007** 0.0006** 0.0007**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.039) (0.046) (0.039)
∆Sizet -0.0060** -0.0070*** -0.0070*** -0.0070*** -0.0064 -0.0064 -0.0064
(0.010) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.140) (0.140) (0.140)
Net interest margint−1 -0.0233*** -0.0198*** -0.0198*** -0.0198*** -0.0143*** -0.0142*** -0.0143***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
FEARSt−1 -0.0389*** -0.0326*** -0.0328*** -0.0035 -0.2581*** -0.2576*** -0.2616***
(0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.766) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Crisis omitted omitted
- -
Crisis × FDIC 0.0003 -0.0005
(0.699) (0.671)
FEARS × FDIC 0.0026*** -0.0003
(0.000) (0.804)
Bank-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 187,882 180,834 180,834 180,834 180,834 180,834 180,834
F/Wald 32.39 83.85 81.89 83.85 6,947.11 6,947.28 6,947.11
F/Wald (p-value) < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001
R2 0.0099 0.0463 0.0463 0.0463 - - -
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Table E.7: GMM-sys regressions of changes in deposits (5% winsorization).
The table shows the results of the (one-step) GMM-sys estimation of ∆Demand and ∆Time on FDIC and control variables. The dependent
variables are the quarterly percental changes in demand deposits and time deposits winsorized at the 5% level. The main variable of interest
is FDIC which is the Google Search Volume Index of the phrase “FDIC” from Google Trends, adjusted for seasonality, winsorized at the 5%
level, and scaled by its standard deviation. Other regressors are defined in Appendix E.1. All independent variables are lagged by one quarter
and the lagged dependent variable is included in the regressions. We employ double-lagged values of the dependent variables, FDIC, and Net
interest margin as instruments. P-values are given in parentheses and *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
level, respectively.
Dependent variable: ∆Demand ∆Time
Sample: All Small Medium Large All Small Medium Large
FDIC 0.0006*** 0.0005 0.0005* 0.0005* 0.0003*** 0.0002** 0.0001 0.0002**
(0.000) (0.101) (0.051) (0.090) (0.000) (0.021) (0.107) (0.027)
Net interest margin 0.0013 0.0034 -0.0017 0.0052* 0.0075*** 0.0148*** 0.0028** 0.0048***
(0.518) (0.325) (0.679) (0.056) (0.000) (0.000) (0.041) (0.000)
FEARS -1.7267*** -5.4672*** -13.9715*** 4.3284*** -1.5158*** -4.0040*** -10.8637*** 2.7091***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Size -0.1668*** -0.5473*** -1.2285*** -0.3776*** -0.1558*** -0.4186*** -0.9602*** -0.2393***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ROA -0.0048*** 0.0005 -0.0036*** -0.0062*** -0.0027*** -0.0030*** 0.0013*** 0.0006
(0.000) (0.671) (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.215)
Non-interest income 0.0001 0.0000 0.0004 0.0007** 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001
(0.234) (0.910) (0.240) (0.023) (0.846) (0.976) (0.702) (0.322)
Operating efficiency 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000*** 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000*
(0.167) (0.317) (0.000) (0.724) (0.372) (0.101) (0.524) (0.093)
Equity ratio 1.1107*** 1.0234*** 0.8453*** 0.8961*** 0.5828*** 0.5067*** 0.2045*** 0.3845***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆Depositst−1 -0.1969*** -0.2062*** -0.1981*** -0.1986*** 0.0320*** 0.0072** 0.0260*** 0.0264***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.042) (0.000) (0.000)
Bank-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 181,141 58,093 59,025 59,637 183,409 59,537 59,530 59,924
Wald 17,880.80 8,122.73 6,034.73 5,644.76 37,069.86 15,700.97 10,416.10 9,129.92
Wald (p-value) < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001
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Figure E.3: Time evolution of changes in deposits (10% winsorization).
The figure shows barplots of quarterly changes in demand and time deposits (in percent) for the time
period Q2 2004 to Q4 2013 for FDIC insured banks in high volume states. The top grey bars indicate
the 80%-quantiles of changes in deposits each quarter and the bottom bars indicate the 20%-quantiles of
changes in deposits. The black lines present the mean percental changes in deposits each quarter. Data
on deposit changes are winsorized at the 10% level.
Time evolution of demand deposit changes from Q2 2004 to Q4 2013
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Time evolution of time deposit changes from Q2 2004 to Q4 2013
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Next, we estimate our main model using pooled OLS instead of GMM-sys. We
employ pooled OLS regression without bank fixed effects but with time dummies and
robust standard errors accounting for clustering on the bank level but also on the state
level. The results are shown in Table E.8. For both dependent variables, we still find
a positive relation with FDIC and a negative relation with depositor sentiment. For
demand deposits, however, we only find a statistical significance of FEARS on the 5%
level when using clustered standard errors on the bank level and no state fixed effects.
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Table E.8: Pooled OLS regression.
The table shows the results of OLS regressions of ∆Demand and ∆Time on the
FDIC-index and control variables with clustered standard errors on the bank- and
state-level. Regressors are defined in Appendix E.1. P-values are given in parentheses
and *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively.
Dependent variable: ∆Demand ∆Time
FDIC 0.0007*** 0.0007*** 0.0004*** 0.0004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
FEARS -0.4328** -0.3455* -0.5373*** -0.4406***
(0.017) (0.071) (0.000) (0.000)
Size 0.0080*** 0.0075** 0.0001 -0.0003
(0.007) (0.012) (0.951) (0.766)
ROA -0.0071** -0.0072** -0.0117*** -0.0116***
(0.034) (0.027) (0.000) (0.000)
Non-interest income -0.0002*** -0.0002*** 0.0000 0.0000
(0.004) (0.003) (0.290) (0.274)
Net interest margin -0.0098*** -0.0096*** 0.0054*** 0.0054***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Efficiency ratio 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000* 0.0000*
(0.328) (0.330) (0.078) (0.078)
Equity ratio 0.9423*** 0.9417*** 0.5801*** 0.5821***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆Depositst−1 -0.1041*** -0.1048*** 0.0490*** 0.0488***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Bank-fixed effects No No No No
Time-dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-fixed effects No Yes No Yes
Cluster level Bank State Bank State
Observations 181,141 181,141 183,409 183,409
R2 0.0464 0.0472 0.1351 0.1362
Accounting for clusters on the state level and also using state-fixed effects in the OLS
specification yields only 10% statistical significance. Qualitatively, we find no changes
for our main variables of interest.
As another robustness check, we reestimate our panel logistic regressions with bank-
and time-fixed effects using a different definition for the binary dependent variables
Run and Gain. For the baseline models, we report the regression results in Table E.9.
It seems that in these extreme cases of large withdrawals, depositor attention does not
play a role in mitigating the likelihood of large withdrawals. For large gains, however,
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Table E.9: Panel logistic regression of large withdrawals and gains in demand deposits (other definitions).
The table shows the results of panel logistic regressions on large withdrawals and gains of deposits. The dependent variables are the dummy
variables Run, which takes on the value one if a bank experiences changes in demand deposits below the 5%-, 10%-, or 15%-quantile of
∆Demand deposits and zero otherwise, and Gain, which is equal to one if the changes in deposits are above the 85%-, 90%-, or 95%-quantile
and zero otherwise. The main variable of interest is FDIC which is the Google Search Volume Index of the phrase “FDIC” from Google Trends,
adjusted for seasonality, winsorized at the 5% level, and scaled by its standard deviation. Other regressors are defined in Appendix E.1. All
independent variables are lagged by one quarter. P-values are given in parentheses and *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Dependent variable: Run Gain
5% 10% 15% 85% 90% 95%
FDIC 0.0021 0.0018 -0.0013 0.0042*** 0.0054*** 0.0074***
(0.388) (0.321) (0.376) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005)
FEARS 1.3982* 1.1897** 0.7607* 1.2680*** 0.8618* 0.5553
(0.058) (0.026) (0.085) (0.002) (0.077) (0.422)
Size 0.4650*** 0.5590*** 0.6013*** -0.8457*** -0.9387*** -0.9759***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 110,662 155,687 177,335 172,522 152,057 109,020
Likelihood ratio 843.33 1,836.31 2,622.31 4,078.79 3,779.83 3,021.42
Likelihood ratio (p-value) < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001
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we find a positive relation of FDIC and the probability of large gains in demand de-
posits. Again, we find a slightly significant influence of depositor sentiment on the
likelihood of large gains in demand deposits, but also a modest significant influence on
the probability of extremely large withdrawals by depositors.
Our results for depositor attention and its influence on changes in deposits could be
biased due to the way we aggregate the weekly data to obtain quarterly values. There-
fore, we also estimate our baseline GMM-sys regressions using the mean of the weekly
values in a quarter for the FDIC-index. Also, we employ two additional measures of
depositor attention that differ only in the way we aggregate the weekly FDIC-index
to create the quarterly index. The results of these additional analyses can be found in
Table E.10. From Table E.10 we see that our inferences do not change significantly
(the main difference is that the coefficients of the FDIC-index show more statistical
significance for small and medium-sized banks). The logit panel regressions reveal
that depositor attention, again, slightly decreases the likelihood of extreme demand
deposit withdrawals. While the maximum value of depositor attention and the max-
imum difference of the FDIC-index do not have enough predictive power to explain
large withdrawals, we find that these two are statistically significant factors that in-
crease the likelihood of large gains in deposits. This is interesting, since it shows that
single peaks in depositor attention (instead of constant attention on a higher level) may
also have influence on extreme movements in demand deposits. Similar to our findings
in the main analysis, we observe that higher sentiment actually increases the chances
of extreme gains in demand deposits.
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Table E.10: GMM-sys regressions of changes in deposits (mean FDIC).
The table shows the results of the (one-step) GMM-sys estimation of ∆Demand and ∆Time on FDIC and control variables. The dependent
variables are the quarterly percental changes in demand deposits and time deposits winsorized at the 1% level. The main variable of interest
is FDICmean which is the Google Search Volume Index of the phrase “FDIC” from Google Trends, adjusted for seasonality, winsorized at
the 5% level, and scaled by its standard deviation. FDICmean is the quarterly average of the weekly values. Other regressors are defined in
Appendix E.1. All independent variables are lagged by one quarter and the lagged dependent variable is included in the regressions. We employ
double-lagged values of the dependent variables, FDIC, and Net interest margin as instruments. P-values are given in parentheses and *, **,
and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Dependent variable: ∆Demand ∆Time
Sample: All Small Medium Large All Small Medium Large
FDICmean 0.0196*** 0.0130 0.0082 0.0290*** 0.0097*** 0.0082*** 0.0039** 0.0092***
(0.000) (0.126) (0.262) (0.001) (0.000) (0.005) (0.023) (0.000)
FEARS -1.8002*** -6.8534*** -13.5036*** 6.1170*** -3.3502*** -8.4900*** -14.1289*** 4.2161***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obervations 180,704 58,074 58,986 59,271 182,972 59,518 59,491 59,558
Wald 9,749.20 4,319.04 3,014.85 3,041.49 35,471.61 19,356.44 6,837.22 5,533.19
Wald (p-value) < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001
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Table E.11: Panel logistic regression of large withdrawals and gains in demand deposits (other FDIC).
The table shows the results of panel logistic regressions on large withdrawals and gains of deposits. The dependent variables are the dummy
variables Run, which takes on the value one if a bank experiences changes in demand deposits below the 20%-quantile of ∆Demand deposits and
zero otherwise, and Gain, which is equal to one if the changes in deposits are above the 80%-quantile and zero otherwise. The main variables
of interest are variations of the FDIC-index which is the Google Search Volume Index of the phrase “FDIC” from Google Trends, adjusted for
seasonality, winsorized at the 5% level, and scaled by its standard deviation. The columns with “Max” and “Mean” indicate that the maximum
and the mean value of FDIC in a quarter is used to aggregate the weekly values of FDIC. The FDIC variable in “Diff” is the maximum of
the weekly differences in the weekly FDIC-index. Other regressors are defined in Appendix E.1. All independent variables are lagged by one
quarter. P-values are given in parentheses and *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Dependent variable: Run Gain
Max Mean Diff Max Mean Diff
FDIC -0.0117 -0.0578*** 0.1000 0.0313*** 0.0339* 0.3731**
(0.298) (0.001) (0.489) (0.007) (0.056) (0.011)
FEARS 0.2792 0.0740 0.3491 1.6105*** 1.6077*** 1.4868***
(0.462) (0.847) (0.353) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 185,566 185,566 185,566 183,581 183,581 183,581
Likelihood ratio 3,321.23 3,331.01 3,320.63 4,511.83 4,508.24 4,510.99
Likelihood ratio (p-value) < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001
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E.6 Heckman two-stage selection procedure
One concern with our inference is that we restrict our data sample to banks that are in
a high-volume state (where we find sufficient search volume for “FDIC” with Google
Trends). Although our sample covers over 70% of all deposits in the United States,
we investigate the impact of this non-random sample selection to mitigate concerns of
a possible selection bias. To do so, we estimate Heckman two-stage selection models
(see Heckman, 1979) in which the selection dummy is one if a bank is located in
a high-volume state (and thus, is included in our sample), and zero otherwise. We
use the first lag of the changes in deposits, bank fundamentals lagged by one quarter,
time dummies, a state’s GDP growth, and its population density as regressors in the
selection model. The estimates for changes in demand deposits and changes in time
deposits are shown in Table E.12. The estimates for the selection model suggest that
banks in a state with a higher population density are more likely to be included in our
sample. Interestingly, a state’s GDP growth is negatively correlated with the selection
variable high-volume dummy. Most importantly, the estimates for the Inverse Mills
Ratio are not statistically significant on convential levels. Thus, we conclude that non-
random sample attrition is not a problem in our analyses.
E.6. HECKMAN TWO-STAGE SELECTION PROCEDURE 211
Table E.12: Heckman two-stage selection model.
The table shows the results of a Heckman two-stage procedure. The selection dummy
is one if a bank is located in a high-volume state and zero otherwise. All explanatory
variables are lagged by one quarter. The regressors are defined in Appendix E.1.
P-values are given in parentheses and *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Dependent variable: ∆Demand ∆Time
FDIC 0.0008** 0.0008***
(0.027) (0.000)
FEARS 6.7658*** 5.5123***
(0.000) (0.000)
Other controls Yes Yes
Time-dummies Yes Yes
Selection variable: High-volume dummy High-volume dummy
GDP growth -0.0109*** -0.0110***
(0.000) (0.000)
Population density 0.0085*** 0.0086***
(0.000) (0.000)
Size -0.0998*** -0.0970***
(0.000) (0.000)
ROA -0.0340*** -0.0276***
(0.000) (0.000)
Non-interest income 0.0095*** -0.0002*
(0.000) (0.071)
Equity ratio -0.9309*** -1.0766***
(0.000) (0.000)
Operating efficiency 0.0000* 0.0000*
(0.050) (0.057)
∆Depositst−1 0.0245*** 0.3013***
(0.001) (0.000)
Inverse Mills ratio (lambda) 0.0047 -0.0030
(0.435) (0.231)
Observations 148,402 151,387
Wald 5,014.29 21,621.2
Wald (p-value) < 0.001 < 0.001
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